Abstract
The idea of a preliminary commons – a sphere of common property prior to private
property – is present in Kant’s philosophy of right where, with his theory of natural law, he
first makes a move towards a still underdeveloped kind of ‘objective idealism’. But he
cannot transform the idea of a preliminary commons into a theory of right that legitimates
social institutions or a sphere of positive law because he soon turns back to the subjective
idealism of his previous work in which he takes the world to be a transcendental
construction of human subjects. Kant’s anthropocentrism and the highlighting of private
property are a direct consequence of this subjective transcendentalism. Kant’s return to
subjective idealism also makes it impossible for him to conceive a theory of right based on
‘serviceable stewardship’ and ‘responsibility’ rather than on private property. My claim is
that in order to pass from a discourse of possession to one of responsibility it is necessary to
emphasize and enlarge his theory of natural law which, I argue, tends towards ‘objective
idealism’. Such idealism takes ‘objective reason’ to be manifesting itself in the world in an
almost Hegelian way – and it is not confined to the subjective consciousness of humans.
Things in the world can then be endowed with intrinsic rights. It is a further claim of this
paper that a consequent theory of the commons needs this transcendental complement
endowing things with intrinsic rights. Alternative positions like naturalism or subjective
idealism place objects in a domain ‘beyond right’ condemning nonhuman beings to
become merely potential private property. A remodelling of Kantianism would constitute
the main layer of a renewed humanism based on an enlarged idea of community and a
corresponding idea of responsibility for Being.
Original language | American English |
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Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | Etica e Politica / Ethics & Politics |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 29 Nov 2018 |