In this thesis, a critique of modern humanism’s concept of man is articulated with a special interest into the way in which meaning is produced. Modern humanism’s concept of man and the implied values of autonomy, human dignity and individual responsibility constitute much of the values of current societies. Martin Heidegger opposes modern humanism’s concept of man. According to his Sein und Zeit, not man’s subjective rationality constitutes human existence and the way in which meaning is produced but man’s spatial relation with/in the world. Peter Sloterdijk’s trilogy Sphären builds upon Heidegger’s understanding of existential spatiality.
Bringing Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world and Sloterdijk’s concept of being-in-spheres into an interplay with each other and with modern humanism’s concept of man, this thesis comprises an enquiry into existential spatiality and contributes to a reconceptualisation of modern humanism’s concept of man. The research is conducted with a critical, comparative, theoretical, philosophical methodology, meaning that the presuppositions of modern humanism’s concept of man are critically examined through a critical comparative conceptual study of Heidegger’s and Sloterdijk’s understanding of existential spatiality.
The study shows that modern humanism’s concept of man comprises a rational self which constitutes the center and origin of meaning. Humans ought to act autonomously and are principally different to (other) animals. Heidegger’s understanding of existential spatiality critiques modern humanism’s concept of man by rejecting the primacy of understanding the human as a rational entity because meaning is predominantly produced in the relationship with the environment which is, furthermore, mediated by moods and other humans. However, as will be argued in this thesis, Heidegger does not critique humanism’s concept of man regarding the ideal of autonomy and the principal moral difference to animals. Sloterdijk’s understanding of existential spatiality critiques modern humanism’s concept of man by denying that the human exists individually because human subjectivity depends on co-subjectivity i.e. on the inhabitation of socially shared spaces. Furthermore, the human is not able to be completely autonomously, since moods and technique co-create the human. However, as will be argued in this thesis, Sloterdijk does not critique humanism’s concept of man regarding the self as the center and origin of meaning and the principal difference to animals.
| Datum prijs | 1 jan. 2019 |
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| Originele taal | American English |
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| Begeleider | J. Duyndam (Supervisor) & M. Schreurs (Supervisor) |
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