Enframing Reality

Master thesis

Critical Organization and Intervention Studies

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Anyone who listens to a Walkman while sitting in a subway or jogging through the park is straddling two worlds. Traveling and jogging are Apollonian activities; listening to music is Dionysian. (Safranski 2002, p. 101)

Prologue

Since I was young, I have always known an intense curiosity for technology, and especially computers. This curiosity however, did not seem to be a "healthy interest" at all times; I have also felt the powerful traction which seemed to draw me out of boring real life and into this semi-magical world, with its seemingly own ontological ground and rules, to the point that I would forget "real life" existed at all. Technology is interesting and exciting; we live in a time where the nerd is actually attractive. This attractiveness has everything to do with the semi-magical world that technology offers us access to. People who are better able to "connect", for instance, are people who have better access to opportunities and knowledge of far away places, and who are, per definition, more successful. We look down on people who do not have access to education (either in disgust or pity), since they clearly do not have the same means to "connect" to a bigger world as we do.

However true this might be, most of us do not even know how the sending of e-mail works. To be sure, we know *how* to send an e-mail, but the actual transmission occurs "somewhere" and "somehow". The further we advance into the technological world, the more we realize that technology is a big black box. I dare to claim that most people, who are so capable of using and implementing all forms of technology, do not know the exact relationship between the "real" and concrete world on the one hand *and* the digital rendering of that world on the other. This thesis is an investigation into that relationship, which is so aptly called *enframing* by Martin Heidegger.

This thesis can be seen as an exploration of "computer language", not from a technical point of view, but from a human existential point of view. Enframing is a concept which not only refers to a certain frame within which "magical reality occurs", but also refers to our own continual efforts to strengthen our presence *within* that frame. In other words, we strive to be part of the frame, because the magic within the frame of the technological world seems so much more meaningful than the boring world of our past. In this thesis, we will see that this *enframing* is not without its problems.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Modernity and Technological Functionality

In today's society, we are confronted with modernity in every corner of our more or less globalized civilization. Some refer to our time as *post*-modern, which signifies a time after modernity, yet harbors this reference to a modern era. What is this *modernity* people speak of? Is it some age which is given to us because of the natural development of time or is it some sort of concept of fashion? For example, the renaissance is the era following the middle ages. But the renaissance is not called the post-medieval time; it is called re-naissance, though it also refers to a rebirth of some older time. Of course, historically, the renaissance is an era which comes after (*post*) the middle ages. Yet, modernity and post-modernity seem to take a different direction because post-modernity does not have a new name for a new time. Modernity is perhaps the epoch where we finally came to some clos-ing point in history, because even in our description of times after modernity, we still refer to modernity. To understand better why modernity is such a distinct time, it becomes es-sential to analyze one of the greatest events of modernity. It might not surprise the reader that one of the greatest events of our time would be World War II. What is so interesting about World War II is the fact that, during the Nazi regime, (as Heidegger says) *everything* 'functioned' (Heidegger 1966, p.10). This means that not only machines functioned, but a human's primary task was to function through the organization of the system. "Everything functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more functioning, and tech-nology tears people away and uproots them from the earth more and more. […] We don't need an atom bomb at all; the uprooting of human beings is already taking place. Moder-nity seems to be a time in which we only have purely technological conditions left. It is no longer an earth on which human beings live today." (Heidegger 1966, p. 10) This quote by Heidegger refers to the root of the problem of modernity. The problem is that everything is expected to function in terms of a technological framework. As the core of our modern and technological era, Heidegger calls this structuring *enframing* (Das Gestell). So, as a German citizen during the Nazi regime, you were expected to help the great nation to win the war: you were called upon to be a tool in the name of the greater national socialist system. We all know what the consequences of this uprooting were. So, the reason why we cannot escape the designation "modern" is because we cannot escape the function of enframing in our time: we are not able to escape *functioning* as main frame. Thus, when we

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speak about modernity, we speak about a frame of functions as the main frame.

The utmost astonishing fact about World War II is that there were people who apparently "just" accepted this regime and fell in line with its way of thinking. In other words, what is astonishing is that people let themselves be used – (en)framed – primarily as instruments in such an extreme and far-reaching way. Although this technological frame might be the essence of our modern time, it cannot explain how people were "convinced" to act so blindly. Perhaps the fastest answer to this question is that people are always eager to gain power and that the road to gaining power during the Nazi regime was very clear cut.

Of course, this "ethical blindness" is not something everyone shares. Even (or especially?) at one of the most well-known and influential technological companies of our time, Google, there exist a different voice. Damon Horowitz, director of Engineering at Google, also has a Ph. D. in philosophy. He illustrates how uncanny our technological era actually is: "We have stronger opinions about our handheld devices than about the moral framework we should use to guide our decisions." (article at Venturebeat.com) He further argues that, "Technologists need a "moral operating system". In this thesis we will find that the main reason for Horowitz's need for a moral operating system resembles Heidegger's redefinition of thinking almost completely. Horowitz argues, following thinkers like Hannah Arendt, "that most of the evil in the world comes not from bad intentions, but rather from "not thinking." (idem). Yet, one cannot argue that technologists do not think, at least not when following the traditional definition of rational and structured (enframing) thinking. The main problem, according to Horowitz, is a problem of power: "That [thinking about the ethical nature of your decisions, KP] is the first step towards taking responsibility towards what we should do with all of our power," Horowitz said, later adding, "We have so much power today. It is up to us to figure out what to do." (idem).

Another influential figure in philosophy and technological thinking, Douglas R. Hofstadter, writes about "Thinking in a new Perspective" (Hofstadter 1985, p. 390). His meaning of this new thinking however, focuses heavily on (artificial) intelligence and scientific analysis. Although I would not like to get trapped in the rhetoric about this definition of thinking here, it seems to exist in contrast to Heidegger's and Horowitz's definition of thinking, which is, at the least, remarkable. This contrast, which seems unbridgeable at times, is what makes the question concerning how we enframe our world *and* how our world is enframed, rather urgent, especially on account of the extreme speed of our scientific and technological progress.

1.2 The Problem of Our Time: Enframing

So far we have seen that modernity is heavily defined by the act of enframing. Its epitome, perhaps, can be found in World War II, when people were seen as instruments to purify the earth, in order to achieve a cleaner and more divine humanity. We currently live in a time we generally consider more developed and better than any time before us, yet we have many global problems we cannot solve technologically. The technological world view and its presuppositions seem to lack solutions for human problems. Still humans try to solve mostly everything in a technological way. What do we need to understand this paradox more deeply and correctly? First of all we need to understand what the poser of this problem, Heidegger, actually means by technological enframing. Secondly, Heidegger seems to believe "only a god can save us now". It seems reasonable then to analyze the views of a religious thinker, who is, next to being religious, generally called the *father of existentialism* and was one of the main "educators" of Heidegger, Kierkegaard. I will analyze Kierkegaard's religious-existentialist writing to find out whether or not he has an answer to Heidegger's call for a god. By moving away from metaphysics (and Kierkegaard) towards original philosophy (as Heidegger would say), it might be that Heidegger's God has been present all along in Kierkegaard's writing. Next to this, Kierkegaard's main work *(Either/Or)* seems to be the prelude to a digital era: a world in which the only answers are *either* 1 (on) *or* 0 (off). Thirdly, it would be interesting to see whether Heidegger was indeed the first to pose the problem of technological enframing. Is he the one we should look to for the original answer to his own question? According to Nietzsche, this is not the case at all. "An unlimited will to knowledge poses a grave threat. This is a fact only a few have understood." (Nietzsche 1980, VII.2:181). This quote already points to the threat of the "will to knowledge", which is nothing other than a technological will to enframe reality. An analysis of Nietzsche therefore, shall add a further dimension. From a meta-point of view moreover, there are also reasons to bridge Kierkegaard and Heidegger by means of Nietzsche's philosophy. I will go into these arguments after the main question of this thesis (in meta-question) has been posed.

Furthermore, I would like to pose the question of how enframing works today. We obviously live in a digitalized world, in which networking continues to gain importance. This networking is often done via the internet. A number of social media communities (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+, to name a few) are widely popular today. Yet, should we speak of *communities* in this digital sense? Does technological enframing provide us with new ways of relating to one another? Or could we say that enframing detach-

es us from the world around us in favor of an imaginary world far away, on the Internet?

> **Main problem**
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> The main concern addressed in this thesis is about how we could come to a better understanding of the problem of enframing, which Heidegger articulated as the essential determinant of modernity, by researching the perspective of early-existential thinkers Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

A lot has been written about Heidegger, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and their relationship. Gregory B Smith explains Nietzsche's and Heidegger's writings in terms of a transition from modernism to post-modernism. One of his questions is whether modernity is unending or whether there truly is a movement towards post-modernity (Smith 1996, p. 282). Perhaps post-modernity is something theoretical, while modernity (praxis) will always be characterized by enframing, thoughtless (in Heidegger's and Horowitz's definition) tendencies. In that case, theory might not have a very concrete influence in the practical realm.

One of the most essential questions about the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche is raised in the book "The will to technology and the culture of nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche and Marx" by Arthur Kroker. He puts it very aptly when he says, "No longer coded by the language of polarities, is it possible that today art and technology reveal traces of a more ancient relationship, traces of the broken spiral of techne and poiesis the absence of which haunted the writing of Nietzsche and Heidegger […]. Against the will to technology, which is increasingly hygienic, art introduces a counter-praxis of smeared images, smudged bodies, and contaminated optics […]. As poiesis, art literally overexposes the always hidden language of power." (Kroker 2004, p. 157). The Heideggerian concepts of poiesis and techne will be explained in this thesis. The question remains however, whether or not art is subject to the same hidden language of power. If art and technology are "no longer coded by the language of polarities", how can it be so that these polarities (for instance "art" versus "science") still seem to have such a power in our current age? I believe that Kierkegaard's concept of repentance as well as Nietzsche's "eternal suspicion" can shed light on enframing in a new and essential way. It is my goal to let the trinity of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger reveal a part of the "ancient" essence of the relationship between technology and art and thus why we, in our current age, are not at all that developed and progressed as we believe.

1.3 Meta-question

An important part of any writing, in my view, is the meta-question. *Meta* traditionally means "after" or "behind". In the sense of a meta-question, I therefore ask the question behind the question: what kind of change can a writing (like this one) intend to achieve? In other words, what does a philosophical exploration about the problem of technology in modernity *change* in our real, daily use or view of technology? According to Heidegger, the answer to this question will be: nothing or almost nothing. "Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the world." Yet, a sentence later he continues, "This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human meditations and endeavors. Only a god can still save us." (Heidegger 1966, p. 11) Of course, we saw the extreme results of technological instrumentality in World War II. Yet, apparently, Heidegger feels that human beings cannot even solve their own problems themselves. For Heidegger, where there are only human beings, nihilism is in charge. But, do we really need a god in order to be saved? It seems like a very pessimistic approach to the problem of technological enframing. As the interviewer from Der Spiegel justly told Heidegger, "We understand that very well. But […] we are denied silence. We, politicians, semi-politicians, citizens, journalists, etcetera; we constantly have to make some sort of decision or other. We must adapt ourselves to the system under which we live, must try to change it, must watch for the narrow door to reform and for the still narrower door to revolution. We expect help from the philosopher, even if, of course, only indirect help, help in roundabout ways." (Heidegger 1966, p. 13) This tension between a constant need to make decisions and the inability to change something in reality with those decisions, is clearly expressed by Kierkegaard in his concept of *Either/Or*. One of the important differences between Kierkegaard and Heidegger seems to be that Kierkegaard is primarily a religious (Christian) writer, while Heidegger intends to break with "former" metaphysical thinking(and thus also traditional religious thinking, it would seem). To form a bridge between Kierkegaard's (metaphysical) thinking and Heidegger's, Nietzsche is central. First of all, Nietzsche is also very suspicious about metaphysical and religious thinking, so we might be led to believe that Nietzsche and Heidegger are in agreement on the subject of metaphysics. Yet, as it appears, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is not very flattering either. This is why Nietzsche can be seen as a core figure between Kierkegaard's metaphysical thinking and Heidegger's existential thinking. By using Nietzsche as the bridge between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, I intend to make the nuances of their thinking as clear as possible. Also, I intend to make clear the demarcation between a *metaphysical* and *modern*

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(technological) era.

So let us look at our society in our modern era. We are people who are always connected to each other by means of (1) technological innovation. We live in a time where there are significant doubts about (2) the ecological sustainability of our planet. Next to this there is the problem of (3) terrorism and, perhaps the most telling, the problem of the (4) financial crisis. Without reducing all these problems (including (1), the problem of unchecked technological innovation) to a single root, I would argue that (as a general statement) the role of technological advancement in all these cases is very evident. Heidegger would summarize this advancement as the problem of *technological enframing* or the *technological construct*. Saying this, technological enframing is not a problem of Nazism, nor is it a problem of technological connectedness, ecological sustainability, terrorism or the financial crisis. Rather, the problem of technological enframing is a problem of modernity *as such*; when we talk about modernity, we talk about technology. Technology is fundamental in our experience of the world in our modern time, "The experience that humans are structured [*enframed,* KP], claimed, and challenged by a power that is revealed in the essence of technology." (Heidegger 1966, p. 11).

1.4 Structure of this Thesis

This thesis has been built around three fragments. In the first part I will analyze Kierkegaard's thinking, as expressed in his magnus opus *Either/Or*. Kierkegaard divided his book into two parts, written using different pseudonyms. The first part of the book is written by A and focuses heavily on an aesthetic analysis of a metaphysical world view. This metaphysical world view returns in my analysis of A's various concepts. Choice, music, desire, tragedy and repentance are aesthetic-metaphysical concepts which capture Kierkegaard's early existential mood. Enframing permeates these concepts as the source of a constant tragic conflict between an *either* and an *or*. What this means is that people are always forced to choose for the better of two options, which is tragic because it is a choice which is demanded, instead of authentically made. The second part of *Either/Or is* written by B, who heavily criticizes A's tragic and contemplative view on life. B argues for (religious) acceptance of the conflict of life, yet he also adds something very important to the concept of enframing, namely a concept called repentance. The conclusion of the first part will analyze this addendum.

The second part of this thesis is the bridge between Kierkegaard and Heidegger

using Nietzsche. Nietzsche, the final metaphysician, is important because of his extreme suspicion of philosophy and religion alike. In this second part, we find a critique and interpretation of metaphysics in contrast to an artistic interpretation. Kierkegaard's view on music is mainly a metaphysical contemplation, while Nietzsche's idea of music and the arts could play an important role in society, since it returns something to life which religion always denied. Just as Kierkegaard adds something to the concept of enframing, Nietzsche adds something to metaphysics, through which the entirety of the metaphysical system is turned upside down. In this way, Nietzsche revives a long lost life force inside thinking, which eventually leads to a deepening of the concept of enframing.

I will analyze Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche in the final part of this thesis, after which I will reveal Heidegger's own concept of enframing, which he discovered because of his research on *truth* (alètheia). This redefining of truth (as an aesthetic concept) appears to be an alternative to scientific enframing.

Conclusively, I will add Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's contributions to achieve a more complete understanding of the concept of enframing. This new concept of enframing shows its face in science as well as the arts. Finally, I will explore whether enframing is inescapable or whether our modern world offers us any alternatives to a perspective of (ecological) sustainability. In short, technology would demand unlimited resources from our ecological environment, but perhaps there are alternatives.

2. Immense Aesthetics

As I explained in the introduction, Kierkegaard's main work *Either/Or* is divided into two parts. In this chapter, I will interpret the first part of Kierkegaard's book, which is his aesthetic philosophy. The aesthetic concepts he uses originate from a metaphysical world view, in which the world is a cruel place. This cruelty comes from the demanding *Either/Or* life, where according to A, there is always a demand for *either* this *or* that. This demand for *either* this *or* that, I feel, is the way in which enframing works; it does not leave us a real choice, because actually, a forced choice is no choice at all. This chapter will explore the relationship between the *Either/Or* choice and enframing more clearly, before continuing with an analysis of the second (ethical) part of Kierkegaard's work.

2.1 The Eternal Conflict of Choice

Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* signifies an always present, internal conflict of life. Often, life demands a choice from us, for *either* this *or* that. This demand is omni-present in such a way that, most of the time, we do not realize we are making choices at all. Kierkegaard believes it is necessary to be contemplative and suspicious about this constant demand to choose. This contemplation however, does not come easy, since eventually we will still not be able to escape making *Either/Or* choices. Life forces us to choose, according to A, and this is essentially tragic because there is no way to escape it. Human beings are thus only able to relate to enframing in a tragic and inescapable way, A would say.

Everything A does and everything he ever wants originate from his idea of beauty. For him, the most beautiful moments in life are always accompanied by death, since they necessarily end (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 28). Paradoxes like this (death and beauty) are always present. He even claims contradictions are necessary to achieve a certain goal. Because of this, A writes purposefully in a very convoluted and conflicted way. He feels a world view should speak for itself, rather than try to convince people (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 21) and since he believes life is conflicted, he also writes down his world view in a conflicting way. He will do everything to show us life is tragic and conflicted as a fact of nature. This inner conflict of life is why we laugh: we tend to laugh when we feel life's deep contradictions; laughing is a form of grieving over our conflicts (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 29). We should even love our grief, since it, at least, cannot be taken from us: That which we grieve about, is deeply our own (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 30, 43). Grief is something which cannot be "fixed", since it is heavily dependent on our individuality. It enhances our feeling of individuality and is therefore a healthy thing, a desirable feeling. Through this first exploration of Kierkegaard's aesthetic side, we notice his early existentialism: his understanding of life is much more a *mood* than it is a rational exploration of life.

But what is this conflicting mood about? What do we grieve for, exactly? Primarily, we grieve because we often cannot understand the relationship between causes and consequences. Reasons are conflicting, because we cannot find the difference between what the cause is and what the consequence of a certain action or occurrence (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33). One can doubt which comes first, the perceived reason or the perceived consequence. A is suspicious of reasons for another reason. If you have a reason to do something, you have nothing to win: You already "have" and thus own the reason, so

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why would you do anything? That is why A considers it better to do something without clear reason, to leave something left to win, which of course can never happen, since if it would happen, there would be nothing to win again: A's life seems a constant failing which he constantly grieves (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 42). Our grief concerning this failing is an essential experience of life and should not be turned away from.

Contrary to grieving stands reflection as an effort of the mind to achieve clarity about what is cause and effect. Reflection is an unnatural activity according to A, since it takes the *mind* as principle instead of *nature* as it appears. When we reflect, we refrain from commanding nature with the very power of our will. Reflection turns our courage to doubt (Did I do the right thing?) and disables us to fight for anything new. The ultimate aim of reflection is to be deceived by the delight of the world and thus to deny other possibilities of being: reflection is meant to reinforce our own opinion about the world, without there being any objectivity to it. For the sake of possibilities, we should have the courage to doubt and fight, but not the courage to reflectively know and own (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 30, 32, 50). Knowledge, coming from reflection, tries to own and control. Through its controlling, it tries to convince us that desires are not as important as knowledge itself. Knowledge is thus the enemy of desire and of individuality, since knowledge tries to own that which it knows about. The essence of the individual however, is that it cannot be owned. To become individuals we should be a riddle to ourselves so we will not get bored with ourselves. Boredom is excruciating and all consuming: It enslaves us by revealing to us how absurd our quest for knowledge actually is (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33, 35 , 38, 46). Mediation is therefore a mistake, since true eternity lies before *either/or* and not beyond in a mediation between the either and the or. Mediation forces you to choose in a certain way, while an acceptance of the *either/or* can only happen through grief. Even boredom is a result of mediation, of an irreversible choice. A knows that if he makes a choice, he will eventually repent the choice he made, whichever he makes. He therefore hides from any kind of repentance and choosing, since both actions limit him in his sense of freedom. He tells us he never starts with anything and even when he stops doing something, he does not quite stop, since he already stopped the moment he begun. It is impossibly hard for him to begin anew, because this implies a breach in his desire and therefore in his being. Here again he chooses for obscurity and paradox (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 48).

So we see that true eternity lies before the choice of *Either/Or* and not in it; hence A's inability to choose. He cannot choose since choosing would mean breaking with his old

self and committing himself to something new. Later we will see that this is the main difference between A and B. B would agree with A in the sense that true eternity lies before the *Either/Or*. However, for A this is not a given of reality "to be suffered", but rather the *Either/Or* has to be chosen. Only in choosing the *Either/Or* in all its implications can we choose ourselves and become a center, instead of hiding in the shadows of the periphery. This, however, is B's perspective, which I will analyze in the next chapter.

A's perspective on the individual is hence not an individual who values a center. The "individual" is rather a setting out, always a displacing for the sake of staying unknown. He displaces himself by denying himself history: memory is something painful, because remembering means something passed, something died. Therefore memory is always falsely romanticized and love is nothing more than this false romanticizing of the past. In time and life, memory does not have any real function (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 41). Though, at another point he tells us we should live backwards. We should live in our memories since it is impossible to know the future. We should, again, choose to grieve our false romances by experiencing the chasm between our romantizations of our past and the cold truth of our present. This is what it means to live in the *Either/Or*: a constant grief for the contradictory nature of life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33).

Luckily we have another balm for our grievous soul. A would be a nihilist if only he did not value his intellectual brilliance like he does. A's power lies in the autonomy of his intellect, in his grasp of the conflict of the enframing of *Either/Or*. His intellect is a machine, though, which cannot rest. Therefore he has no patience to live: he is always saturated because of the quickness of his intellectual grasp, yet he is always hungry for more (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33). At the same time, he tries to escape the machine in his head: being in a hurry – mentally as well as physically – is ridiculous, as if there were any progress. A attempts to live life in the most profound sense, but because his attempts to live are so profound, he never quite achieves *living* life. This immediate knowledge makes his actions obscure. Sleeping is an activity of geniuses, he claims: there he is safe from himself, his self is obscured. In sleep, images of life come to him through dreams. He enjoys these representations and images, in theater as well as life. In this sense he is, what I would call, one of the old aesthetics: Those who dwell on art as a representation of nature. The modern artists, as we will see in the concluding chapter of chapter four, do no such thing. Yet, A seems to diagnose the lack of his aesthetics: images of eternal beauty lie in a pathological disinterest in whatever is concrete. This is also his diagnose of metaphysics: the entire metaphysical system of *imaging forth* a more profound reality happens because

reality itself does not satisfy us. It has been philosophy's task to sell us these profound ideas. Over the years, philosophers have been nothing more than the sale people of metaphysics, paraphrasing Kierkegaard. I would argue that therefore the main function of philosophy is capitalistic in nature; to entice us with beautiful and interesting stories about the *true* nature of reality. So, again, it is better to sleep (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 37, 41).

Summarizing, we noticed how both A and B locate the eternal true choice before the *Either/Or.* This means that the forward slash signifies the representation of life as *Either/Or*, but that it is only possible to find anything true if we accept the eternal conflict of this *Either/Or* itself. For A however, this does not come easy. He holds on to his creative individuality; he necessarily grieves this inner conflict of life: the conflict of choice.

2.2 Representation and Imagery: the Importance of the Opera

So, as we saw, A feels that human beings are only able to relate to the enframing of the *Either/Or* choice in a tragic sense. Yet, he is also looking for a way to cope with this tragedy. His way of coping with it is by means of representation and imagery. The opera especially, as a complex representation of life, is an eternal bliss to human kind according to A, because the opera combines music with language. Music resembles the *Either/Or*: both have their own totality. Music cannot be analyzed in parts without destroying the music, while the *Either/Or* cannot be understood by analyzing its specific choices. Music represents the totality of the *Either/Or*. Language, as an addition to music, clarifies this totality for the viewers of the opera. Through the opera, we will be able to experience (internally) *and* clarify (externally) the *Either/Or*.

In our sleep and dreams, we encounter the obscurity of life. Life can never be truly known in a scientific way, since science will never be able to enlighten life's innermost obscurity. Rather, the ultimate result of life is a mood, a hue (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 37). Through this hue, the obscure becomes perceivable, without actually becoming any less obscure. The revelation of mood as primary instead of (for instance) reason, is one of Kierkegaard's early existential findings, which Heidegger will found much more elaborately when he talks about enframing (Gestell), which I will analyze in the third part of this thesis. The obscurity of the primary mood seems to be something A suffers from: it heavies his soul. His aestheticism is heavily determined by a religious metaphysics: life is a constant unsolvable conflict and that is why A has to suffer. This might be one of the reasons why A enjoys representation and imagery in theater so much: It immunizes him, however temporarily, against the fear for the obscure in his own soul by providing an image of life where life is better than the real life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 40). Later we will see that, according to Nietzsche, the essence of metaphysics lies in the following: metaphysicians turn away from life in resentment and create a powerful transcending image which makes life durable for weaker people. The durability of the metaphysical image is *because* of the inability to live with life as it is, according to me. A's metaphysical aesthetics lie in this movement as well. He enjoys creating, which is defined as forcing occurrences to his hand and mind. He revels when his goal is achieved, since that means he is right in his metaphysics. This kind of thinking I would like to call *enframing:* goal oriented thinking in terms of *praxis*, a practical value which is always located *outside* of the discourse where thinking occurs. For instance, A thinks about transcendent goals in real life (like art,

music and love), while most of his thinking is actually characterized by his own grief. He analyzes his grief as a mood, yet expects his mood to have a forcing implication in the outside world (in love, art and music). The enframing aspect of this thinking, in other words, lies in the fact that he mistakes an *existential mood* for a *determination of reality*. It is *reality* which is conflicting and obscure and A feels a victim, while he is actually as much part of the "problem" as reality is. Basically, this immanent relation of a subject with its reality, is what Heidegger will later call Being (*Dasein*), a concept which I will analyze in part three of this writing. The source of Kierkegaard's aesthetics however, seems to lie in the fact that he does not see his relation to the world as mediating, but as creating or forcing (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 45).

So where is A's immunization against the tragic life located, exactly? This immunization lies in the concept of immortality. Mozart achieved true immortality, according to A, because of his creation of Don Juan. The essence of this immortality, is that *Don Juan*'s beauty does not lie outside of time as *immortal*, but rather inside time (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 58, 61). Immortality as a victory over time cannot exist, since then it would only exist in the either *or* the or. In other words, if Don Juan would transcend time, it would be too good to be true, it would be a choice for *one side* of existence, while excluding another. Rather, immortality lies *before* the demanding question of the either/or, which is why immortality can only be achieved by an abstract piece of music. In abstraction, music is embedded in its time, because an abstract work of art can never be reproduced at a later point in time (and is hence immortal), while concrete things can be copied. So, immortality is measured by the likelihood (the unlikeliness) of the replication of art. The idea of beauty will be expressed most perfectly in a work of art that cannot be reproduced. It is original and no one who is not Mozart will be able to copy it. In abstraction, a certain clarity can be achieved, a clarity which will withstand the test of time. A work which is very concrete will not survive for very long, because of the conflicting nature of life. The clarity of the abstract lies in the unity of content and idea. In a concrete work, the content and the idea will be ruthlessly divided, which leads to confusion and obscurity. Life already offers enough confusion and obscurity and art needs to reveal that fact by uniting content and idea, paraphrasing Kierkegaard.

It seems that the most abstract work of art is located furthest away from language, since language is bound to words, while music can be free from language. The importance of music seems to be a tendency in certain philosophy (see Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, among others). Music is the most essential expression of art for these

philosophers, because of its perfect unity between the idea and its expressing form; there is no difference between the two in music. In other words, music has its own particular flow of time, contrary to the more concrete arts, which can only be known through "the time of the clock". These concrete arts are therefore closely related to the time they're constructed in. For this reason writers (for instance) can be brilliant in an epic sense, yet they are never able to create something immortal, since they express, through language, an historical idea. Music, however, cannot be analyzed in parts of history, without destroying the complete idea it attempts to express. Music is abstract, unlikely to be reproduced, immediate and therefore the immortal expression of the idea of a *sensible genius*. Because of this, music immunizes us against the destructive chaos of life like no other form of art. Time claims its place as the absolute in music, through which we relate to being. This concept (without the importance of music though) influenced Heidegger, who describes Being in terms of time, hence the title of his magnus opus, *Being and Time*.

The question soon becomes how language and the mind relate to music as art. A argues that the essence of human beings in our time is mind and the essence of language is thought. However, A writes about music, he does not make music. So, A admits he is an outsider when he analyzes music (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 72). Nevertheless, because of some sort of mood or image he has about music, he hopes he is still able to express something fundamental about it in language. According to A, language is the essence of the idea which shows itself in thought. What A 's interpretation of language actually implies, is that language is not something instrumental, but rather an expression of an idea (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 73). A practical example of this is the act of reading. When you read a book, you do not read separate letters. If you see every particular letter when you are reading, you can be sure you will not be able to get to the meaning of a text. Likewise, what should be heard escapes the sensible constantly. We hear through our ears, but not with our ears. Ears cannot hear as such, since they are not able to give meaning to what is heard. Meaning gets constructed within thought and therefore music is a language as well.

Continuing, A argues that language is limited by music on all sides. Music is that which expresses itself in an immediate sense (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 76). Language cannot do this, since it is determined in reflection and always mediates. Music cannot be defined by language because of this immediateness. Surprisingly, A sees this inability of music to mediate as a lack of music. Music lacks because it necessarily leaves something essential unsaid, it keeps essences hidden and vague. This is also why an opera like *Don Juan* is more worthwhile than a "mere" piece of music; the opera gives the room for meaningful

discourse *about* a piece of music, while joining it with the immediate immortality: the opera (and Don Juan specifically) is the ultimate form in sensible sense and mind and therefore the ultimate representation of how life is enframed.

So, we have seen that the inner conflict of life (the urgent call to choose between the either and the or) is something against which we need to immunize ourselves from time to time. This immunization occurs as metaphysics, as an image or representation of life, through which life becomes bearable. The best representation to achieve this immunization is through music, since music has its own flow of time; one cannot capture music in minutes, nor analyze a piece of music by cutting it into parts. In this way, music provides an obscure experience about the inner conflict of life, while temporarily removing us from the conflict of life. This temporary standing aside as observers, is what makes Mozart's *Don Juan* brilliant. Yet, however much A claims it chooses for the entirety of the *Either/Or*, the metaphysical aspect of this movement remains problematic, because, through this metaphysics, life is judged to be innately conflicted by someone who claims to have that power. However much this might actually be true, we cannot escape the notion that it is not *only* life which is innately conflicted. When we silence our understanding of life in order to find relief in metaphysical music, we act out of resentment against life, as Nietzsche would show us. Kierkegaard's music becomes an escapist notion because of the unifying (and therefore metaphysical) tendency of the idea of music. We will analyze music further in part two of this thesis, after we have analyzed Nietzsche's take on it.

2.3 False Desire

Previously I explored how the opera (as a representation of the enframing *Either/Or*) is the eternal form of art according to A, because it lets us experience the tragedy of life as an image, while using language to clarify that same tragedy. Contrary to the opera though, is base desire. Desire forces us to choose the *either* or the *or* without actually knowing what it is that we desire. We simply feel that one choice is more desirable than the other, without actually knowing why. This is exactly what A feels that the *Either/Or* is about – and – what I would call succumbing to enframing; the enframing effect of the *Either/Or* is a demand for the illusionary choice, and the reasons for choosing are simply the groundless reasons of our dreams and far-fetched hopes.

In his description about the first of the immediate erotic stages, A shows us a difference between owning something and desiring something (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 81). He asks himself what the difference is between owning something (which you already have) and desiring something (which you do not yet have). He claims that the object of our desire is already owned by us in representation. So, the object of our desire is never located outside of us: we always already have what we want. The representation of the object of our desire is already owned by us, since there cannot be a relationship between us and that object in any other way than through representation. In other words, we have a conception of what we want: we know exactly what we want. In this sense, knowing is owning. When we incorporate this idea of desiring as owning, how can we ever want something again without realizing we already have it? This idea is thus a very grievous insight, which leads to a sort of quiescence when A talks about the erotic. It is a paradoxical view on desire which twists the standardized experience of desire, namely as some lack which needs to be filled. Everything which we desire, we already have, we already own. Desire effectively comes to a halt by this movement, it becomes light en silent, it escapes the desired object. In short, I would argue that desire becomes contemplative of an object which strictly speaking is not an object but an semi-object, simply because there is no such thing as the object we desire, but only our mental representation of it. The distance between desire and its object increases, it becomes a relationship between desire and its "sigh": the sigh of our realization that we already own it. In A's writing there is already a knowing and having, about the paradoxical insight that the object of desire is not at all the object of desire.

In summary, the idea of desire has an illusionary character (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 84). One expects to change when one gets what one wants, to gain something *more* and *new*. This is however never true, since one already owns what one wants. In A's perspective, desiring anything would be an illusion, a dream.

2.4 True Desire

So far, we explored desire as dreaming, which is the illusion that we do not yet have what we want and that it would be so much better to own what we desire. Desire as dreaming is false desire, because of the illusionary character of the choice for the *either* or the *or*; the tragic demand for a choice cannot be breached by choosing. However, contrary to desire as dreaming, true desire is aesthetic desire. Aesthetic desire is the desire which occurs when we visit the opera and actually reside in the experience of the conflict of the *Either/Or,* without choosing for one or the other. The aesthetic desire is fueled by our awe at the obscure musical and clear conceptual revelation of the *Either/Or.*

One might expect this to end the discussion of desire. Yet, desire can take another form, which is very much unlike the one we just analyzed. According to A, there is something like "desire in its final phase". This final phase of desire, according to A, is desire's definition *as principle*, which unites desire and its object in the sensible genius (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 90). Desire as dreaming fundamentally silences any form of desire one might have (as we saw in the previous chapter), yet with the coming to pass of desire in its final stage, *conviction* appears. We noticed before that the musical genius is ultimately found in Mozart's Don Juan, which leaves behind all passion, speculation and reasoning about the true character of aesthetic value. The true character of the aesthetic value has been found in Don Juan, because it inspires awe like nothing else. This awe leads to an eternal conviction of the true character of the *Either/Or* and, hence, to true desire for its representation in the opera.

To put the question concerning desire in historical perspective, A analyzes the Greek era and the middle ages (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 93). The middle ages are the period of representation, according to A, because of dominating ideas of the *scholar*, the *priest* and the *layman*. These separate ideas are dominating for the essence of the middle ages. Their essence lies in the fact that they are indifferent toward and excluded from each other: the priest does not want anything to do with the lay man (in terms of contact or relation), the scholar wants nothing from the priest. This order of representation is a horizontal representation, rather than a vertical one. A argues that these three concepts are in existence simultaneously, without actually interfering with each other. Here we see the essence of the religious conviction of A: he believes these categories are given. Nietzsche however, as we will see in part two, claims there is no such thing as horizontality,

even in the middle ages: It is the priest's sole purpose to keep the lay men in check. Yet, according to A, the individual idea of the priest stands next to the individual idea of the scholar, who stands next to the individual idea of the lay man. Even the king belongs to this horizontal realm of individual representation. The idea of representation cannot be found in the ancient Greek era, since the Greeks have *only* individuality and no representation, according to A This is shown by the fact that Eros was never in love, although he was the god of love. There exists no love in Eros, since in the Greek era, only *individuals* are in love. They do not have a representation of the erotic female and thus no conception of monogamy. Eros is the god who makes love possible, who enables individuals to be in love. Yet, he is never in love himself, unlike the Christian God, who loves us all equal.

But, what does this division of love mean? In the Western world, Christianity and the Middle Ages provide the idea of representation, which was absent in the Greek era. This representation makes it possible for us to love an idea, rather than only an individual. Paradoxically, the birth of *representation as such* occurs by the exclusion of desire by the mind in the middle ages. Desire becomes something one should be reflective and mindful (literally) about with the Christians, according to A. This means that desire is excluded as primary experience of love from the sensible and thrown into the realm of the mind: one should first love the idea, God. When listening to *Don Juan* for instance, the mind should not be "autonomous", as that signifies reflection and reflection is Don Juan's demise (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 95). Reflection, as aesthetic indifference, already excludes the sensible: reflection does not care about art. It stops the music. It is reflection that aims to take power away from the sensible experience by rationalizing, categorizing and excluding the experience of the qualitative highest work of art – namely the opera – as "just another" work of art. Reflection necessarily chooses inside the *Either/Or*, either a divine or an earthly thing, in a metaphysics of aesthetics. A's interpretation of *Either/Or* makes the reflective choice between the two either monstrous or unforgiving: choosing the wrong one means a consenting of power to rational reflection – means exclusion from true art, forever. A's choice for Don Juan is thus very significant: for him the positing of the sensible as principle in the Christian middle ages is necessarily the epitome of the aesthetic experience in the unity of desire and its object.

So, we saw that desire can effectuate itself as desire as the metaphor of dreaming, which is no true desire after all. True desire, in A's opinion, is aesthetic desire. This aesthetic desire takes the sensible as principle, which means that the sensible becomes an idea, a

concept of thought, as well as a concept which overflows thought, because of its genius musical composition. It is this principle which we find in the opera and which urges us to awe; we are immediately in awe when we experience the unity of music and language in the opera. Our awe at this unity makes the opera immortal; Don Juan as epitome of the opera astounds anyone with a sense of aesthetics. Seen existentially, we recognize an important aspect we will also find in Heidegger, we recognize our own (however limited) understanding of this surpassing experience through language. In other words, existence is defined as something we experience on the one hand – the movement from the musical toward us, and on the other hand our understanding of that experience – the movement from us toward something surpassing *our experience of this music* in the world.

2.5 Tragedy and Repentance

Previously we explored the difference between going along with the demand of the *Either/Or,* which A would call succumbing to false desire. And, we saw how true desire is a desire for the revelation of the *Either/Or* in its enframing effects, in its working. This enframing is tragic though, according to A, because we realize that we cannot escape its demand in day to day life. A's possible answer to this tragedy is re-pentance: the ability to repent for our sins of succumbing to false desire for the *either* or the *or.* But, according to A, repentance primarily requires reflection, and reflection, in turn, is the death of tragedy. Reflection attempts to sweet-talk the tragic and to use it to our advantage. Thus, eventually, reflection and repentance are both examples of false desire for A: the desire to choose the *either* or the *or.*

The tragic should not be understood in an ethical way, according to A, since ethics emphasizes the notion of guilt in a tremendously unforgiving way (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 143). Ethics makes the individual responsible and guilty for its actions, to an extent that it could kill the individual's autonomy with its powerful blaming gaze. The destruction of the individual by guilt is hence nothing tragic or evil; it is rather simply a bad thing: a misunderstanding. The softness of an aesthetic view on tragedy shows how an individual's acts hovers in-between acting and suffering, between agency and an occurring, between either and or. When an act is reflected upon and reflected upon in an ethical way, the individual *choice* and solution of the either/or becomes more prominent. Yet, actually, this choice should never lie between the either and the or. The choice should be *before* the either/or, in favor of the tragic of the either/or, instead of the choice between either the guilty or the not guilty. This choice in favor of tragic signifies *sadness*, in aesthetic terms. Sadness is preferable to ethic guilt, because it opens up an experience of being: it opens up a mood instead of a judgment in terms of either/or.

When reflection in a tragic case is very prevalent, there will be an absence of aesthetic ambiguity in its meaning, according to A. One cannot reflect and keep the aesthetic tragedy alive (at least not without music). For Kierkegaard, a new way of dealing with tragedy is the reflective way of *repentance,* which is, unsurprisingly, an attempt of synthesis of the either/or. Repentance shows its face when we actively think about suffering and consider how the tragic should be averted or prevented in the future. It searches for solutions where it should not search for solutions, for instance in church, in novels or in ethical philosophies (K1 161/148). Repentance is part of the dictionary of the

manager: "Why is this happening? Is there no other way?" (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 150). A more aesthetic approach would not yet decide that the occurrences should be improved. It would rather hover in-between guilt and innocence as a fundamental experience of our being. It is the objective of art to show this fundamental – yet fragmented – experience. For A, art is required to leave something behind, a legacy. This legacy, requires something more than this fundamental experience of being though. It requires a form of reflection we have not mentioned before (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 153). So apparently there are two different kinds of reflection, or rather, two different directions our reflection can take.

Reflection in the ethical sense consists of our ability to move out and search for something further away from ourselves. It leads to us forgetting ourselves in favor of principles of understanding. It represses our anxiety in order to immunize ourselves against that which can immediately affect us. Another kind of reflection – the aesthetic one – would be a reflection to the inside, to face our anxiety instead of hiding from it. We call this reflection an aesthetic one, because it is not fast, it does not provide direct solutions, but is rather a reflection of becoming (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 155). Anxiety is hence not a psychological condition, but it is the ground tone of being, according to A. Anxiety searches for sadness and desires it, because of its power to stand before the either/or, without attempting to hide from it. I said before that the demise of the individual cannot be something sad or evil, it is merely something bad in the sense that it is destructive. Facing anxiety, the individual never risks demise. What is destroyed is rather a small world, a small stage, an either/or. But the stage is not the outside, it is a showing of the inside before the mind. This is what aesthetic reflection is and why it is so immensely more valuable than an ethical repenting.

In summary, it appears that aesthetics win over ethics, at least in A's perspective. Aesthetics seriously deal with the inherent tragedy of our lives, not by escaping it, but by facing it and allowing ourselves to be influenced by the tragic. Reflection, on the other hand, is something ethical, since it is aimed at how things *should* be. In this sense, ethics are life denying and resenting of our existence. The opera, especially, allows us to experience the tragic and deal with it. However, one might argue that there is still some ethical realm inside A's concept of the aesthetic, because the suspicion arises that the opera is an image of how life should be, namely the tragic division between the principle of the sensible and the idea of the mind (thus, our understanding of the sensible). A's undoubted victory lies in his exploration of existence as a mood, a hue. Yet, he also defines this mood as inherently tragic. One cannot escape the impression that Kierkegaard, while writing using

A's name, was *already* under the impression that aesthetics would eventually fail in dealing with reality.

3. Mundane Ethics

In the previous chapter, I explored how the aesthetic Kierkegaard, writing as A, interprets life as a continual choosing between *this* or *that*. This continual and unending choosing is something which we cannot escape and is therefore tragic. The tragedy resides in the fact that choosing is never enough; another choice is always implied in the first one. Only a true desire to see the enframing – the effectuating – of the *Either/Or* itself, by means of the opera, might give us any eternal understanding of life. In this chapter, I will interpret B's – ethical – answer to the aesthetic approach of the first chapter. The ethical B is disgusted by A's aesthetic focus on the tragic nature of life. Although B accepts the *Either/Or* and its demand on us, he reveals the demanding choice as that which makes life worthwhile instead of tragic. Eventually, B shows us that life is about choosing for the enframing of the *Either/Or,* because this enframing is the only way we can escape the tragic mood which accompanies an aesthetic approach. This choice happens by means of repentance, a concept A so despised.

3.1 "Heaven" and "earth"

As we saw, A viewed repentance as part of enframing, since it requires reflection. Reflection is an enframing act, since it reasons out which of the choices is the best. Therefore repentance is aimed at providing a solution – a choice – between the *Either/Or,* which originates in the false desire to remove the *Either/Or.* B's critique to this vision is that it is deliberately tragic; A's vision is not an "objective" investigation of life, but a metaphysical inclination toward the tragic as higher ideal, as if all this tragic hardship makes you a better person. The ethical choice B proposes is a choice for the self *as part of* the *Either/Or.* This choice chooses the fact that all choices will appear in the form of *Either/Or,* yet it is not silenced by the tragedy of it, but uses its enframing to choose a simple, yet meaningful, life on earth.

The division of the book in its two parts is remarkable. It forces us to ask a few questions, before we start to see exactly what the content of the reply is. One question is why Kierkegaard chose this division instead of simply explaining to us what these two essential parts contain. Why does he "become" a different author in both parts? And: What does this division have to do with the title of the book? Does he expect us to choose sides here? And last but not least: Why did he write the aesthetic part of A before B? Why is B a reply to A instead of vice versa? To answer these questions, we should find out what his answer to A's aesthetics is.

B describes A's conflicted philosophy as an interpretation of majorly important occurrences in A's life, which essentially always boil down to a choice between truth, justice and holiness on the one hand and lusts, inclinations and dark passions on the other hand. His main critique on A is unexpected: B is critical about the important and intense occurrences in A's life and rather focuses on choices in lesser important moments of his life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 155). Contrary to those forces, which tend to pull a person between boredom, anxiety, beauty and the erotic, B reveals A's habitat as one of aesthetic loneliness because of a fear of everything that is near him. In other words, A lives in distant and intense concepts because of his fear for a choice for his own, simpler life. Simplicity is something which is very scary for A.

B claims, as we saw, that these conflicted forces can actually never be separated. It is his personality which is created by the powerful tension between these two "sides". B warns A and urges him to end his passionate and destructive fight, which tries to kill

everything meaningful, because it only hardens his soul (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 158). It is surprising to read how B attempts to prevent A from "hardening" or immunization, while A himself wrote about the dangers of this immunization in ethics. However, these types of immunization are definitely different. We saw before that A does not want to become immune in the sense that he flees from whatever suffering is in his soul. Moments of anxiety and suffering are precious to him. B however finds these tendencies destructive. His concept, which I call "immunizing", has to do with creating an aversion for small things, for things near and close in reach. A seems to be not at all interested in this nearness. B's rhetoric however, is not one of reasonable debate, also because he realizes it is not in his power to win through reason from an aesthetic who appears to be so well educated. Rather, he claims a different logos, which is surprisingly an aesthetic and sensible one: his head reels from all the intensities in A's writings, he cannot endure it (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 158). Yet, to think that B's response would be aesthetic, would be a conclusion drawn too soon.

There is only one project in a person's life, B says, namely to win one's self. A's thought experiments are basically nothing more than a twisting around in the grasp of what he perceives as life: the tragic. To win one's self, one has to make a fundamental choice, which is not a choice for an abstraction like the Platonic Ideas, nor for a principle like sensibility, but a much simpler and easier choice in many ways, namely the choice for one's personality in its inner infinity. This choice is in another way immensely more complex though, because it is – in fact – a choice, unlike the aesthetics. One cannot choose to experience something tragic or to be astounded: the aesthetic just happens and can therefore never be a choice. This is perhaps why A is not really an aesthetic: the tragic in his philosophy is his metaphysical attitude. The ethical choice B proposes is a choice of personal transfiguration, with a certain degree of mental seriousness towards one's own life and its nearness. What then is the meaning of the either/or in this context? It appears not to be a choice between good and evil, but rather a locus of meaning. The importance of the either/or – and B's endeavor – is to make the either/or meaningful for A He who lives aesthetically, does not live, does not choose. He merely tries to juggle balls, to endure himself in his conflictedness and to hide the truth of his own essential indifference for himself. This is what B calls desperation (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 188).

It is surprising that B, in his understanding of A, seems to make sense of him in a non-analytical way. We saw before that A does not think highly of mediation. Neither does A seem to be heavily focused on the future, since he tells us that true eternity lies before

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either/or and not beyond in a mediation between the either and the or. However, B claims that A is mediating anyway, when he describes how B is concerned with how art is given meaning by past developments during the Greek and Medieval-Christian eras. Furthermore, B blames philosophy in general for this dive into the past: it is a philosophy which ended world history itself by culminating in tragedy and seeing no possible future anymore (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 167). The end of philosophy, or at least metaphysics, seems to be a powerful force in Kierkegaard's thought.

3.2 Hysteria and Despair

Thus making choices is not a problem for B, the way it is for A: the choice for one's self can be a light choice, since one cannot be anyone else. It is not the opera which gives meaning to life, but rather meaning lies in daily and normal activities, meaning lies in the choice for the *Either/Or* as an active agent in life. B diagnoses A's heavy tragic mood as hysteria of the mind, which sacrifices the individual to tragic forces of nature. In other words, A knows he exists in a discourse of enframing, he is pulled in two directions *(Either/Or)* all the time. Hence, his solution is despair. He despairs in resentment, because he does not have another choice, a third choice. B, however, despairs because he chooses the desperate outside world absolutely, while remaining at the stable center in contrast.

Metaphysical philosophy has always been searching for an infinite category, independent of time and culture. In this regard, philosophy blinds itself for the either/or. It focuses on history and the historical process and does not want to know about what is happening now or what will be. It lacks because of its foundation of grief within the nature of the world: the world is no good as it is and we should find ways to immunize ourselves against the tragedy of time. Ethics however, takes time into consideration, according to B, and one's becoming into his own time. B basically returns freedom to philosophy through his discourse of choice. Reality is choosing and in making a choice the I receives itself and therefore comes back into itself (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 173). When I spoke about choice as being easy, I meant that choice is in fact a very light something: it is not heavied by the storms of lust in B's perspective. The storm of lusts, as we noticed in A's thinking, appears to be something nihilistic: it is the effort to purely create something, since there is actually nothing of value to be found in local life. Only the *true* opera's give meaning to life. But what about one's daily activities and work? Can work be meaningful at all? According to B, this is definitely the case.

A's heaviness is actually seen as hysteria of the mind by B (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 184). He sees this hysteria as the only true sin, since it prohibits the individual to will with inner strength: it sacrifices the individual to the tragic forces of nature. Later, we will investigate how this hysteria of the mind correlates with the concept of nihilism according to Nietzsche, which also seems to prevent people from willing with inner strength. According to B, the reason for this hysteria of the mind is the original sin of Christendom. Here we meet Kierkegaard's religious conviction. The original sin is deeply ours, because no one can

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become truly transparent for himself: we are never without metaphysical opinions (about God), which is why we sin, since our knowledge is limited. The primacy of the will over the knowing subject, is what makes our soul heavy and is why we suffer.

Now, there appear to be two distinct ways of dealing with the hysteria as a reaction to the original sin. It is no surprise that these two ways are the aesthetic and the ethic. The aesthetic way of dealing with hysteria is actually no way of dealing with it at all; A's aesthetic is an aesthetic of despair. Despair is the essential element of the aesthetic life, according to B; it is the tempting beauty of it, because of its essence in a mood instead of in choosing the enframing process of *Either/Or*. In other words, the personality of the aesthetic A is immediate; it is there, on the surface of his intelligence. That is at least where it appears, because in itself the aesthetic is always conflicted. It lacks the force of direction of the self which the ethical choice provides in contrast. The aesthetic is fed up with the finite and strives only for the infinite (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 195). However much this infinite is located in time, as A argues, it still strives for a fleeing abstraction, it flees from life here, at this moment. The ethic also experiences the fear for its finite being, but its answer to it is different. The ethical answer to the fact of finitude and to the original sin, is not an answer of desperation and deceit, but an answer of choice and religion. Despair, as mood of life, is something with which the ethic and the aesthetic have to deal. The difference in answering is quite simple: the ethical choice is a choice for the self, a choice which enables the self to inhabit itself again, even though the outside is turbulent. The aesthetic is led by the outside, the ethic by the inside. The aesthetic however does not make the clear choice for despair, while the ethic does. The ethic chooses despair, but, because of this active choice, despair is transformed. Despair can only be despair when there is a lack of choice, when it is something passively undergone. So, in the ethical choice, the self is at home.

3.3 A Revitalization of Religious Repentance

We explored how the ethical choice for the *Either/Or*, according to B, is the absolute choice for the self. This absolute choice is the choice not to flee into any abstract thinking of far-away ideas and ideals, but instead choose whatever is nearby, practically, it is the choice (the eternal "yes") for the frame of the *Either/Or*. Yet, we might ask how we can choose such a stable and absolute choice, while we so often experience the failing of the outside world. B's ability to choose this failing world exists because he knows we will always be wrong – in the face of God, at least. This means that opinions and truths only go as far as the social realm. When we feel we know how the world works, metaphysically, we cannot be anything else than wrong. By means of repentance for this wrong doing, we will be able to have the strength to choose our life without resentment.

How is the self-secured by an ethical choice? The self is secured through the positing of a truth through choice. But this truth had to be posited already for it to be chosen, according to B If it was not posited already, it could not be chosen. In this sense, it is possible to choose the absolute (namely God) and still not to choose absolutely. This truth is the essential fact of the original sin, which is the projecting of all our opinions unto God. The original sin is a fact of life, yet the aesthetic cannot deal with this fact, it keeps bugging him: A finds no way to deal with it in a rightful manner. B found the answer, according to himself, in repentance. Repentance, which A sees as life denying because it invalidates art, is something B deems necessary for an authentic choice, because it is an act which "throws an individual back unto himself." When I repent my fundamental choice for myself, I am destined to work with my closest environment, instead of living in the bubble called metaphysics. Repentance allows me to grasp myself and live in myself, to endure the original sin and to give direction to the imperfection of life. The ethics of choice in light of repentance is lacking, contrary to the abundance of the aesthetic, and necessarily so.

Choice demands from me the ability to live with "just" that which is closest to me. This, on the other hand, is also what provides the self with a concrete richness instead of the thought experiments the aesthetic is so fond of. Repentance is based on choice and is the essential and only true choice for the either/or, according to B This choice is namely not a choice for either good or evil. It is a choice for good/evil and hence a confession of the good as well as the evil inside one's self. Repentance is therefore the choice. It is part

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of the insight that choice also signifies the evil inside me. This is what I mean when I speak of the relative differential of aesthetics – the differential between what could be and what could not be – and the absolute differential of ethics – the inside of the world which has *being* as its fundamental characteristic. It seems that the ethical choice requires a lot more courage than the apparent trivial choices of the aesthetic, because it requires a vision of what is good in the most daily activities (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 216, 217). Even more demanding, the ethical choice requires one to want to live in the general, the public and the universal instead of in the special, the differentiated and the particular. It requires the courage to live in the center and not in the aesthetic periphery, to acquire a *total*-mood, to acquire *being*, which is continuous and time dependent.

Repentance, as we saw, is necessary for our freedom, since it enables us to live in peace with the evil inside us. Now, what is this evil? For B, this evil is nothing less than the original sin: our "truths" about the absolute (God, metaphysics). Because of this, repentance is also a testimony for our love for God and symbolizes the death of Christ for our sins. It enables us to go on again and not dwell on our original sin, while at the same time not diminishing the importance of the original sin. Kierkegaard's (B's) perspective on the Greeks is interesting in this regards, also considering the development of existentialism from Kierkegaard to Heidegger later on. According to B, the Greek way of life fell short since they had no conception of the individual *as principle*. The individual could only choose itself in abstractum (all individuals were alike in being individuals, so to say, in Greek citizenship), so its achieved perfection was just as abstract (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 230). This is why repentance is necessary: it brings the individual in a concrete relationship with himself. The ethical choice is a choice toward clarity, a choice for the Apollonian, as we will see in the next chapter. To answer his own call for clarity, Kierkegaard explains his idea of repentance with the idea that we are always already *wrong* in the face of God. This means that when we wish to be right at all times, we enter in a finite relationship with the world, since our wish always to be right will always need more proof: it is never enough to be right *this* time. On the other hand, when we wish to be in the wrong at all times when facing God, we actually enter in an infinite constructive relationship with the divine. This relationship is infinite because the choice includes every occurrence: in the face of God we are *always* wrong. When we choose to repent and be wrong in the face of God, B says, A will finally know peace as well. Next to that, this choice is constructive, because only the infinite wrongness in the face of God encompasses continuity: it does not risk destruction because of an occurrence, but builds on

occurrences which all proof a person's relationship towards God (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 327).

To summarize, B's main critique towards A is that A is never at peace. He is always searching for meaning and justification of his world view. He finds this justification eventually in aesthetics and the opera especially. A attempts to make himself a unique individual, encompassing both the principle of the sensible and the so precious idea of the mind in language. Yet, because of the attempt to incorporate two conflicting notions, A's life is a conflict by itself. For A, this conflict is the acceptance of the either/or. B accuses A of being too attached to his own intellectual power and frustrations with life. According to A, B does not interpret the original sin in the right way. Both A and B might agree on the fact that the original sin is the "mood of life", yet while A finds the tragic conflict of the original sin everywhere in daily life and therefore flees daily life, B accepts the original sin as a constructive force through repentance. We should repent the one basic fact of life: we are always wrong in the face of God. Through this repentance, one's self can inhabit itself again and be at peace, not in the high metaphysics and philosophy – since it is in the wrong there – but in the low efforts to make a worthwhile daily and simple life.

3.4 Summary and Conclusions on Kierkegaard

So far, I analyzed A's and B's positions, both pseudonyms for Kierkegaard himself. I explained how A's aesthetic world view is primarily based on a tragic *mood*. The tragic permeates his entire thinking and this is why Kierkegaard is called the father of existentialism. His philosophy does not deal with a rational metaphysical system, unlike so many philosophies before him. Rather it is about his mood and feeling about the enframing of the *Either/Or* in modern times. This enframing demands from him and everyone else to constantly make rather irrelevant choices, which are only essential in appearance. These choices are not true choices, since they only lead to more choices; a true and irreversible decision is never reached. To battle this emphasis on fake choices, A turns to the opera for salvation. The opera combines an immense musical representation of the tragedy of life, with an explanation of this tragedy in language. The real lessons of life are learned in the opera. Yet, as it appears, this aesthetic thinking is metaphysical thinking. The world itself is cruel and tragic, so we need an image of life (the opera) to comfort us. Because of this, an escape from enframing does not seem possible. For what else could the essential tragedy of the world be, than a technical rendition of what is experienced? In other words, I would like to argue that A's tragedy is not at all aesthetic; A is not astounded by the tragedy of the world, which would be an aesthetic experience. Rather, he assumes the world is tragic from a metaphysical presupposed position. B might agree to this conclusion when he diagnoses A's metaphysical tragedy as hysteria of the mind. B agrees that the *Either/Or* leads to despair. Yet this despair does not lead B to hysteria, but to repentance. Through repentance we are able to continue to live with our past and all the mistakes we made. So, repentance is necessary to make life light as a feather in order to be able to carry the burdens of life with relative ease.

An important meta-question to this analysis would be why Kierkegaard chose to write a book called *Either/Or* and split it into two parts. It appears as if he is giving us a choice: either an aesthetic perspective or an ethical one. Yet, throughout his writing, both A and B made it sufficiently clear it is not acceptable to "just" choose between either the aesthetic or the ethical. B's critique on A, according to me, signifies that Kierkegaard is eventually an ethical thinker. First and foremost, one needs to repent and choose for one's self and one's beliefs. Afterward, aesthetic can be an approach to life, as a representation in the form of, for instance, a book.

Now we will turn towards Nietzsche. Nietzsche's thinking is similar to Kierkegaard's,

in the sense that they both pose similar questions, namely questions concerning how the world is enframed by means of ethics and aesthetics. However, we will see that Nietzsche answers these questions in a very different way. Kierkegaard "remains" a religious figure, someone who explains the significance and gain of accepting a religious (Christian) world view. Nietzsche, in contrast, is extremely suspicious of this religious power. He believes religion (and, by the way, philosophy) is used to keep people "small", to turn them into obedient and docile creatures. By means of Nietzsche, I will analyze more deeply how the world is enframed by hiding this other side of religion.

After discussing Nietzsche, I will shed light on Heidegger's "modern" existential philosophy. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were very intimate with their own thinking, in the sense that they write personally and radically. Although Heidegger's philosophy is no less radical, he seems to have found some personal distance to the problem of the enframing of our world. This distance might be just what is necessary to put Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's frames in proper perspective in our modern age.

4. The Final Metaphysics: Securing & Enhancing

A thinker who poses quite similar questions as Kierkegaard, but answers them radically differently, is Nietzsche. We already saw that Kierkegaard's final answer to the enframing power of the *Either/Or* is the ethical approach of repentance, which is sustained by the idea that one is always wrong concerning metaphysical matters. The idea that one is always wrong however, presupposes a God or other metaphysical authority that is always right. Eventually, this is something one can only believe in. It is exactly this believing attitude that Nietzsche would find very problematic. Nietzsche, as well as his idol, Wagner, both believed that religion is not sustainable anymore in easing the pain of existence in our modern era. Wagner, however, was much closer to Kierkegaard, because he thought music could take over the role of religion. Nietzsche differed radically from these two, because he felt that religion and its modes of experiencing were done for forever. It was the arts rather, that could provide a renewal of the Greek tragedy, by which people could feel connectedness with each other again. Therefore, Nietzsche created the opposing categories of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Dionysian, named especially after the Greek god of wine, ecstasy, chaos and pluralistic impulses is important, since these impulses have been suppressed in society since the beginning of Western philosophy by the tendencies of the Apollonian way of enframing. This Apollonian enframing teaches us that reason is important above all else. Nietzsche attempts to revive the Dionysian chaotic ways of feeling and to incorporate both the Apollonian *enframing* and the Dionysian *anti-enframing* in daily life. Eventually, this integration evolves into the idea of the *Will to Power*. Both, the Apollonian enframing and the Dionysian chaos, work together to secure truths and to enhance life. They appear to be two concepts (Dionysian *and* Apollonian), yet they do not exist separately. Basically, both concepts are descriptions of how power works: what is held on to as "true" (the Apollonian) and what is developed as "new" (the Dionysian). Eventually, this happens by the Nietzschean concept of *Eternal Recurrence*: the enhancement of life is based upon and added to our scientific enframed truths, which is an eternal recurring process. Modernity, in this sense, is a time of constant accumulating of *new things* and storing them *(enframing)* in the storehouses of old.

4.1 Dionysus and Apollo

In the previous chapter, I analyzed how Kierkegaard primarily chooses the ethical (real) choice for the self, which relocates the aesthetic experience from the center (A's perspective) to the margin (B's concluding perspective). According to Nietzsche, such a powerful "choice" or translocation could already be found in Plato's thinking. Nietzsche tells us about Plato's philosophy by creating the concepts Apollonian and Dionysian, which relate to the Greek gods. Plato's thinking and Western philosophy in general, according to Nietzsche, is primarily Apollonian, meaning that there is not much room for the validity of ecstatic experiences in our society. Rather, the rational, moderate (Apollonian) experiences are seen as sustainable, while the ecstatic (Dionysian) experiences need to be repressed.

In the previous chapter we noticed that Kierkegaard emphasizes transparency and generalizability in the ethical choice of the self. It should be our goal to become a transparent and general self, in order to live well, he says. Further, it seems that, for Kierkegaard, becoming a general and transparent self means accepting religion's and society's frame, in order to connect to that discourse and eventually to become part of it. This also means that, to become general and transparent, we have to become embedded in an already powerful discourse. Only then can we speak of the general (the accepted standard) and the transparent (recognizability). So, Kierkegaard's view on the matter of ethical choice does not seem to be very suspicious of the uses of power in the ethical sphere. The enframing we can now call the Apollonian, which is the structured effort to bring clarity into the world by means of technology. This process of enframing can be seen as the banishment of power into the aesthetic fake-choice. This banishment is the act of Apollo, who cannot stand the conflicting chaos of the Dionysian. So, Kierkegaard's concept of art is, in accordance with Western philosophy, an Apollonian concept of art, which he not nearly appreciates as much as the ethical choice.

By denouncing the aesthetic choice as a fake-choice, Kierkegaard intends to show us that the aesthetic choice is part of the enframing of the *Either/Or*. The aesthetic only gains temporary satisfaction by choosing between the either and the or: There is need to choose it over and over again in any new situation, yet A always chooses in the same way, namely through his enframed Apollonian mind. The choice always returns and does not give real satisfaction like the ethical choice. Ethics would harbor the real choice, the only choice which is resolvable. This is the choice for the entirety of the immense either/or: The

choice to always accept the rift the either/or brings. The aesthetic becomes lost in the face of this choice. The aesthetic hesitantly chooses because he made choices like these before. Yet the ethic is able to live with the conflict of *Either/Or*, through his repentance to God. The ethic knows his choice is always wrong in the face of God, since only in God is the ethical choice truly resolved. So, only because we are always wrong in the face of god is it possible to repent and thus to truly choose for organized life. Contrary to Kierkegaard's concept of art, Nietzsche wanted to explore a concept which was lost since the coming to power of Plato's Apollonian thinking. Nietzsche does not accept Kierkegaard's ethical solution, because he believes Kierkegaard's Apollonian idea of art – and the analysis of the problem – was faulty from the beginning. Kierkegaard's ethical choice would mean that an individual needs to close his eyes for the powers which force him to accept this ethical choice. Repentance in the face of God disgusts Nietzsche, since it means that the individual purposefully blinds himself. However well we would be able to live by repenting, repentance signifies a denial of life. Nietzsche wanted to lead his readers straight into the night of the unorganized shadow side of ethics (Nietzsche 1870-1, aph. 516).

This night is the night of Dionysus, the god of wine and excess. Nietzsche describes this god as the authoritative figure of the Greek tragedies and attributes to him the qualities that make life possible. It is important to realize Nietzsche is primarily concerned with *life* (in a positive sense) and analyzes most other concepts like truth, religion and science in terms of life. In Nietzsche, we find similar questions compared to those asked by Kierkegaard, with an apparent opposite answer. To make life endurable, Nietzsche says, one has to be in an *enveloping atmosphere* of ignorance, illusions and dreams (Nietzsche 1983, p. 323), contrary to Kierkegaard's attempt to repent for our ignorance. It is an entirely different matter to accept ignorance as a part of life (Nietzsche's Dionysus) or to repent for it as a uncomfortable part of life (Kierkegaard's Apollo). Especially music – the Wagnerian kind – celebrating the affections through drama – is needed for life to become strong. Wagner's music totally envelops man in an atmosphere which celebrates life in all its chaotic and ecstatic qualities and does not turn away from it in repentance. In this, Nietzsche is the anti-Socrates. Where Socrates is the one to pose that "everything must be conscious in order to be good" (Nietzsche 1870-2, p. 540), Nietzsche uses the pair of opposites – Dionysus and Apollo – to interpret the emergence of the Greek pre-Socratic tragedy, where there still was room for communal forms of society which revealed the injustice of the hidden intentions of the gods. The life-enhancing Dionysian spectacle was able to uncover the injustice of this destiny. Thanks to Dionysus, the arbitrariness of the

gods can be overcome. This tradition of tragedy, according to Nietzsche, is effectively killed by the coming to power of Socrates' Apollonian ideal of clarity, since the entire Western philosophy, with Socrates as its founder, is Apollonian in nature. Nietzsche's reason for resurrecting the Dionysian as the counterpart of the Apollonian clarity and healthy logic, is that he suspects a movement of terror in the suppression and destruction of passions. Dionysus is the god of wine and the passions. His resurrection enables us to reduce the walls we construct around our feelings. Embracing our feelings as valid, when the walls are down, is what makes life rich. On the contrary, Apollo is the god of reason, of health and sobriety and of the unity of the ego (Nietzsche 1872, § 23). Nietzsche distrusts Apollo as a force to give direction to life, since consciousness creates a distance to life which it can never bridge to experience. The value of consciousness, progress and the (enlightened) individual, has been overestimated since Plato.

This myth of Dionysus and Apollo was an artistic – and metaphysical – creation we need in order to be able to live with the chaotic and ecstatic nature of our lives. But life needs organization in order to be livable. Before, Kierkegaard's organization of life lies in ethics, as basic repentance. Nietzsche neither agrees with Kierkegaard's Apollonian interpretation of aesthetics, nor with his easy acceptance of God and he redefines aesthetics a Dionysian force, to give life back its vitality. Nietzsche therefore returns the rights to live to the shadows on the wall of the Plato's cave. In contrast, Kierkegaard strengthened the Apollonian ethics by adding a Christian foundation of original choice. When we embrace this ethical, original choice to repent, aesthetics becomes just an option – as hobby. According to Kierkegaard, we need to live ethically.

Wagner would heartily agree with the need for religious redemption to make life sustainable. He was of one mind with Nietzsche concerning the inability of religion to fulfill its function in modern times. Religion simply cannot offer the certainty to live life well, in these socially different times. This is why Wagner embraced art as the modern alternative for religion's failing. Wagner's revival of art as the religious essence is what drives Nietzsche and Wagner apart. Nietzsche was never a great lover of religion, so he interpreted art not as a redemption, but as the possibility of the *enhancement* of life. He saw religion, as well as Wagner's attempts to establish religious art, as fundamentally life-denying. His reason for judging so is that, fundamentally, the most essential characteristic of life is that it *enhances* itself. Religion, as well as religious art, does not accept this enhancement of life. Instead, a religious foundation leads to life-denial, because it denies Dionysus. The myth of Dionysus can be seen as returning the dialogue with nature to life

in order to enhance life (Safranski 2002, p. 101). The Apollonian denies the dialogue with nature because of its methods of enframing. For this reason myths are much more valuable than certain rational philosophies, like the Kantian categorical imperative, which is only a thought experiment – *as if* life worked that way! Nietzsche's aim was to "remain faithful to the earth" (Nietzsche 1883, § 3). It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche did not see Apollo as an enemy who needs to be utterly destroyed. The enframing of life is something which we should not hide from. Yet, in society, the Apollonian is always seen as bigger and better. Clarity of writing and of ideas are always judged to be better than a movement to make things obscure, affectionate and chaotic. Somehow, through Socrates and other ascetic priests, Apollo became the worshiped God, while Dionysus was forgotten. This movement makes Nietzsche very suspicious of the enframing ideal of Apollo. In this suspicion of reason, an early existentialism shows up: Heidegger will eventually redefine *thought* against its misuse as mere thought-experiment. However, Nietzsche's "area of research" is a different one than Heidegger's ontological one at this point. Nietzsche is primarily concerned with myth and art as revolutionary in society, fighting against the "overwhelming indifference" towards life he perceives in German and European culture. People seem to live life and die, all the time, without there being anything which made them ecstatic. Nietzsche saw the mythical "as a life force that returns a festive bounty to being" (Nietzsche 1872, § 23). In this *festive bounty* we see art becoming a truly public affair, in contrast to the hyper-individual enframing affair we see in Kierkegaard's aesthetics. Kierkegaard's aesthetic is purely interested in his own case, in his own values and his own thinking. A does not seem to care about other people or culture. Nietzsche however, as well as Wagner, are truly concerned with the sake of culture and society and not so much with the sake of individuals.

So far, we analyzed the history of philosophy and western thinking in terms of the Dionysian and Apollonian. We saw that Plato effectively destroyed the Dionysian. Kierkegaard also seems to accept the Apollonian as more important in both his aesthetics as well as his ethics. The primary ethical choice must be a choice for transparency and the ability to be generalized, which are both Apollonian ideals. The aesthetic Kierkegaard gains strength from his individuality and brilliant mind, also Apollonian ideals. Nietzsche perceives these Apollonian tendencies as life-denying and aims to revive the Dionysian chaotic life-giving in art, in order to make life worth living again.

4.2 The Dionysian Life Force – a contemporary example

I analyzed previously how the Apollonian ideal attempts to unify and enframe, through religion, science and rationality. The Dionysian, on the other hand, is the concealed concept of the plural, of disorganized and chaotic effects. We are able to recognize these concepts in the way we approach music and noise. We noticed earlier that the aesthetic Kierkegaard experienced the opera as a revelation of the conflicted and tragic nature of life. Yet, this conflicted and tragic notion, which we could call Dionysian, is still forced into the unity of the opera and not found in life "as it happens". The aesthetic Kierkegaard picks up this musical attempt to show chaos by actually hiding it in the frame of the opera. Looking at music from a truly Dionysian point of view, it becomes nothing less than *noise*. Music becomes a sea of random and irregular sounds. And, sometimes, a few of those sounds happen to sound like something structured, as the contemporary philosopher Serrès shows.

Nietzsche found the perfect manifestation of the Dionysian life force in Wagner. The resounding foundation of Wagner's opera's is Dionysian. The opera is musical ecstasy "all-pervasive as *white noise, atmosphere*, and *milieu* [emphasis KP], and has become the acoustic backdrop of our entire existence."(Safranski 2002, p. 101) Here we see clearly what Nietzsche intends with the Dionysian: it is the *Big Bang* of life, interpreted as primary ecstasy, as a celebration of the victory of nature and being. According to some philosophers, music has been regarded as the highest amongst the arts, for a very simple reason: music is direct, its medium is itself. It is not a random fact that the *Big Bang* is a metaphor of sound. Other forms of art use external media: sculpture and paintings for instance. Instead, music touches the soul directly. This is why we see this focus on music as the prime metaphysical entity in numerous philosophers, from Schopenhauer in the 19th century to the contemporary French thinker Michel Serrès, who tells us: "There is no gray, strictly speaking. There is white, the sum of colors, there is *noisiness*, the totality of number." And again when he says: "Noise, again. The background noise is permanent, it is the ground of the world, the backdrop of the universe, the background of being, maybe" (Serrès 1995, p. 62). This is why the specific book I quoted is called *Genesis*. However, Serrès distinguishes his *noise* from the metaphysical music of the 19th century. He bids us not to think of music as a singular and metaphysical system. The idea of music as a singular system can be found in the *principium individuationis* (the principle of individuation), as understood by Schopenhauer. The *principium individuationis* is the epitome of Apollonian

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metaphysics and signifies that everything in nature strives to individualize and separate itself.

This way of thinking is the opposite of the Dionysian, where components do not strive to become individual at all, yet they stay chaotic and irregular. Nietzsche's critique on philosophy is hence not just a critique on Plato, who fought so valiantly for Apollo. Rather, it is a critique of the entire history of the West, since the core of Western thinking is *unifying* and driven by the *principium individuationis*. In fact, this means that every metaphysics – from ancient Greek metaphysics to Nietzsche – aims to individualize itself. This principle is something both Serrès and Nietzsche attempt to supplement with the Dionysian, since the Dionysian has been forgotten throughout history. Their critique is hence a critique of the West, yet it is also embedded in the West, since even the complex chaotic Dionysian music of Wagner is *one* piece with *one* name: it is unified in some sense into an individual piece. According to Serrès, what happens in Western philosophy is that the multiple (Dionysus) is subsumed under the one (Apollo). The subsumation of multiplicity under unity – thus the subsumation of diversity under one singular principle – "is scholarly magisterial and ecclesial arrogance" (Serrès 1995, p. 5). In other words: The subsumation which is so essential to Western thinking is caused by scholars and the clergy - of the elite. This is exactly why Serrès speaks about *noise* and not sound or music: "The most amazing thing in the world is that agreement, understanding, harmony, *sometimes* [emphasis KP] exist." (Serrès 2007, p. 121). This existence of the Apollonian harmony is only a happenstance in nature. Yet, being part of the same Western thinking he is criticizing, Nietzsche cannot escape the need for one metaphysical foundation of that backdrop of the universe that is noise. The reason for this need and the entire need of the West, is that Dionysus does not do justice to life in the sense that he does not judge. The chaotic Dionysian just as easily kills as it gives birth, without any given reason other than *life*. Reason is Apollo's domain, so a pure Dionysian life (if it were at all possible) would kill individuality without remorse, in favor for life itself. Apollo was hence the god who became dominant in Western thinking. Yet, he became so dominant, that we forgot that justice is not everything: Sometimes we are at the disposal of fate. So, there are two ways – maybe more – of dealing with injustice and accidents. One of them is Apollo, the god who uses "divine" reason to show us why things are how they are. But, this showing is also a creating. "Reasoning things out" in the Nietzschean sense would not so much be about clarifying, but rather it would be about forcing a reason onto reality in order to hide a fear for the Dionysic chaos. Nietzsche's suspicion of reason lies in the fact that reasons are

never just meant to explain. More importantly, they are meant to exact over reality.

Nietzsche's hope lies in the mythical arts, because these arts signify the resurrection of Dionysus vis-a-vis the enframing Apollo. The latter gives solace to the tremendous injustice our world does to the multiplicity of the presupposition we call *the individual* (Safranski 2002, 103). In other words, the (Apollonian) individual as some sort of solid-founded being can be seen, mythically, as a conquering of the chaotic multiplicity of Dionysus. This conquering is the creation of the individual and at the same time a limiting of the multiplicity. Nietzsche breaks with the powerful mainstream process of enframing, by re-creating two forgotten gods for the future. In contrast to this, the ethical world view of Kierkegaard might offer solace as well, because it teaches individuals to unconditionally choose the cards fate has already dealt them. The ethical choice allows us to convince ourselves that these cards are ours by God's will and not random and chaotic at all. Nietzsche was not able to see how a person with such a moralistic attitude could still be passionately in love with life. Rather, he believes that such an ethical person would be in love with God, an entity *beyond* life. Nietzsche found this choice utterly life-denying.

“Even if all of mankind should need to perish – and who would doubt this! - man has been charged with a goal, as the loftiest task for all time to come, of growing together into oneness and commonality so that mankind can confront its impending doom as a united entity and with a sense of the tragic. This loftiest of all tasks encompasses the sum total of the ennoblement of mankind.” (Nietzsche 1876, § 4)

The above quote shows Nietzsche's inner conflict like no other. Man needs to perish, since man cannot ever stand the chaotic – Dionysian – diversity which is life. Eventually, life will kill man; this is as certain as it gets. Yet man still has a task to grow into oneness, to deal with the Dionysian tragedy without always repressing and running from it. Nietzsche saw this happening in the Greek pre-socratic tragedies, in which suffering was shared. Kierkegaard takes the goal man sets itself (toward oneness) as the one true choice of ethics. He does not “zoom out” as much as Nietzsche does, for his choice takes man right into his local life, which does not deal with external goals or the death of all mankind. Rather, the ethical choice is a choice for a local life; the choice for the difficulty of loving your wife and raising your kids. Kierkegaard's critique on philosophy is that it can never live without “zooming-out” and analyzing life from an external standpoint. Nietzsche's critique on philosophy is that it always unifies whatever diversity it finds. These critiques do not seem to immediately exclude each other.

In this chapter, we explored how Nietzsche's creation of the concepts based on the gods Apollo and Dionysus, shed light on concepts like diversity and unity. By creating these concepts, Nietzsche revealed how reason and religion attempt to unify. More importantly, he revealed how attempts to unify can be very dangerous, because these attempts tend to disrupt or even destroy the chaotic diversity and fluidity which *enhances* life and makes life flourish. In other words, attempts to unify (through religion, reason, science and other examples of enframing) do not bring real change, but always aim to *preserve* the presuppositions we have. Yet, we need preservation as well, if we are to survive all the anxiety because of our own incongruence with the world. So, both gods, Apollo and Dionysus, can be seen as active principles in our lives. One should strive to accommodate *both* gods in one's life.

4.3 Bodily Experience & Conceptual Experience

So, we noticed that an Apollonian idea of sound is aimed at establishing music as a single piece, a totality of music, technologically enframed (into musical staff et cetera) to give an experience of life. On the other hand, a Dionysian interpretation would start at noise, out of which – accidentally – structure might occur now and then. Nietzsche's interpretation of life rests on this distinction. In the development of Nietzsche's thinking, the Dionysian category can be seen as bodily experience. This means that the Dionysian is the validation of the aesthetic experience of *feeling* and *sensibility*, in contrast to conceptual experience, or thoughtful enframing (the Apollonian), which was more valuable throughout history.

But, could Kierkegaard not be right, when he determines that art is an individual's hobby, which is merely valid after one chooses the true ethical choice? Art does not seem to discharge us from the necessity to be transparent in service of others – be it a family, society or political life. For instance, in our society, we see that art is often positioned in the margin of society, while the Apollonian rationality appears to be the mainstream, socially accepted position of life. The difference between Kierkegaard's ethical choice and Nietzsche's favor for Dionysus is not that simple, though. We explained before how the rift between pre-socratic and socratic philosophy destroyed the validity of the Dionysian idea, until Nietzsche revived it. Yet Kierkegaard does not make a distinction between the pre-socratic and the socratic. Kierkegaard refers to the entire Greek civilization as aesthetic, since the Greeks would lack the idea of the sensible in their thinking. The Greeks only knew the sensible in its sensibility; hence it could not be excluded, nor included: It simply *was* here. What this means is that the Greek society was purely sensible: the Dionysian lusts were satisfied, regardless of any possible shame or guilt concerning marriage and other institutions. Shame and guilt in sexuality came into existence because of the Christian world view, which ruthlessly pulled the aesthetic out of the bodily or sensible and put it into containers of thought, called concepts. And as concept, the richness of the bodily experience will never survive. Only as thought could sensibility be excluded and simultaneously posited by the Christian faith. So, sensibility is excluded in the sense that it became hidden, what means that people thought it should not be part of life, while it actually – obviously, since we are still here – was. Here, sensibility became something to shun (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 105). An example of this exclusion of the sensible by thought is the difference between the Greek gods and the Christian one. The Greek

god Eros for instance, was an icon for sensible love. Eros himself, however, was never in love (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 69). He made love possible, yet he himself did not love. The Christian God, on the other hand, does love Himself. So, love has been displaced from bodily experience into the realm of concepts. Kierkegaard's aesthetic does not actually distinguish between a pre- and post-Platonic era in Greek thought, although he does distinguish between the Greek era and the Christian era. So, how does Kierkegaard choose? Does he, like Nietzsche, envision the lack of the sensible in modern times? Or does he choose for Christianity's profit? In other words, does he choose thought as having a higher validity than the sensible? Kierkegaard's ethics lead him to take the Christian invention of clarity and organized life as more important. How can one truly choose in a sensible world? This is never possible, according to Kierkegaard. One can only choose in thinking and in repentance of the sensible, as we saw before when we analyzed the aesthetic and the ethic. Kierkegaard's easy acceptance of the ethical Apollonian clarity of ideas is probably why Heidegger calls Kierkegaard not a philosopher, but a religious writer – although an important one. Heidegger also warns us, that the comparison between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche has become customary, but therefore no less questionable (Heidegger 1977, p. 94). This questionable aspect lies exactly in the reading of Kierkegaard as a (western) philosopher. The western tradition of philosophy has its earliest and perhaps most forcing representation in Plato. Even Nietzsche, who tends to experience the world as 180 degrees opposite to Plato, needs Plato's destroyed foundation to create the new temple of mythical art. However, Kierkegaard does not seem to see Plato's philosophy as a turning point from the bodily to thought.

So far, we retold how Nietzsche saw mythical art as the enhancement of life, after the failure of religion. This enhancement is built upon the rediscovering of Dionysus, of the creative and destructive aspects of life, a rediscovery of the chaos of life which is necessary for life itself to flourish. Contrary to this, the Apollonian wants to preserve certain structures, not the least of which is the individual. The Dionysian (as chaotic and life-enhancing) hence faces religion's binding and preserving aspect. Preserving is not enough, because a system which is only focused on preserving what it has, will ultimately fail. Enhancement is necessary for life, and the mythical arts, according to Nietzsche, are its provider. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, recognizes a saving power in a person's ability to choose for a certain life and therefore preserve the life which he chose. Kierkegaard is a traditional thinker and takes a clear stand against a primary aesthetic and self-enhancing approach. Nietzsche is the liberal thinker, who attempts to enhance life and fight against

the organizing and controlling aspects of life.

4.4 The Positivist and the Cosmos meet in the Will to Power

Nietzsche revives the chaotic in nature (Dionysus) with an unparalleled intensity. As we saw in the previous chapter, this revival occurs as aesthetics, as feeling. Nietzsche attempts to reintegrate the Dionysian into life, performatively, just like the Apollonian enframing that is already performed day to day. Both of these concepts, when put together, signify the working of power. The Apollonian is the designation of how life is understood and thus how life is enframed. The Dionysian (anti-enframing) points to the elements of change and chaos, which give life its freshness and surprise. Hence, the Apollonian is a positivist force: it sees nature as lifeless and usable. The Dionysian is the perspective of the immense cosmos, in which nothing is in our control. In other words, the securing force of the Apollonian and the enhancing force of the Dionysian meet in the Will to Power.

Hence, Nietzsche tries to find this new chaotic, multiplex, and life-giving Dionysian in an apparently singular Apollonian basis of human oneness, as the quote on page 49 of this thesis shows. Yet, he is rooted in the European philosophical tradition and he desperately tries to remove what he perceives as negative of that tradition, namely the dominance of the always-healthy Apollonian unilateral ego. "*Stop feeling like such a fantastic ego!* Learn to *cast off* bit by bit *your alleged individuality*" (Nietzsche 1926, § 443). This Apollonian unilateral ego however, is not the only thing Nietzsche finds problematic. Why would he even feel so strongly against his alleged individuality? So, he not only considers his alleged individuality a problem, but also his strong feelings against his individuality. This feeling seems like a Dionysian allergy towards the Apollonian ego. The ego might be Apollonian in nature, yet the perceiving of this ego as such an immense negative force can surely be called Dionysian. He has two antidotes, one for his individuality and the other for his extreme feeling. He calls these antidotes *experiencing on a cosmic level* and *positivism*. He wants to get rid of organic thinking, of being lived by nature and by a faulty culture. Dead and cold things are much better teachers than people, who call upon feelings. These projected feelings are basically an oversight of existence: They never served any purpose but to make people into herd animals. Nietzsche's immediate task is to purge emotions of self-denial from existence, to annihilate feelings from social life. Note that these feelings of self-denial are Dionysian in nature: Dionysian feelings are life-affirming, while more socially acceptable emotions are emotions of the herd animal.. Herd feelings are oppressive in nature, while Dionysian feelings are liberating.

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So he wants to dehumanize nature (in order to "zoom out"; to experience on a cosmic level) and naturalize humanity (in order to mute feelings of self-denial) to remain faithful to the earth (Nietzsche 1926, § 443).

Simultaneously, Nietzsche's aim is to dehumanize nature in order to ground the self. Because, when nature has human – social – elements and speaks in human language, one is never alone in a psychological sense. Always human's social nature calls upon feelings and thought processes: It always calls upon responsibility. So he needs to immunize himself against natural elements which he perceives to have meaning, while he knows they actually do not have meaning. This positivist approach is necessary to be firmly grounded as a self, in order to be able to reach for a cosmological perspective. In other words, he needs something very firm to hold on to, in order to look up into the cosmos. And, what can be more firm than an inhuman, positivistic nature? Nietzsche realizes humanity needs solid ground underneath its feet, in order to be safe enough when one is looking *outside* of one's self. Because of this, the founding of a cosmological self is first of all a founding of the self in nature (Safranski 2002, p. 234).

However, the dehumanization of nature would be, in Heidegger's terms, a covering up of Being. When nature is regarded from the position of positivism, the human element in nature becomes obsolete: humanity becomes a measurable thing inside nature as well as all other entities. Being without the observer of Being, human, cannot happen. Heidegger might also say that Nietzsche's attempt to found the self is misguided, since it is already grounded. Nietzsche just forgot the self is grounded, because he tends to reject his own historical and metaphysical presuppositions, which might be perceived as the two most important grounds in Western history. This is probably what makes Nietzsche so powerful as well: he wants to incorporate that which is far (cosmos), to bring it closer into nature, as a condition of life. One needs a strong will to do this.

Basically, he called this will the "Will to Power". The humanization of life in reaching out toward the cosmos, and the dehumanization of nature in a positivist approach to being, are not two separate things. They meet in the Will to Power: the principle that everything moves in order to achieve power. This is true for the tiniest grain of sand – the positivist nature – as well as in the most intense self-affirming feeling – the cosmos. All of it exists because it strives to power. The mode or method of this Will to Power is the eternal recurrence: everything strives for power as it did before and will do after. The Will to Power does not work linearly, in an Apollonian accumulation of power with a certain crescendo. Rather it works cyclically. Everything (physical, metaphysical, spiritual and even

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passions (Nietzsche 1999, § 288)) will to incorporate what it is aimed at, as a condition of itself. In other words, everything tries to find itself in the Other (in cosmos), through the eternal recurrence of the same. Once more, everything endures and enhances, by strengthening its own foundation. Exactly this is what life is, enduring and enhancing, something which happens over and over again, powering itself to happen again and again. This eternal recurrence is the mode of the Will to Power. The Will to Power is thus self-transcendence through self-preservation (the positivist) and self-enhancement (the cosmos). "You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: this is your final hope and intoxication" (Nietzsche 1883, second part "On Self-Transcendence"). To do this, one must strangely stay away from the Dionysian in a pathos of distance: One needs proper distance to judge the working of power in discourses, to perceive the veil of Maya in order to get an image of the Will to Power. This image of life rejects the human world of values, truth and meaning as we knew it before. Now, everything is Will to Power. Self-preservation and self-enhancement eventually lead to a cosmological and naturalistic principle of Being and hence, to a new and all-encompassing metaphysical cause of Power. (Safranski 2002, p. 290)

To summarize, we saw how Nietzsche translates the Dionysian and Apollonian as the cosmological and positivist approach to life respectively. By doing this, he grounded the mythological gods in a psychological foundation. The cosmological approach is the enhancing factor of life; it is necessary for life to transcend beyond its borders and to grow. The positivist approach is the preserving factor of life; it is the ground from which enhancement can set out and take place. Enhancement sets out towards the cosmos from its positivist grounded preservation. Enhancement however, moves cyclically back into its own ground; it sets out to found itself in the cosmos, before returning to itself and strengthening its preservative ground. When we translate this into a more concrete organization theory, the cosmos can be seen as the organization of the outside world as we perceive it - "kosmos" being Greek for order. In other words, the cosmos is the macro-level of society, how organizations relate to each other and strive for value. Yet, the cosmos and outside world are based on our own foundation in positivism, in that which we know for certain. Enhancing then, happens by trying to connect that which we perceive of the macro-level to what we know for certain. Because the cosmos is purely based on how the outside order of the world is perceived (in a process which *reduces chaos*), the return to what we know is actually a return to *the same*; it feeds itself its own image of the outside world. Yet, the essence of this eternal recurrence is the accumulation of Power.

Power is the drive behind all our venturing out into the real world with our own truths. In the next paragraph, we will explore the inherent problems which accompany a metaphysics of Power. Heidegger will show us that the Will to Power is utterly unsatisfying, and that Nietzsche forgets to think truly ontologically. However, we have seen that Nietzsche has been tremendously important in Western thinking, since he rediscovered nature (the Dionysian) in our thinking.

4.5 Summary & Conclusions on Nietzsche

Before continuing with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I will recapitulate Nietzsche thoughts, as explored in this chapter. I started by explaining how Nietzsche saw the entirety of Western philosophy (after Plato) as Apollonian. In other words, the interpretation of life in Western philosophy is enframing, structuring, reasonable and technological in nature. Therefore, Nietzsche intended to revive the Dionysian: the principle of chaos, ecstasy, the cosmos and *nature*. He intensely wanted these elements to be part of valid interpretations of life. To achieve this, he taught us that the Apollonian shows its face in the experience of thinking. So, philosophy's ideas are first and foremost a matter of thinking, a matter of the mind. The Dionysian however, is a matter of irregular feelings. These feelings should also be accounted for when explaining life by means of philosophy, since they exist. Therefore he finds that a cosmological point of view provides a Dionysian answer: the Dionysian is the immensity of the cosmos and the marvel of the diversity of life. Yet, the Apollonian needs to immunize us against the mistake of being overly emotional. The positivist movement thus provides an Apollonian answer: there is a certain quietism in viewing nature as lifeless, instead of projecting feelings unto it. Yet, both these "forces", the positivist Apollonian and the cosmological Dionysian, meet in the Will to Power, since they cannot be separated in life but only in thought. The positivist Apollonian can be seen as the securing power, it enframes our world, thereby providing truths and stability to believe in. The cosmological Dionysian, on the other hand, withstands enframing by relating man to the immensity of life, which the Apollonian can never enframe totally. Eventually, both of them exist together to achieve a heightened sense of power in one's life. In a way, this Will to Power *is* enframing, because it powerfully structures the world. Thus, Nietzsche's addition to the concept of enframing, is his addition of feelings. Nietzsche showed us that enframing is not only a matter of Apollonian rationality, but that it also works by means of "natural" feelings (Dionysian). So, however much the Dionysian is a concept of anti-enframing, the encompassing concept of the Will to Power seems to have the characteristic goal of enframing yet again. We know this, because eventually, the enhancing aspect of the Will to Power (the Dionysian), is enhancement *in order to be able to be secured (more powerfully)*. This movement is a concept which returns eternally out of itself (enhancing), but toward the same (securing). In this sense, the Dionysian is paradoxical. It signifies the enframing of feelings by means of the Will to Power. At the same time it also signifies the chaos of an uncaring nature. Perhaps the essential meaning of the Dionysian as chaotic is that it is not specifically *either*

enframing *or* chaotic.

To recapitulate, we analyzed Kierkegaard's philosophy and concluded that the world is enframed in terms of a series of choices with digital decisions (*Either/Or*). Kierkegaard's morale calls on us to repent for this enframing, of which we are part, while at the same time acknowledging that we cannot escape it. His method of repentance makes this possible by denying any validity of metaphysical claims. Only God knows the metaphysical truth.

Kierkegaard revived a religious possibility to relate to the enframing of the world. Nietzsche on the other hand, revived an aesthetic perspective which both organizes and disorganizes enframing (respectively the Apollonian and Dionysian). In our next chapter, we will see how Heidegger deals with his concept of enframing and how it follows from Nietzsche's "final metaphysics". Heidegger will finally open the existential dimension, while turning away from Kierkegaard's religion as well as Nietzsche's mythos-inspired aesthetics. I will analyze why he turns away from these concepts, as well as provide a critique of his rejection of these pre-modern methods.

5. Returning to the Nearest Question: Existentialism

So far, I would summarize Kierkegaard's addition to enframing as the explanation of the demanding choice of the *Either/Or*. There appears to be a definite need to choose between either of two choices during life. To "escape" this downward spiral into seemingly real choices, we should repent for the times we mistook these unreal and binary choices for the real choice of one's self. Nietzsche's addition to enframing lies in the validation of erratic feelings in experiencing life next to reasonable thinking. This validation happens by means of the cosmological perspective, which leads us to awe in a way which disallows belief in reason alone anymore. The difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, in this sense, lies in Kierkegaard's ethic approach, which tells us that one can only do good in what I would call the microcosmos of one's own life, versus Nietzsche's aesthetic and macrocosmic life-experience. These oppositions between microcosmos (the local life) and macrocosmos (the global life) might seem unbridgeable. Yet, this choice between local and global seems to present itself as an *Either/Or*, which means it might not be a real difference, only an apparent one. In this chapter, I will finally discuss the inventor of the concept of enframing itself, Heidegger. Heidegger agrees with his "existential father" Kierkegaard about the importance of the microcosmos by heavily criticizing Nietzsche's metaphysical orientation towards the higher. He argues that Nietzsche, however suspicious he might have been, is still a metaphysician. Heidegger would argue that Nietzsche does not escape Plato's higher metaphysical thinking, but merely turns it upside down. To explain more clearly how Heidegger sees Nietzsche's role in the history of enframing, I will begin by reviewing Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche. First of all, Heidegger shows how metaphysics always incorporates an essence of nihilism. This means that metaphysics has always run away from the valueless bleakness which is reality (as we would experience it) into a realm beyond reality. We noticed a similar escapism in Kierkegaard's aesthetic (A's) metaphysics when we talked about the opera as an interruption of life. After this, I will show how Heidegger sees truth as well as art in Nietzsche's writing, as parts of enframing. Thirdly, we will return to the Will to Power and the difference between Heidegger's existential approach and Nietzsche's metaphysical one. Eventually, I will conclude with a critical note on Heidegger's method of thought.

5.1 The Limits of Nietzsche's Thinking

In our previous chapter on Nietzsche, we explored the Will to Power, which explains how enframing came to power by means of rational thought *and* sensible experiences. The arrival of the Will to Power however, rips apart meaningful ways of philosophy, since it interprets the entire history of the (metaphysical) enframing by philosophy as (rational) power-play. In other words, ideas other than power are not sustainable anymore, even the most beautiful and just philosophical functions such as Will to Power. The same happens to religion; first and foremost, religious truth has the function of keeping the masses satisfied and content by providing them with a docile concept like repentance. This dominance of the power perspective eventually leads to its own destruction, because it leads to the insight of nihilism; metaphysical philosophy (including the Will to Power) exists only as an image, because we are dissatisfied with reality and unceasingly will to establish power over reality (aka enframing).

Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche sheds light on his value as well as his lack. He shows us that Nietzsche's self-transcendence overturned metaphysics by revealing the repressed meaninglessness which is part of any metaphysics. This meaninglessness is caused by the fact that metaphysics turns away from life, from nature and thus from Dionysus in creating some structure. Yet, Nietzsche also showed us that feelings could be used in the same enframing way. Feelings can also be used in a metaphysical way, when they are viewed from a distance and analyzed as usable "objects". Through this distance, Nietzsche seems to be under the impression he is affirming life. Yet, his metaphysics could not actually be life-affirming in its fullest sense, since metaphysics is never life affirming, according to Heidegger. Rather, metaphysics needs to create a representation of life, which improves our *image* of life, thereby denying certain parts of life itself in favor of better images. These metaphysical images of life are constructed by the Will to Power. We have analyzed how the eternal cycle of stabilization and enhancement works in the previous chapters.

Where Kierkegaard's choice lies before the Either/Or as a whole, Nietzsche's choice seems to lie in the Neither/Nor. This Neither/Nor points to an ultimate discomfort with life, because all values have become meaningless. The Dionysian allows us to deal with the injustice of fate, yet it is still a metaphysical image of life, which Heidegger loathes. In other words, the metaphysical image of life is always located beyond life, in the frame of a system in which one creates a structure and believes that life works that way.

So, Nietzsche essential mood of life seems to be discomfort. He appears to be extremely uncomfortable because he cannot seem to escape metaphysics, so he sets out to "revalue all values" by means of the Will to Power. The Will to Power is meant as the final metaphysics, which can be seen as a conclusion to the history of the west and philosophy: "all gods must die". The Will to Power is not only a new metaphysical interpretation of life. Rather, it is the metaphysical interpretation of *all* metaphysics, which Nietzsche called the Revaluation of *all* values. It ends here, because the metaphysical image is apparently never enough to live life well. The fact that all metaphysics can be interpreted as Will to Power (in favor of its own content), means that there never was anything truly essential about metaphysics. In one word this is called nihilism, but it is a specific kind of nihilism. Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of nihilism (Heidegger 1977, p. 104). On the one hand, we have completed nihilism. This form of nihilism is indeed nihilism as a completed event and a conclusion of history. On the other hand, nihilism can be understood as an ongoing event in western history and even as the inner logic of the west. In this sense, the entire ideological-philosophical tradition is aimed at its own destruction, heralded by the birth of the Will to Power, which Nietzsche explained as implicit in every metaphysic (Heidegger 1977, p. 54). In other words, Nietzsche uncovers the Will to Power as a hidden dimension in all metaphysics, thereby destroying every metaphysical system. The essential question however, is raised by Nietzsche in his Gay Science, aphorism 125 of the Madman, which is probably the most over-quoted aphorism of Nietzsche by his hand:

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!"—As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated?—Thus they yelled and laughed.

The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become

colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.

"How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us—for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto."

Nietzsche is shocked by the discovery that metaphysics has come to an end by its own insufficience. Sadly, mankind does not understand what the death of God means, while at the same time living through the event. Continuing:

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars and yet they have done it themselves."

It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way into several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: "What after all are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?"

According to Heidegger, even Nietzsche himself does not make the right movement concerning the death of God: Being remains unthought of even by Nietzsche (Heidegger 1977, p. 58). Nietzsche turns metaphysics upside down, yet the essential question (the question concerning Being) remains hidden: the question concerning Being. Once the question concerning Being is asked, we will see that we already passed the era of nihilism, because nihilism is the time when nothing (nihil) happens to Being. Nihilism as event – the

devaluation of the true, good and beautiful – has been completed. Yet, somehow, nihilism has a defensive vehemence (Heidegger 1977, p. 65, 66). Man often attempts to escape nihilism without actually revaluing his values. This way, nihilism becomes a pessimistic suffering from which we try to escape, which actually makes the problem of nihilism even more acute (Nietzsche 1980, aphorism 28). We see this often whenever values are declining: We run, try to hold on to them, to construct them further and to find more ideals to ground them. We try to cover it up with gloss and so-called beautifications, make-overs and other cosmetic surgeries on organizational as well as personal level. Rather, according to Nietzsche and Heidegger, the task is to take nihilism as something positive, something constructive, which can only be done by revaluing all values. Nietzsche's effort to do this was the Will to Power.

When nihilism is completed as historical process, there is only one thing we still need to do, in order to take nihilism as constructive power for revaluing: we need to get rid of the *place* of values. Metaphysics has always given more importance to God, in heaven, while not valuing our place on earth. In order to gain existential importance, we need to get rid of the throne of God, so to speak. Otherwise, some value will take over power again, repeating the whole cycle of nihilism. At this point, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche fails: Nietzsche's revaluation still happens inside of metaphysics, namely in the preservation and enhancement of life as the new leading metaphysical concept (Heidegger 1977, p. 73). Hence, Nietzsche "merely" turns metaphysics upside down, he does not (or cannot) overcome it, since he is bound to his analysis of it as Will to Power inside the "subjective" tradition of metaphysics.

Nietzsche's *victory* lies in the Will to Power as well, but in a different sense. The epitome of metaphysics, namely the Will to Power, now occurs consciously out of its own principle: now we know that any metaphysics actually works as Will to Power, so we are conscious about the power principle of any metaphysical theory. Any metaphysics attempts to have power over those who become weak because of this power. Life cannot be about honor, safety, profit or value anymore, since power precedes all as the panacea of super abundant life. Yet, of course, sometimes power still hides *as* value or profit or whatever value we put upon the throne of god. The Will to Power as a conscious principle though, entails a commanding. One commands something to dispose itself in reality – this we call *change*; it is a gathering together of nature at our disposal, for instance by the saving of the energy of the sun, in order to unleash that energy elsewhere and at a different time to change something. Metaphorically, we manufacture handles unto

anything natural, in order to grasp and use it as we see fit. Kierkegaard sees the will as want (as we saw in the paragraph Fake Desire), that is why he is able to argue that the will already has what it wills. There is nothing transcending about the will in a religious sense. Willing as Power however, wills in a commanding way for its own self-preservation and self-enhancement, in order to gain power over oneself. Willing signifies a positing of conditions for reality and therefore overreaching. Today, we recognize this overreaching in our world of organizations. Organizations in this sense are synonymous to gathering together, to willing-commanding, in a branch-like system of top-down and bottom-up power-relations. These gatherings where willing-commanding happens are generally called meetings, in which decisions are made concerning a certain commodity. Central to all modern metaphysics and thus to the metaphysics of organizations is the aim to assure a basis of substance on which the physical as well as the immaterial world as we know it is built, according to Heidegger (Heidegger 1977, p. 82). The method of certainty is called truth. Truth is definitely not something which one can do without, for there has to be a content of certainty to believe in. Thus, metaphysics becomes the job of people who value truth and certainty above all other things. The *subject*, as gathering together of Willing-commands (also known as enframing) and therefore as the epitome of certainty in modern times, becomes the pinnacle of the Will to Power (Heidegger 1977, p. 83). The Will to Power is constantly making the subject substantial in modern times.

To sum up, we can see how Nietzsche both triumphs and fails with the Will to Power as the eventual method of metaphysics. He wins because now, the Will to Power can only be used consciously in the making of a metaphysical system. It can no longer be subsumed under a different concept. In other words, every system of thought will have to take power into account. Every system of thought will have to justify itself in terms of power. There is no way of ignoring power anymore. Nietzsche's failure lies in this same fact; once there is no way to ignore power, believing in *any* other value becomes excruciatingly difficult. To believe, one has to "forget" about being subject to power. But, the death of God always reminds us of what kind of power we have. We killed God! We might not know what to do with that fact, but it does reveal what powerful beings we are, whether consciously or subconsciously. This revelation is what leads to nihilism, which is the loss of the inherent validity of values. Obviously we *always have had* the power to kill God; we just did not perceive it.

5.2 The Consummation of Nature

In the previous chapter, I explored Nietzsche's destructive metaphysical perspective. In this chapter, I will analyze how his destructive perspective functions in the consummation of nature by projecting an image of power unto it. By calling the Will to Power an "image" which is "projected", one could say I am questioning the power of the Will to Power. Eventually, the Will to Power is "attached" to whatever concept strives to gain power. Yet, the validity of the concept can never be dodged, since even when we do not believe in the power of the Will to Power, we believe in another powerful concept. This is how the Will to Power inescapably enframes us and our "natural" world (in terms of power). The Will to Power, Kierkegaard might say, only exists in illusionary choices. Nietzsche however, feels this will is the metaphysical foundation of all time, simply because there is no escaping its illusionary character.

Heidegger's way of sensing is a sensing of something which comes forth and presents itself to us; something which opens itself to our perceiving. Self-consciousness (as the upkeep and enhancement of the subject) and thus the consciousness of Power, essentially make the world into a dead object, according to Heidegger. Rather a dead object than one which has power over us, might Nietzsche have said. The dehumanization of nature is also not something Heidegger is happy about. The positivist approach is rather an *assault to Being*, forcing the earth to present itself as unconditional objectification. Nature consists of dead things, so there is no hold for morality anymore to tell us not to use every part of it we can. "The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried on. It will be carried on in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines" (Heidegger 1977, p. 101), like, obviously, the Will to Power. The struggle for dominion over earth can occur because history is already in the mode of the Will to Power (nihilism as metaphysics turned upside down) without being recognized as such. The subject drives towards its own consummation in its drunken haze of power. Nietzsche showed us that willing is making conscious of its own power about itself, which happens in objectification, because in objectification the subject-object relationship is clear cut and simplistic: I am the subject and I use the object, like we saw, without any moral scruples. So the late metaphysics is about making conscious of itself through organizing (stabilizing and enhancing). Through this process the subject consumes itself as *more* subject and eventually as Übermensch. So metaphysics has something *reflective*, as will reflecting on will on the best way to continue willing.

Paraphrasing Heidegger: "So, in this time of Will to Power, what is happening to Being?" (Heidegger 1977, p. 102) With Nietzsche, Being has become a value, since everything presents itself as value in the view of the Will to Power. A value can differ in power from other values. Nietzsche found Being as a value to be the highest gift you can grant Being, since it allows humans to expressly grasp Being (the most powerful value) and make themselves out of it. Heidegger does not agree with this perspective however, since this would mean that the Will to Power is but a condition of Being. This would actually be the hiding of Being instead of revealing it, since Being is the most fundamental question; the question concerning Being is simply the question of "what is?". However close Nietzsche comes to this question, he never experienced *Being* (Heidegger 1977, p. 104); he never thought in an existential way. Eventually, *nothing* happens to Being in Nietzsche's thinking, and in the entire philosophical tradition for that matter. Apparently, Heidegger says, thinking in terms of values is nihilism itself, since *nothing* happens to Being in this thinking. Hence, for Heidegger, Nietzsche did not think existentially, nor did he experience Being at any point. Value-thinking is the essence of the turning around of nihilism. The overcoming of nihilism actually means consummation of nihilism, which I will analyze in the next chapter.

5.3 Technology and the Response-ability of Reply

In the previous chapter, we explored Nietzsche's limits according to Heidegger. These limits consist of the inescapable definition that all ideas strive to become more powerful; "money", for instance, has gotten more and more powerful the last couple of centuries. Metaphysics has been occupied, throughout our history, with making concepts more powerful by perfecting them. According to Heidegger, this was a mistake, because metaphysics should have questioned experiences closer to Being by asking: what do we relate to in the first place? The answer to this question in our time, according to Heidegger, would be that we generally relate to what we experience in a practical-enframing way. Yet, there is an alternative.

Thus, unlike other – metaphysical – philosophers, Heidegger returns to the question of the ground of any and all metaphysics, namely the question concerning Being (Heidegger 2008, p. 23). The word Being is, however, a difficult one to grasp: what does Being mean, exactly? One needs to keep in mind that our confusion at this word and his language in general is exactly what Heidegger intends. Heidegger questions certain ideas we never questioned ourselves, making us blind for the full meaning of the words we use. By Being he actually means all things which are near us, all things *and* us, here, in time and our understanding of this nearness (Visser 1989, p. 77). The question concerning Being seems like a self-evident question then, since we are always near the things we are near; we are always with the things surrounding us. However true this may be, history shows us that the question concerning Being is absolutely not self-evident and unnecessary. Like the history of philosophy and perhaps our own personal history shows us, human beings are extremely capable at being at different places than where they actually, "physically", are, whether in fantasies or through technological mass-media. So the language Heidegger employs with regard to Being is not merely an impressive philosophical show of neologisms; its function is to make us *stop* skipping over ourselves and to interrupt us from our inbred habits. Heidegger seems to think these verbal habits (we call concepts) are metaphysically enframed to be "universally valid".

What makes us skip over ourselves all the time, then? What is this power which has the ability to let us be ahead of ourselves all the time? In accordance with *The Question concerning Technology*, the answer to this question is also technology. More specifically, the answer to this question is our use of technology while not knowing what we are using. While metaphysics attempts to create an essence for us to believe in, the enframing of

technology in modern times seems to be the forgetting of an essence in order to simply *use* instruments. Heidegger reminds us that the essence of technology is nothing technological. Neither is this essence of technology some anthropological, social or metaphysical essence. Essence, namely, does not mean *essentia* here; essence does not refer to some essential part, but rather to that which *endures* in technology. According to Heidegger, this enduring aspect of technology has nothing to do with technology itself: the process of enframing just wants us to think that the essence of technology is technological in nature. Yet, something only has essence when it has the power to endure. This seems like a view Nietzsche would heartily agree with, although he might define the enduring thing as a symptom of power, as we saw before. So, the question concerning the essence of technology is a question towards *what* in technology endures. For Heidegger the essence, that which endures of technology, is not something technological, as we saw. But how can that be? What is the enduring essence of technology, then? In a way, the answer is obvious: it is man who endures, and, more truthfully: it is the subject who endures. This subject (*subiectum, hypokeimenon*[1]) (Heidegger 1977, p. 128) establishes a relation to the world and is, very realistically, the enduring foundation on which the technological representation of the world is built. To get to the essence of technology however, the subject needs to develop a *freestanding* relation with technology. Because, how can we get to the essence of something when we cannot think about it freely, without the thing influencing our very thinking of it? Heidegger defines freedom in a spatial way, namely as freestanding. We need to be at a distance from technology to be able to see its essence clearly; to be able to oversee it. That might be the main reason why Heidegger did most of his thinking in a cabin in the forest. When human himself is caught in the technological system of *praxis* – which always has a goal outside of itself – it becomes very hard to keep a freestanding relation to it.

To analyze the essence of technology, Heidegger re-examines the modes of technological thinking, namely causality in all its forms. His interpretation of these modes of causality is remarkable, since he searches for this definition within the ancient Greeks and not within the modern Newtonian model of causality. He defines causality as *responsibility*. This responsibility is nothing moralistic: it is an *occasioning* responsibility, a *crafting* responsibility. It is "Starting something on its way into arrival, an inducing to go forward" (Heidegger 1977, p. 9). According to Heidegger, this inducing forward and occasioning is how the Greeks experienced the concept of causality. They did not experience causality as a natural

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[1] *Both translate as* persisting underlying substance, *hence enduring.*

physical reaction of forces. The Newtonian type of causality lays claim to an objective reality outside of us, while the Greek causality includes the experiencing subject into the "equation". Causality as responsibility – the Object's *ability to response* instead of just being an image – resides in *poiesis*, in the poietic work of bringing something forth for its own sake. One would probably not be surprised that this bringing forth for its own sake is the destiny of the arts in the aesthetic realm (Heidegger 1977, p. 116). It seems very different from a regular organizational discourse, in which work ought to have practical value. How else can you measure your work, the work of your company and of your subordinates, than through practical results? This is, of course, very true. However, poiesis, whatever we might be inclined to believe, is not something accidental or random, in the sense that it happens only in an artist's dream or in coincidences. Poiesis has a different responsibility than this enframing, the latter which attempts to capture the subject in an organizational responsibility-thinking. Where the responsibility of praxis urges human to *challenge* others and nature to measurable results, the responsibility of poiesis is a responsibility of *reply*, of a reaction in language.

Let us go back to our initial question: The question concerning the essence of technology. Heidegger's analysis and method of questioning deals with finding out the truth about technology. It should not be a surprise that truth in existentialism is not the truth of factual correctness. This correctness would only be possible within a certain procedural discourse, where we can measure our findings. Correctness only has meaning in a setting in which man needs to follow protocol. But, as we saw, Heidegger aims at a freestanding questioning of an essence. When we reach and complete this freestanding questioning, truth is "merely" technology showing itself to us in its essence. We explored before that contrary to metaphysical attempts to create an essence, the enframing effect of technology, attempts to hide an essence. Truth in this sense is the revealing of this hiding: to catch enframing in the act. Truth "as correctness" may have become obsolete with Nietzsche, who opened up the realm of suspicion for us, thereby showing us the actual power mechanisms in truth as correctness. Let us see whether Heidegger escapes similar suspicion.

So far we noticed how Heidegger returns to a question forgotten by metaphysics, namely the question concerning Being. With this question, he intends to return to our roots, to our own environment, contrary to the abstract systems of thought. Returning to our environment, he realizes Being in our time is hidden behind technology; technology is everywhere around us and is our normal mode of living, while Being is, yet again, nowhere

to be found. So the question concerning the oblivion of Being becomes the question concerning technology in our time. He then searches for the essence of technology in order to understand our time better. This essence of technology lies not in technology itself, but in our use of nature and the world. When taking a free-standing perspective on technology, he finds that there are two ways to use objects: one of which is the enframing of praxis, the other the aesthetic response-ability of poiesis.

5.4 Truth and Concealment

Thus, in contrast to Nietzsche's far away metaphysics, Heidegger examines what is near us. Heidegger defines the way we relate to our environment in our modern era as a way in which we expect everything near us (from objects, to values, to our bodies) to be immediately ready for use. Yet, the truth about this *immediate usability* is a paradoxical one: uncovering the fact that everything should be made usable disables the usability itself. In other words, when observing objects in order to understand them instead of using them, we actually notice how strange it is that we are not using them. The truth about the technological usability of things, therefore, reveals the modern paradoxical frame of technology in which we are generally caught.

Truth is hence synonymous to revealing. When we look at technology truthfully, it will un-cover its essence before us. Becoming transparent, as Kierkegaard found an essential part of a true choice, also seems to be the essence of Heidegger's truthful questioning. So, the truth about technology refers to a revealing of the essence of technology; a becoming transparent of technology. But does not technology itself reveal something as well? We can see how technology works, can we not? The image technology wants us to see is however not a truthful revealing, but rather a concealing. Modern technology's concealing movement is a Nietzschean way of concealing: it enframes us, so we will not be able to see outside of the frame anymore. In modern technology, nature is called upon to present itself as how we imagined nature. Nature is not revealed for the sake of nature, but for the sake of being usable and practical by us, which happens through science and research. Exactly this is what modern and mechanized technology entails. I feel therefore that modern technology is essentially capitalistic, since it treats nature as commodity, which can be stockpiled to provide maximum yield at a minimum of expense. Hence the sun can be stored and kept until man decides to unleash its power (Heidegger 1977, p. 15). The horizon can be placed where ever we feel the need to represent things. The sea can be made land and land can be made sea. The secret of nature (its *energy*) can be unlocked and transformed, stored and distributed as we see fit (H16). We notice here the securing and regulating tendencies we noticed before in metaphysics. Now we finally secured the subject, unlocking the possibility to equalize object & nature, because now the subject is the ground on which the equalizing takes place. In our technological society, nature is not a big question mark anymore: nature has been secured. In this process, we secure not only our subjectness, but also the objectness of the world. The withstanding and immensely

different Object becomes the domesticated object: we manufacture handles or points of entry on every object we could not carry naturally. I would argue that we normally assure ourselves that any object can only exist as practical, usable object, after which we can in-sure ourselves against any other possibility. Insurance is the securing of those moments we essentially cannot secure. It is an enframed process, in the sense that there is no genu-ine thinking or reflection involved, only stockpiling and reproduction to make chances of exception smaller. In this light, the financial crisis seems less and less unlikely an event: unlimited stockpiling in an enframed discourse eventually leads to a breakdown, since the earth's resources are not as unlimited as believed in the enframed discourse.

Nevertheless, are there ways to reveal what is happening in technology from a free-standing point of view? The unconcealment of truth cannot be brought about by mere subjects; it would be too great a task for anyone. "The fact that the real has been showing itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of Plato, Plato did not bring about. The think-er only responded to what addressed itself to him." (Heidegger 1977, p. 18) This also stands in line with Heidegger's description of responsibility, as we saw before. The respon-sibility of *poiesis* is a responsibility of reply. Poiesis is not meant to judge Plato for not thinking existentially. Rather, a poietic interpretation can explain why Plato did not think existentially. In this way we will understand more about our own time as well. The only foundation for a humane society would be a focus on the truth as poiesis, with the respon-sibility of reply as "action-framework".

5.5 Enframing (Das Gestell)

Truth is thus, according to Heidegger, a mode of revealing what is actually happening. It is a poietic mode through which we bring the effects of a system to light, instead of forcing a certain truth into a frame. We already saw why poiesis is important; only poiesis has a direct relationship with the essence of technology, because it reveals the process of enframing from the outside of its structure in order to perceive exactly what is happening. This technological "usability-framework" is called *Das Gestell* by Heidegger. On the one hand, enframing signifies the mood of global usability. On the other hand, enframing points to the demand on man to make the world and its objects usable. Enframing is thus truly a *frame* which enframes man.

So, the core benefit of an existential approach is the revealing function of truth, versus the enframing need to make Being into *standing reserve*, made ready to be at our command at all times. An existential approach allows Being to come forward, instead of enframing it. Let us first go back into history and analyze how Being has been experienced before. Being has been hidden and subsumed under metaphysics for a very long time. As we saw before, the reason metaphysics could destroy itself, was because of nihilism. Nihilism in Heidegger's interpretation means that metaphysics and history were never about Being. Therefore, with the destruction of metaphysics, we lost nothing essential. Metaphysics was destined to destroy itself, for it was only meant to keep the powerful in positions of power, I would argue. The Will to Power uncovered metaphysics for what it really was, from within. In other words, metaphysics never touched Being itself, while it claimed to search for Being everywhere. Simultaneously, however, Being came into presence as metaphysics, or as nature, during a huge part of our history. Why is this so, when metaphysics was never about Being? Basically, whenever things are experienced as being *near* our heart and people understand this nearness in a certain way, we can speak about Being. Furthermore, we cannot claim that people never experienced God, Power, nature or other metaphysical concepts as being close to them. In Christianity, even God becomes personal. So, Being was always there during metaphysics, yet it is never understood as Being. The moment God (or any metaphysical concept) is experienced as nearness, is the moment the historical process of nihilism begins, since it is the *nearness* and our *understanding* of it which is important, and not God. So, eventually, Being presents itself by its hiding as metaphysical concept. This presencing of Being is a *hiding*-coming-to-presence, concealing itself to man *as* something (values, God), but never as what it is (unconcealed Being).

Heidegger calls this *enframing* (das Gestell).

Where nihilism is the essence of metaphysics, enframing is the essence of technology. Metaphysics, in this sense, is the preliminary stage of technology. First, the process of historical nihilism has to be completed. When it is completed, Being can finally reveal itself. Yet, the meaning of the revelation of Being is its own hiding-coming-to-presence in technology. Basically, after the death of God, Being shows us it will be hidden again in the process of enframing. So, there is no clear-cut, clean revelation of Being. At least, not for a long time to come, if ever. By the coming to presence of technology, something is obviously revealed to us. Yet the way technology reveals itself has never been an unconcealment of Being. Technology is as the mythical Maya's Veil or as a woman's make-up, through which she shows something, while she hides the essence of what is underneath. Let us point out that Heidegger does not describe enframing moralistically; there is nothing good or bad to it; but it is essential to Being in our time.

Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological. (Heidegger 1977, p. 20)

Again, one should notice Heidegger's peculiar use of language. I would argue that his use of language is peculiar, purely and solely because we are used to a more enframing way of speaking. Heidegger deliberately and necessarily breaks open our enframed use of language, to establish a Turning (Kehre) towards poiesis. In the translation of the quote above, we notice that first of all enframing is a *gathering together*. What does enframing gather together then? It gathers together a certain frame with a hooking point which hooks man (Stellen). In other words, man is called forward to his boss, to reveal reality, but in a specific mode, namely the mode of *praxis*, an assembly of stocked usability (Heidegger 1977, p. 22). In this sense, man is a soldier of practical change in the world. Yet, since technology works how it works, namely as enframing, there can be no real change inside of its discourse.

The essence of technology lies in the meaning, revealed by the Kehre, of setting-upon (Stellen). This meaning is in the sense of *poiesis*, because in truth das Gestell cannot be something enframing. If it were, life would have already found its completion in the perfect organization of humanity and accumulation of science and technology. In

Heidegger we see a maturing of the Nietzschean suspicion of the meaninglessness of practical progress: It is not that progress itself is meaningless, but progress purely within enframing is never progress. Progress lies in the Kehre. So when Heidegger says, "modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve" (Heidegger 1977, p. 21), it is both a description of its essential working as technology as well as a free-standing rendition on that working in our reading of that particular sentence. Because, when the essence of technology is expressed in language, we are able to free ourselves from a unilateral interpretation (which was hidden to us, just like Apollo was hidden before the creation of Dionysus) and come to the interpretation of poiesis. Hence, "language is the house of Being".

      To recapitulate about Heidegger and this paragraph in particular, we saw that in metaphysics, nothing ever happened to Being. Through the entire history of metaphysics, Being was used in an enframing manner to create systems of thought. These systems of thought were, however, experienced as very immense and close to humanity. This immensity and closeness is Being showing itself while hidden behind some concept of thought. When metaphysics was completed by means of historical nihilism, Being showed itself in modern technology. The difference between metaphysics and modern technology is hence that we can be aware that Being is hidden inside modern technology. The essence of modern technology makes it possible to experience the enframing. During metaphysical times, this was not possible, since metaphysics involved universal structures, which man could not escape or turn around, until of course, Nietzsche did that very thing, heralding the end of metaphysics and the beginning of existentialism. In fact, Kierkegaard heralded existentialism as well, by emphasizing the individual's choice, based on the individual's experience and mood. This allows for an escape for the individual of the absolute system, hence also opening up the existential Kehre towards poiesis.

5.6 The Danger & Redeeming Power

Enframing (Das Gestell) is thus what Heidegger calls the process of storing nature, i.e. in batteries or other commodities, in order to use it whenever we see fit. This process of modern technology is a dangerous undertaking. Eventually, nature will not be able to sustain the frame in which we live. Heidegger therefore searches for ways to escape this totalitarian enframing. Paradoxically, he discovers this redeeming power in the same place where lies the danger, namely in the process of enframing. The uncovering power of truth is necessary in order to perceive the enframing process justly. So, when we look at technological enframing from an outsider's perspective, we can judge it justly instead of being its slave. However, this is not a critique of technology as much as it is a critique of humans' enframing ways.

So, versus the ordering forth of enframing, the poietic *destines* (Heidegger 1977, p. 25). This destining is a subtle invitation into an open space, in order to be able to reply. So, can we conclude it is simply a matter of choice between two extremes of a duality, practical enframing versus poiesis? Is it perhaps only a choice between the practical ethical versus the poietic aesthetic? Yet, as we saw, for Kierkegaard, true choice occurs *before* the either/or and not between the *either* and the *or*. It would then be a misinterpretation of Being, were we to say that Heideggerian existentialism would be a rejection of technical use and machinery in favor of an aesthetic – destining – approach to human existence. This misinterpretation is not so much about it being an incorrect interpretation of life. Rather, this dualism would be another creation of metaphysics, because of its creation of absolutes, and therefore, as Nietzsche shows us, fundamentally a disregard of its own power and a concealing of Being. What this means is that any metaphysics which aims to be constructive, historically valid, thus *powerful*, needs to close its eye towards its inner workings of power. When it discovers its own workings of power, it eventually self-destructs. This is the reason metaphysics ended with the process of nihilism and why, in *The Age of the World Picture,* Heidegger tells us "When this occurs, then the gods have fled" (Heidegger 1977, p. 117), where "this" refers to the degradation of man's inner – metaphysical – relation to god into "mere religious experience"; in other words, the completed process of nihilism.

Man's final delusion is this fallacy of dualism: it is the idea that "man everywhere

and always encounters only himself" (Heidegger 1977, p. 27). This egological[2] error tells man he is the only one who can decide which direction to take, which road to travel. It refers to the all-encompassing idea of autonomy: man can decide his own destiny, everything has "gathered together" and is at the ready for man to carve out his ideal reality. In this gathering together, the *powerful* practical side of the praxis-poiesis dualism is obviously the better choice. To even consider an aesthetic, goal-in-itself, course of action would feel like treason to the idea of an autonomous identity, since it would signify that autonomy is not all-encompassing. But, knowing the technological claim for what it is – enframing – man can *never* encounter only himself, since he is the one *spoken to*, hence he *eksists* from without of himself into the world. How can one find only oneself when one is revealed from out-of-within? It is possible only as a grave mistake. The compelling enframing is that which conceals itself like this idea of autonomy, and thus also prohibits truth. Since the essence of technology has nothing to do with technology, but with truth as revealing, the threat does not lie in the working of the machinery and the use of technology itself. The danger lies in the fact that man could lose his possibility to perceive *Being* more originally, i.e. poietic. In other – organizational – words, man might become stuck *inside* a discourse, without any possibility to open it up and take a step back towards freedom. Man might become someone who only "exists" in the language of the system, like we saw in George Orwell's *1984* and Aldous Huxley's *A Brave New World*. Unlike these books show however, the danger lies in the *disguising* of it (Heidegger 1977, p. 37). We do not realize we are in danger and that is the danger itself. Perhaps this is also why the great tragedies of our time (The World Wars, for instance) could have happened and why Heidegger wrote most of his work on technology in the years after World War II.

On the other hand, Heidegger claims that the redeeming power also resides in this danger of losing Being: "*But where danger is, grows the saving power also*" – Hölderlin (Heidegger 1977, p. 28). Here a Turning (Kehre) takes place, since "it is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by "essence" (Heidegger 1977, p. 30). What this means is that technology is primarily a method, a mediation, between us and the world. Basically, this mediation can never be the essence, since mediation happens *in between* being and beings. So, since technology is mediating, it cannot be the essence of itself. The believe in technology as its essence is what is dangerous. Yet, apparently, Heidegger is in no way against technology as such, but

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[2] Interestingly, Levinas most important critique on Heidegger was on the notion of Heidegger's supposed egological ontology, in favor of a fundamental ethics. Here, however, Heidegger does not seem to be in favor of egological thinking.

only warns us for its danger. How does the Turning, toward seeing that technology does not equal its essence, come to pass then? How can we be redeemed from this mistake? The answer to this question lies in the Greek definition of the essence as *enduring,* as we explored on page 70. This enduring is granted to man by enframing, since that which has a (more or less) stable frame needs to (more or less) endure. The question concerning technology is important, first of all, because of the enduring of technology. Technology is not something which comes and goes: since the beginning of time, when man used tools to hunt and gather, technology has been a hiding-coming-to-presence of Being. In other words, technology has always hidden the fact that it needs to be used when it is used: when we are using a spoon, for instance, we do not care to think about how uncanny it is that our hand "fits" the spoon. We simply use the spoon. So, whatever else we can explain about technology, it endures because of how normal it is, or, in other words, because of its enframing character. Heidegger's exploration is a questioning of *what* exactly makes technology endure. The answer to this question is simply *Being*. The danger then lies in the hiding of Being through technology: the danger is that by using technology, we forget that the essence of this use is not located in technology, but in our relationship with technology. The redeeming power lies in figuring out about that uncanny relationship, while continuing to use technology. Heidegger primarily calls on us to stay observant of the danger, in the mode of aesthetic reply, to make sure that man is truly given to himself and not to some practical goal, while at the same time realizing that man's aim toward practical goals is what makes it possible to experience it differently and freely.

An important remark needs to be made concerning the nature of existential philosophy. One might think that to be conscious of the danger is the right way to be saved from harm. Yet being conscious would not be a valid way of dealing with the danger, since *consciousness* is not in fact something which has a certain tradition: it appears to be something metaphysical. A consciousness is called into existence which has the ability to judge. This consciousness is a perceived singularity, while there actually is no such thing. Being happens in the relation between *what is – near.* Poiesis however, is something *aesthetic*, which means that is has to do with seeing, hearing and feeling (perhaps smelling as well). This seeing, hearing and feeling is what makes *time* so important in what we call existence, since it is only possible to see, hear and feel *something*, in a particular discourse, in a particular time. Aesthetic judgment is the ordering forth (enframing) of ourselves to look for and listen to the ordering forth of ourselves in reality. In other words, aesthetics makes us ready to find that which has been made ready. This might be where

Kierkegaard's true choice really lies: It is obviously absurd to be made ready to search for the readymade reality in the world. *Being made ready for use* is a concept of enframing. Since this enframing is a matter of external goals, we can ask what would be the external goal in experiencing *reality being made ready*? There cannot be one, since it falls outside of the inner workings of technology, while at the same time being driven by technological enframing itself. It is absurd, yet is there another – better – choice? Does not the aesthetic inside existentialism *command* us to listen to Being? Can there be any other goal? We thus ask ourselves whether the Nietzschean Will to Power is so absent from Heidegger's existentialism. It seems that a Will to Power orders us into *making things ready,* even if we escape the danger of practical technology. How would Heidegger have written his books, if not ordered by *Being*?

This leads us to another question, namely the question of why Heidegger did not write, as Levinas suggested, a more ethical – metaphysical – work (Levinas 1969, A4 "Metaphysics Precedes Ontology"). Heidegger's ethics, apparently contradictory, lie in his aesthetics: It is when seeing with our eyes and listening with our ears for those moments when *Being* reveals itself (in technology near us), that we will be able to catch its hiding. Yet, when attempting to catch Being as it hides itself, we are always too late. Being is already hidden from us, before we can even catch onto its hiding. As far as I am concerned, this is exactly why Heidegger did not write an ethical-procedural work, or why ethical works in general are less valuable than often, practically, thought. I would argue that ethical works do not recognize that they come after the fact; they presuppose an open space where there is room for us to think about ethics. Yet, we are *too late* for that, technology has already hidden existence from us and thinking otherwise is actually an enframed way of hiding Being. This is the setting Heidegger is in. When man keeps an eye on the dangers at all times, a possibility opens up in the future for man to safeguard Being by revealing technology's working. This might seem to be an ethical "eye", yet I would argue that it is primarily an (normative) aesthetic matter, a matter of *sensing* and not a matter of theorizing about that normativity.

5.7 Technè

In the previous section, we discovered that both the danger and the redeeming power of our modern time are located in enframing. The danger would be the mindless acceptance of the supposed usability of modern technology as the grounding frame of our time. Note that mindless also refers to intelligent people, since the designation "intelligent" already refers to the "enframed human". The redeeming power lies in the truth about technology in terms of poiesis. Poiesis refers to the artist's way of guiding something into existence which harbors a certain aesthetic view on life (a painting, for instance), instead of forcefully creating something efficient and practical. Surprisingly, the ancient Greeks called both poiesis and praxis *technè*. Just like the difference between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, there does not appear to be a clear-cut, real-life, distinction between poiesis and praxis. This is why, eventually, there can only be redeeming power where there is danger and vice versa.

As we explained, Heidegger proposes a different way of dealing with technological modernity. Next to this, he does not only offer this way, he *writes* this way: It permeates his language. This is the meaning of the ancient Greek word of technè in its supposed original meaning. Technè does not only refer to the technological praxis, but also to a technological poiesis, which is the aesthetic part of technology. This aesthetic possibility is opened up when we are astounded: Through everything technological, the essence of technology – which is nothing technological – might come to reveal itself. The more immanent the danger of hiding Being in favor of practical exercises is, the more powerful the aesthetic force to be *astounded* by the revealed saving power becomes. This is what Heidegger means by art. The job of the artist in the broadest sense is then to first lay the groundwork for thinking and experiencing the essence of Being and to prepare the road which is – often – blocked by enframing (Heidegger 1977, p. 40). Now, if Heidegger would pose anything as destructive, it would be the dominance of a practical interpretation of technology. This dominance is what, according to Heidegger, constitutes modernity as an era. Most of us live our life in the shadow of the ghost in the machine, accepting a certain set of values or regulation as natural and unthought laws. We are constantly pulled by this dominance of one side of technè: It is our only understanding of the nearness which surrounds us, losing Being in the process. Yet, the poietic side of technè should not be seen as an antidote for the loss of Being. The poietic might seem more important than praxis, simply because in our time, the poietic is nearly disregarded as a valid mode to

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Being. This is so, because we often require scientific argumentation to support poietic views, after which we are surprised when the aesthetic cannot give proper scientific arguments for its revealing of Being, while the rest of reality appears to conform to the status quo of capitalism and practical order.

The poietic does not allow itself to be commanded like that. It does not require any outside change, except an existential turning in the responsibility of the subject in its relation to Being. When this happens, the world changes, because our understanding of language changes. The aesthetic-poietic is not nearly enough for this to happen however, just like the practical and rational would not be enough. The true redeeming power lies a presupposition in technology as *destining*: it lies in an opening up of human's relation to himself, which in our time is revealed by a poietic understanding of technology, simply because the poietic is the alternative method necessary for us to have a deeper relation to our Being compared to the superficial and fast relationship of praxis. In other words, the poietic reveals that it is our destiny to define ourselves as our relationship with technology, in this modern time.

To summarize, the poietic and enframing are not opposites. Although enframing might aim for total dominion of the private and public realm, it will never be able to keep this aim going, since it will simply be observed in its attempts to dominate. This observing, that is the poietic, disarms the enframing praxis. Yet, the poietic *needs* a frame in order to reveal anything, because, as we saw, poiesis always arrives when enframing has already started. Still, the two are not actually distinct, since it is only the one movement of Being which has any meaning whatsoever. This one movement of Being lies in the fact that it hides and while it hides, it is discovered. Being is the third observer in a game of hide-and-seek, who knows exactly where someone hid, because it did not close its eyes when the seeker was counting. Being needs the game in order to reveal the hiding, while at the same time breaking the enframing of the game where one is not allowed to peek. The danger would be an everlasting game of hide-and-seek, where no one can find the one who hid, yet they ceaselessly try to stay within the limits of the game to do so. Being brings about destiny, in the sense that it can experience the hiding places where it is hidden.

5.8 Thought as Catalyst

As Heidegger's critique mainly addresses the metaphysical tendency to enframe the world as thought-experiments, he opens another definition of thought. In the previous section, we saw that, essentially, there is no difference between poiesis and praxis. The difference "only" resides in how we see, feel and think (and thus enframe). In this sense, thought becomes something less central than we are used to. During metaphysical times, thought was generally seen as more important than feeling. I already analyzed Nietzsche's critique on thought and how feeling is an essential part of the enframing as well. Although thought might still be very important in Heidegger's philosophy, real thought (meaning thought from outside of the frame, unto the frame) happens from the periphery.

The Turning we mentioned before is a turning in and towards thinking. In a part of the NESKE Documentary, Heidegger made the clearest analogy: one does not need to know the exact workings of technology and science to be able to operate, say, a television. In the same way, one does not need to be able to know how to think to be able to think (http://youtu.be/9_vYz4nQUcs 4:20). Yet, knowing how to think allows us to be free-standing to what we think about. This is a freedom metaphysics never had, since it was mainly focused on perfecting the system of metaphysics, yet did not know what the essence of the system was. Basically, in our obvious use of a microwave oven, we are metaphysicians, expecting technology to work as it works without any knowledge of the essence of our use.

The Turning towards knowing how to think moves from the entrapment of Being in oblivion towards the safekeeping of Being near us, at home. The turning refers to an understanding of what we are doing locally, in contrast with a knowing what happens in the abstraction of a metaphysical idea. It is something which astounds, like we saw, because it happens suddenly and unexpectedly. The turning in thought cannot be predicted in any way, since it is so heavily dependent on whatever and whenever Being lights up. Yet, I would argue that an opening up through *poiesis* invites this Turning: when we emphasize poietically bringing something into Being, we take a *coaching* attitude towards whatever reveals itself to us: we become catalysts of Being. Thought can never be mine alone, since language is not essentially mine either. It is only possible to coach something else into existence on a shared foundation of experience. This shared foundation of experience is Being, that which is near to us and reveals itself to us as

technology. This nearness, *Being,* is nothing more than our interest and stake in what is close to us. We can only coach something into existence when we care about that something or someone. I would argue that caring, by definition, can only happen to things which are close to our experience.

The turning from enframing toward the (in my words) coaching-poietic is an invitation into the workings of thought. The thorough investigation of technological methods (*science*) cannot reveal it, since that only leads to a practical investigation. It can only be discovered through a glance. It is this almost minimalistic glance, in which the truth – the uncovering process – and Being emerges. So, what exactly happens in the glance? A glance is never a straight investigation with all the enframing tools of research at our disposal. Rather a glance happens from a corner, towards the center – where "things happen". Yet, the people in the center are closely working with the specific thing, while a glance from the corner has absolutely no effect in technological sense. So, because of this glance, the thing recovers its right to stand before us as object, impassable, instead of as usable tool. The thing cannot demand us to come forward and join its discourse, when we do not approach it from an enframing perspective. Enframing is the enemy of the glance, because it does not only disguise the impassable Object as usable thing, it even disguises this very disguising. Enframing is a meta-disguising, in a way. Thinking, for Heidegger, means renouncing the purely rational human. Rather it consists of projecting oneself towards the insight of coming-to-pass, of the revealing of truth, of genuine questioning from an independent point of view, through a poietic coaching.

When we talk about thinking in this way, we talk about thinking as questioning. Actually, we talk about thinking being questioning. Questioning is not a metaphor of thinking (questioning *as* thinking), but questioning is the most original method of thinking, in the mode of language. Similarly, Nietzsche posed that originally language constructed concepts and later science took over that part (Nietzsche 1879 , p. 21). Yet, for Heidegger, this is not exactly true, since the construction of concepts comes from the original questioning: A turning of what language hides (essence), so instead it gets to reveal this essence in more original language, the language from the glance in the corner. Although we explored Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche in the first chapter of this part, I am still suspicious of Heidegger's fundamental founding of a more original question, namely the question concerning Being, mostly because Nietzsche sometimes seems to be suspicious about knowing in general. When we return to the writing of Nietzsche, we read the following:

Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly-as though the world's axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself. There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought. (Nietzsche 1879, p. 8)

It almost appears as if Heidegger's *more fundamental* way of thinking is based on Nietzsche's insights in the fundamental power plays within the act of knowing. Now the question becomes whether Heidegger's revelation is another mode, outside of the power of knowing, or whether it feigns to complicate the enframing discourse in order to gain power. Is Heidegger's existentialism truly the herald of a new era, a modern era in which we think Being more original than ever before? Perhaps it is. The beauty of Nietzsche's thinking is that he clearly investigates the construction of knowledge *in a non-moral* sense. Nietzsche himself opened up the realm of truth with this investigation, for anyone to construct a crown and throne for his or her own knowledge-expertise. In one way, Heidegger "merely" tried to hold it all together, to, as he himself says, *destine* Western contemporary evening-thinking toward a new future, a future which was nearly destroyed with the end of metaphysics. Doing this, he takes his distance from Nietzsche, in order to be able to create a free-standing discourse and not a temple to the man before him, Nietzsche. This free-standing discourse is clearly which influenced his analysis of the enframing praxis: Nietzsche's Will to Power is nothing if not practical in its working; even the stones and dirt are upheld by it. Yet, the Will to Power's goal lies outside it as well as inside. The most fundamental (existential) relation of man to himself would *also* be determined by Will to Power, in Nietzsche's philosophy. Yet, because Nietzsche investigated metaphysics so radically and deep, without turning away from it, Heidegger might have felt justified in turning away from it so radically. Metaphysics was done for, since it was questioned from within to its point of self-destruction.

However, Heidegger found that the essence of metaphysics was still not thought by Nietzsche. Nietzsche did not look from a free standing point towards metaphysics, as to determine its essence. He named himself a follower of Dionysus, so he dived right into the

debate of metaphysics. So, Nietzsche might not ever have thought existentially, as Heidegger posed (Heidegger 1977, p. 104); it is still the question whether Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is entirely acceptable. Whether the most foolish or the most brilliant, one cannot escape a lust for power through knowledge. Existentialism, on the other hand, seems to disregard the importance and urgency of power-play in our world. Contrary, Heidegger hopes for a better time in which Being is more fundamentally experienced, a point of view which creates an extreme responsibility for the individual. Weirdly, Nietzsche might be seen as more at peace than Heidegger with the shadow side of reality, while he was the one who still clung on to a metaphysics, contrary to Heidegger. Nietzsche describes the road of the Will to Truth, which Heidegger seems to have adopted, integrated and used. Yet a Will to Truth – perhaps even Heidegger's truth as *revealing* – harbors the Will to Power. Nietzsche writes that it is imperative to make peace with the worst *bellum omium contra omnes,* in order to found the first of all truths, namely the terms of this peacemaking (Nietzsche 1879, p. 10). Before we can live, there need to be terms of peace. Peace is hereby a state of exception. The war which we are talking about is the war between the world and its image, between the unmovable Object and the made-ready object. Because Nietzsche wrote about the destruction of metaphysics, Heidegger was in a position to make peace with the world, which had been leeched upon for so long by its forceful image. Heidegger made peace with the world by being more essential in his thinking, by which he created the distance he needed between the revealer of the death of god and the harbinger of the essential, *Being*.

It might sound counter-intuitive, but all these arguments are actually not arguments against Heidegger and his thinking, just like Heidegger's arguments about Nietzsche showing us the oblivion of Being is not an argument against Nietzsche. It seems that the hiding-coming-to-presence of Being inside Heidegger's own work might be a constructive hiding of Nietzsche's Will to Power, to focus on something which was yet obscured in Nietzsche. When one glances from the corner, one definitely does not see everything. But the concealment of Nietzsche in Heidegger's work needs to be uncovered, if we are to arrive at a truthful explanation of his existentialism. It is thus not quite as important that Heidegger disregarded certain other interpretations of Nietzsche, which might fit an existential approach better. The true suspicious and radical question Nietzsche would have asked Heidegger is whether or not Heidegger used valid language to make the unreal real, which is the criterion of a grasp for power (Nietzsche 1879, p. 10). Through his writing, Heidegger's tries to open up a different way of experiencing, namely

an experiencing beyond the ever affective limits of power, thereby powerfully recruiting us for the validity of his concepts in the future. But, it is a powerful recruiting in a different way, because the power works through an open invitation. Most people will not be touched by Heidegger's language, otherwise we would all be using poietic language on a daily basis. On the other hand, Nietzsche's Will to Power *does* touch everyone, at all times, at least according to the explanation of the concept. So perhaps, in being poietic, Heidegger really does glance from the corner and therefore needs to stay the exception in a world of power-accumulation. Perhaps there is no other way.

Heidegger's existentialism and the metaphysical language he employs make him appear a thinker of the sublime and infinite. Indeed, the possibility would exist that man is given to himself most fundamentally in this modern era, with every freedom that entails. To express this fundamental existential relation of man to himself in a coaching-poietic way is thus of the utmost important for people to understand their own ground. Yet this ground is not known to us yet. This simple fact makes our own ground not fully our own: There is a sense of the Other in us, we are not fully who we are. Basically, the Other in us means that the Will to Power indeed *cannot* be all-encompassing. Because, how would we know if it were? Nietzsche is obscure, even for himself, since he cannot touch this Other, yet still forces the Other inside his metaphysics of power-accumulation (Heidegger 1979, p. 97). So, while Nietzsche's rejected Kant's thought-experiments of reason, his own thought-experiments of metaphysics still last. So, does Heidegger allow this Other to be Other? In fact, it appears he does, namely in the concept of poiesis itself. Poiesis is a relating process, since the destining forth which is our responsibility is not something we can figure out by ourselves. It needs to happen *near* us, in a concrete situation, where there are Others as well. Although Being is a general concept, it is not a closed and final concept like the Will to Power is. The Will to Power is closed and finalized by the idea of Eternal Recurrence, which consists of a cyclical idea of time, instead of a linear. This cyclical idea entails the ever repeating and coming again of the Will to Power, meaning that the Will to Power cannot tire or change itself. Everything is an expression of the Will to Power and in that sense, everything will be again an expression of the Will to Power. Heidegger uses time as an opening and not as a closing, which allows the Other to reveal itself. "So long as we do not, through thinking, experience what is, we can never belong to what will be" (Heidegger 1979, p. 49)

We have seen how Heidegger aims for the coaching-revealing of the essence of an-ything near us (the bringing about of the revelation of Being), contrary to an approach

which aims to create air castles which we can live by. This coaching-revealing happens from the periphery and not from the center, because the periphery allows one to escape being absorbed by the system. This system creates a center of practical effects. We also suspiciously explored the possibility that the coaching-revealing from the corner is actually a new grasp for power instead of a true coaching. In other words, I asked whether one would be satisfied sitting in the corner, glancing, or whether the corner-glance is actually a renewed effort to create a center and banish the process of enframing to the corner. Yet, because the coaching-revealing is a relational method, its essence lies in the relation between the enframing and the revelation of what the enframing actually is by relating it to a glancing person in the corner.

5.9 Pictures and Worlds

So, the redefinition of thought tends to view the enframing process from the periphery, in order to reveal the enframing itself. The truth which we eventually discovered, is the truth about the world. "Before", the world was flat and round, yet it was an Object on which we lived and which gave us an eternal foundation; it was not possible to exclude our location on the earth in our existence. At this moment, however, the earth is enframing as well, namely enframing as a picture; we travel the world and enframe the places we visit by taking pictures. Apocalyptic movies, air planes and social media also contribute to the enframing of the earth as a picture. These pictures are ready to use; the world with its cultures changes from grand Object to exhibition.

The change which comes in modern time is the enframing by technology of the world as picture. What does this mean, the world as picture? First of all, Heidegger tells us, we should not be too quick in interpreting picture as some sort of copy or print of the world. Rather, world picture means the "world conceived and grasped as picture" (Heidegger 1979, p. 129). In this sense, we cannot say that there also was a medieval picture of the world, or a Greek picture of the world. These times simply did not grasp the world as picture, because in those time subjectivity was not developed as much as it is now. The subject was not the ground of its relations to objects in the world: rather, there were external structures which were grounded in other, absolute authorities, like God, the Church, the City-State et cetera. Now, however, the subject becomes the absolute authority. The subject has become so stable, it can "carry" the entire world, but only as "image".

The first fundamental event which led to the world picture lies in its (mathematically oriented) science, which feeds the autonomous enframing of machine technology as second distinct fundamental event (Heidegger 1979, p. 116). Modern times are, as we saw, no longer grounded in metaphysics. Rather the quest for technology leads us to a scientific exploration of nature within history. The most important insight of Heidegger's on this point seems to be that research is not something which is constructed through experimenting. "Rather, on the contrary, experiment first becomes possible where and only where the knowledge of nature has been transformed into research." (Heidegger 1979, p. 121), meaning, that the transformation of knowledge of nature into research is the ground of the experiment. The modern era gives birth to sciences like bio-politics and bio-hermeneutics because of the fact that nature within history is the common

ground in all research. Also, a huge amount of entirely new communities are being created in a digital sense, thanks to the ongoing enframing of nature. Because of this, "every place is equal" (Heidegger 1979, p. 119). Perception on the internet has nothing to do with real location. This makes science an ongoing project to methodologically map more and more territory of nature, while simultaneously posing differentiated territory as its own (Heidegger 1979, p. 126). What this means is that science is claiming more and more of nature, while assigning what it finds in the process to different "new" parts of science. The immediate goal of this process of science is freeing man to himself, although only in a superficial sense. The reason for this superficiality is that man forgets one thing: His essence changed at some point, he became subject (subiectum, hypokeimenon) (Heidegger 1979, p. 128) and establishes a relation to the world, thereby *picturing* the world as modern contra picturing a *specific* demarcated place as a (i.e.) kingdom in medieval times. A king has a limited amount of land, yet he has also a far-reaching authority, sometimes granted by a metaphysical idea like God. Now however, our ground (subjectness) is not dependent on place anymore. In modern times, we perfected the foundation as a mobile home, the subject. In this sense, man is a caravan. In this, the world as locus is what makes the picture modern. However, the meaning of locus is fundamentally destroyed, since *world* and *locus* are contradictory: A locus is always local, the world is always global, but apparently this is not the case.

Science ongoingly secures its methodology over nature and history, which are hence objects in research (Heidegger 1979, p. 125). Heidegger summarizes the essence of modern science:

"Modern science simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates itself in its projections of specific object-spheres. These projection-plans are developed by means of a corresponding methodology, which is made secure through rigor. Methodology adapts and establishes itself at any given time in ongoing activity. Projection and rigor, methodology and ongoing activity, mutually requiring one another, constitute the essence of modern science, transform science into research." (Heidegger 1979, p. 126)

The decisive element for a turning towards a coaching-revealing mood is that the very essence of man changes and hence, man becomes subject. This subject is first of all a metaphysical concept and has no relation whatsoever to man or to the I. It rather means that man becomes the being on which everything is grounded: Man becomes ground as it observes the manner of its Being. Man becomes "the relational center of that which is as such" (Heidegger 1979, p. 128), putting man into the center of all relating science does.

The movement of subjectivity appears to draw all "matter" (as "that which matters", "meaning") to itself and into the world.

The real turning event occurs where art moves into the scope of aesthetics, which means that art can be subjectively experienced and thus, becomes a valid expression of human life. Does this mean that the aesthetic in both Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's vision had nothing to do with art itself, since the real was not founded on the subject in that time? (Heidegger 1979, p. 116) In any case, it does seem that when we talk about modern art, we talk about a different kind of art than the arts before modernity. Before modernity, the function of art was to provide an image of nature, for whatever goal. Schopenhauer, for instance, saw art as necessary for humans to temporarily escape the cruelty of the Will to Life. In his concept of art, the Will could be glanced in all its destructiveness and because of this the Will could be objectified and observed in calmness. Art was almost an escapist's notion, through which we could organize nature and revel in our power over it or freedom from it. Schopenhauer's vision of art was adopted by Nietzsche with the only difference that Nietzsche did not use art to escape nature, but to enhance culture as the humanization of nature and the naturalization of human. The modern kind of art is different because it seems to attempt to provide a different perspective of the process of enframing. Because of this, simply placing a urinal on its side is a form of modern art: Normally a urinal is enframed as part of a toilet system, which has the enframed praxis of deposing our bodily waste. Turning it on its side is absurd, from an enframing way of thinking: It is not formed by the logic of practical use. It is not even art! Of course, enframing has no concept of art after Heidegger, since that concept is located in the connection of the poietic with the process of enframing itself. Seen from the enframed point of view, the pre-modern art is more artistic, simply because it functions as an image of the world and life, just like science. Yet, in modern art, a toilet on its side is quite literally a bridge between the enframing part of technè and the poietical part of technè, since the urinal is not enframed as a working toilet system anymore: It shows us the limits of technology and thus the limits of our own subjectivity as well, since we become astounded upon seeing this work of art, exclaiming: "But it has no use! "Yet, this exclamation is also a sign of our tendency to enframe.

Marcel Duchamp's *Fountaine* (1917)

If we consider the possibility of modern art as a Will to Power, we soon experience its deficiency; Modern art has no practical meaning. Well, supposedly one can still use a toilet seat upside down, but that would be absurd, since we have regular toilets for our much more practical use. There is no use to art in the classical sense of power. Power in art does not flow top-down, nor does it flow bottom-up. The power of art lies in the astounding effect of the poietical. It has the power to stop us for a moment from our tendency of forgetting ourselves while setting the world into our hand, to use. It shows us the day to day enframing by resisting that enframing. Yet, an aesthetic approach still *works*, it has an effect on us in its astounding effect. It is a turning of our daily mode of productivity and lets us experience our ground again, however fun, painful or ridiculous that may seem. Art is an essential opening up for Being to be experienced more fundamentally, and is therefore not limited by the traditional definition of "artist". Its effect can be achieved in all fields of work and science, because, where the danger is, grows the saving power as well.

5.10 Summary and Conclusions on Heidegger

To recapitulate once more, I analyzed Kierkegaard's idea of enframing: the idea of *Either/Or* choices, which entails the way our reality is constantly being enframed. Kierkegaard's solution to the tragedy of this enframing lies in the concept of repentance: we should repent our partaking of enframing, by acknowledging our limits concerning metaphysical matters. Kierkegaard still accepts the presence of a God though, since there has to be a being which is always right where we are wrong – and which is thus the origin of enframing, according to Kierkegaard. Nietzsche is disgusted by this idea, since it only serves to keep people limited and small by means of the Apollonian idea of right and wrong. Nietzsche reveals the Dionysian, the chaotic and ecstatic, as an essential part of life, which has been hidden throughout our history.

At the beginning of this chapter, I analyzed Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche, which is also a critique on the entire Western history. This critique signifies the foundation of Western (metaphysical) thinking as *nihilistic.* Nihilism signifies a constant movement in order to escape towards a metaphysical reality, which supposedly founds and transcends the real. Somehow, we cannot live in reality as it is; it is too much to bear. Even Nietzsche, in his disgust of metaphysics, did not actually have the power to let metaphysics go. Heidegger therefore, returns to the question concerning what is right in front of our eyes and our relationship with whatever is *near.* Nearness is opposed to metaphysics, in his philosophy. In order to return home, as it were, he redefines truth as the unconcealment of what is actually happening in front of our eyes. It is this relationship between us and the objects around us in our modern times that he calls *enframing.* According to Heidegger, we are always occupied with attaching handles to whatever transcending object, feeling or idea there is. For as long as we remember, philosophy has been occupied with making ideas, objects and feelings usable. This is dangerous, according to Heidegger, since enframing actively excludes any non-practical way of relating and is eventually as self-destructive as metaphysics was before. Consider, for instance, capitalism as a process which is aimed at making everything about human existence usable in order to gain profit. The saving power is thus located in a truthful perspective on technology and how it attempts to capture us, as well as nature, inside its frame. This truthful perspective is what Heidegger calls *the Turning.* It is not a turning in the way we do things (since philosophy cannot bring about a practical change at this time), but in the way we see and think about things. This Turning allows the process of enframing to continue, without actually contributing to or joining it.

The Turning happens when one merely watches enframing take place. An excellent example of this is Duchamp's Fountaine, in which we see a usable object (a toilet), turned on its side rendering it totally useless, while still harboring the enframing power, because there does not exist a toilet which is not usable.

6. Conclusion

Uncanny Pictures: Ianus as the image of our society

Throughout this thesis we explored the question of enframing from different points of view. The specific mood out of which technology is problematized can be described as *suspicious*. Nietzsche taught us to be suspicious of any system which claims dominance, because it primarily attempts to control and exercise power. Kierkegaard warned us about life's eluding choices; life (or the idea of it) always wants us to make a choice, thereby exercising a power over us, which may lead to a suspension of choices altogether on the one hand, or an almost random choice of whatever seems to be best on the other hand. Kierkegaard's religious philosophy was already the prelude to the binary world we live in today *(Either/Or* − 0/1 − on/off). Eventually, Heidegger alerts us about *sweet-talk*, which is meant to hide the falseness of the binary demands of the *Either/Or*, while it attempts to enclose us in the process. The danger of our time then lies in the grasp enframing has on us and through which the world is structured. This structuring happens through any method which is reasonable, calculable, measurable, mathematical, scientific or (in short) technological. Yet, enframing also happens by means of feelings, as the Will to Power shows us; feelings are technological as well, since one can predict or agree on how certain happenings make someone feel So it appears that we should not allow ourselves to be caught in any system. In fact, it might be best to keep away, as far as we can, from the destructiveness of technologies and feelings alike, in a Schopenhauerian quietism[3]. Although I would consider this quietism as one option, it is still a lacking one, since it tends to disengage with society and reality in a fulfilling human way. Quietism is still a metaphysical escape from an *Either/Or* world, since one perceives the enframing as purely destructive and forcing.

It stands to reason that Nietzsche's resurrection of the Dionysian happens in rebellion against the all-inclusive power of the Apollonian. However much Dionysus and Apollo are like Ianus – two sides of the same coin – there has to be a fight, when reclaiming the domain of Apollo for Dionysus. Contrary to this fight, Heidegger's concept of truth (alètheia), is not a concept of fighting, but of showing, of revealing. Yet, when reading and interpreting Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I cannot escape the impression that

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[3] Arthur Schopenhauer was in favor of pessimistic quietism, the idea that "playing the game" of life as we know it (politically, socially, emotionally, et cetera) can only lead to suffering. Instead, we should attempt to silence our desires through asceticism.

Heidegger is aggressive toward Nietzsche, because he reduces him to a metaphysical thinker from a pre-modern time. Actually though, Heidegger's writing and language also exhibit elements of the Will to Power; he does not just speak his mind, he does so in heavy metaphysical language. In order to understand Heidegger, one must struggle with his language, while his language establishes a hold on the reader. Yet, Heidegger would probably never dare to suggest that he would be better than other philosophers in a time in which enframing is perceived of as tremendously important. Heidegger cannot offer the solution, but only a beginning. So, the warlike attitude of a dualistic approach in thought *(Either/Or,* Dionysus/Apollo, praxis/poiesis), is not something I would immediately discredit as pre-modern.

My question would then be: *what* is being fought for in this war? In other words, who is the enemy and are we fighting the correct enemy? As we saw, the Apollonian was never the enemy, because it is merely a psychological category which simply cannot exist without the Dionysian. Nietzsche showed us that the death of God does not mean the death of the *place* of God. So, what is the Dionysian fighting? What is Heidegger's truth revealing? Is it the system itself or the *effects* of the system? Notice that this question is posed in the *Either/Or* function as well. Again, we are confronted by the need to make a choice, while this choice is – actually – meaningless. There is no way to rebel against the system, since rebelling means accepting the power of the system (as *true*) against which we fight.

In another respect, the choice (either/or) is the most meaningful choice one can make. Heidegger showed us that we should not forget our Being – meaning whatever is *close* by, in contrast to far away. Heidegger then, actively makes the choice for the ethic Kierkegaard prescribed: one should choose the local life, since, whatever we see, is before our eyes. Our mood is always a *local* mood, even when confronted with far-away impulses through the internet. To deal with what is close by however, Heidegger seems to *need* Kierkegaard's repentance in order to escape his one-sided interpretation of Nietzsche. I would argue that, in order to escape a warlike attitude and truly reveal (from out of the periphery), it is necessary to repent for the time (in the past and future) where *truth* did not mean unconcealment, but certainty.

"Everything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny." (Heidegger 1966, p.11)

In terms of a conclusion about technological structuring seen through the eyes of

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, this is an immense, yet simple, conclusion. "Thinking can do nothing more than to help humans to this insight [the dominance of enframing, KP], and philosophy is at an end" (idem). Thinking and knowing, as in philosophy, do not and cannot occupy the place of God anymore. The three philosophers made sufficiently clear that thinking, in a sense, is enframing of reality as well. Thinking cannot occupy the place analytical philosophy claims it to. Hence, to conclude *something Big* would be disastrous, since it would have close to no relationship to the world as we experience it nowadays, namely the world as a picture. We passed the time that thought, just like music, could have a unifying effect. To achieve something unifying in thought would nevertheless be disastrous, since then the specific system of thought would function, yet there would be no space for it to be uncanny. In my opinion, this is not only undesirable, but even impossible. Yet... was it ever possible to achieve a unity between thought and reality? Or was it merely *thought* that it would be possible to achieve unity between thought and reality? This achievement of unity itself is impossible. So, what is the danger, exactly? The danger lies merely in the thought and assumption that this unity would be achieved some day. If I dare make any prediction about the future, it would be that there will never be any true unity or any true progress toward a time in which man recognizes himself as the shepherd of Being. Yet, to strive for such a time (a time beyond enframing and dualism) is essential to human existence.

Eventually, the *Either/Or,* the Dionysian, the Will to Power and the Turning are concepts used to understand what is happening with us and/in reality. The power of these insights exists in the changing of perceptions instead of a forceful enframing of reality. The *Either/Or* shows us how the enframing demands a binary choice from us, whether to use this technology or to use that technology. Yet it appears as if the *use* is given; the specific choice is only suspended in expectation. Similarly, the Dionysian does not exist without the Apollonian. The suspension which is given here is that there would be an Apollonian, technologically enframing dominance in any given discourse, which can never be the case. Yet, this technological dominant frame might only be pronounced and believed in the discourse. Here, as well, it is a matter of temporary suspension from the *Either/Or* which, in fact, allows the enframing of the *Either/Or* to continue working. This is exactly what is meant by poiesis in the Turning; it is defined by the enframing-revealing experience of the uncanny fact that, in the center things always work, one way or the other. Yet, when this function is seen from a sideward glance, the binary choice which is requested of us – *either* get in the system *or* get out – is very uncanny. If not for this uncanny feeling,

enframing would be totalitarian. To understand technological enframing *and* to provide a foundation for new acting in the practical sense, there is no need to stop enframing, since there will always be moments that the following, as ontological condition of the mood "uncannyness", is true: **Nothing functions.** Eventually, "everything functions" is revealed to be equal in truth to "nothing functions" (the two sides of Ianus), since one can only feel uncanny when one is, simultaneously, "in the picture" (repenting in order to stay in the picture; Apollonian) and "out of the picture" (ek-static; Dionysian). An example of this would be the photographer, who is simultaneously the condition to the picture he just took while not being printed on the picture at all. The photographer is simultaneously included and excluded in the making of the picture.

In some ways, this is a new definition of the concept of enframing; a concept which tries to make peace with our technological advancement, while at the same time recognizing that this technological advancement is a totalitarian act. Yet, in speaking about technological advancement (from an outside perspective like the arts), its totalitarian aspect is diffused. I would give an example of this diffusion by saying that the much heralded scientific progress and development of our time is a tendency which can never be ground-breaking, revolutionary and new, however much it claims to be just that. Rather, paradoxically, the ground-breaking effects can only be found in repenting for our content-based technological extremism and instead relating to the old; to the "prehistoric" darkness of what Nietzsche would call the Dionysian. Naturally, this does not mean the destruction of *a* sub-culture of technology. Yet, this technological sub-culture, as well as the "prehistoric" darkness, both need to be recognized for what they are in our time: Images of splendor and failing, as the two faces of Ianus, true and uncanny at the same time.

Further Research

Only a god can still save us

Heidegger made this proclamation, after explaining that philosophy, as well as any other human endeavor cannot bring about a direct change in the world (Heidegger, Spiegel interview p 11). At this time of decline, he argued, people will begin missing the absent God. People who decline the necessity of this God, decline the fact that they are always wrong in the face of the absent God. The resemblance to Kierkegaard's repentance is clear: Kierkegaard thought the true choice for one's self requires a repentance for our being wrong in the face of God. What is missed, according to Heidegger, is the directness of change a god could provide. A god could justify our repentance, could let us choose for ourselves and avert even greater tragedies. Yet, a god does not seem viable, perhaps because this generation missed the intensity of the direct experience of World War II, which Heidegger had. A question which would be very interesting to research would be: what happens to our metaphysical questions when there is no god? How does this god relate to nihilism?

Obviously, philosophy did not stop after Heidegger. The post-structuralist philosophical discourse of Deleuze and many others[4], rely heavily on Nietzsche and Heidegger as "teachers". They continue to produce philosophy, *even* when Heidegger's opinion was that philosophy would come to an end. Gilles Deleuze, for example, expresses Nietzsche's Will to Power as "the differential and genetic element" of force, in order to show that Nietzsche did not think of the Will to Power as a unitary element, like Schopenhauer did with his Will to Life. The Will to Power is differential in nature, which implies differences in the level of power of those different expressions of the Will to Power. How exactly the different expressions relate to each other, in terms of power, is subject to genetic structure; changes in identity are determined by fluctuations in the level of power (Deleuze 1962, p. 57). Reading this post-structural philosophy, Heidegger's need for a new God seems rather superfluous. Apparently, power also effects reality without a God, through a dislocated differential with genetic qualities. Next to this, it should be said that the majority of the people in our world still believe in the existence of a metaphysical God. Yet, as Nietzsche and Heidegger aptly showed us, God has become an image in modernity, instead of an absolute metaphysical structure. So, an urgent question of social importance seems to be

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[4] For instance: Bataille's *La peinture préhistorique*, Derrida's *Marges de la philosophy*, Foucault's & Deleuze's *Nietzsche as Genealogist and Nomade* and Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode*, all analyze Nietzsche's and/or Heidegger's influence in the modern era.

the question concerning Heidegger's new and necessary God versus the God as an image in our current society. In other words, people seem to believe in a metaphysically structured God, while that kind of God cannot exist anymore in our world of images. How do we deal with this discrepancy?

As a final remark on this question, it appears that art took the place of God, at least in philosophy. Post-structural thinkers like Deleuze and Derrida have more in common with art than they do with religion. A final part of this question would therefore be: Is it possible that (in theory) Nietzsche's revitalization of the Dionysian in a world where religion is failing, was carried on by post-structural philosophers in and by means of modern art?

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Gratitude

I would like to thank some people who made this end product possible. First of all, I would like to thank my advisor, Fernando Suàrez, for his patience and willingness to help me with this thesis. For a big part, his help consisted in "keeping Apollo alive", while I wrestled with my resistance against enframing my thoughts in any way. I would also like to thank Sherria Ayuandini, ayangku, for listening to my, often, profound philosophical musings and actually taking them seriously, as well as her help in being the much needed laywoman in proofreading this thesis. Furthermore, my thanks to Ruud Kaulingfreks and his many courses in"relationship counseling"(aka post-structural organizational theories). Ruud has been a major influence in the formation of my ideas and perspectives on philosophy and organizations. I would also like to thank Kriti Toshniwal for checking my English, Shefique Nindu for proofreading an early concept of this thesis, Jon Leopold for all the more *and* (much needed) less meaningful conversations, Roline Schaink for the nice coffee and Martijn Simons for the inconvenient questions at the right time.

Abstract "Enframing Reality"
Kevin Pijpers

In my thesis, I will focus on the problem of technology, from an existential perspective. What this means is that my goal is to explore how we relate to technology, what kind of sentiments are part of our use of technology and how technology *enframes* our daily lives. In the first part I analyze Kierkegaard's thinking, as expressed in his magnus opus *Either/Or*. Thinking and acting in terms of either/or, which I call *binary*, define not only the digital world, but also the entire frame in which we exist in our modern world. Everywhere, we are called upon to choose between *this* or *that*, which seems to be part of an authentic choice, but not really. Inside the dogma of either/or, Kierkegaard says, choosing is not *real* choosing. In his view, we should repent for thinking that our false choices were real at any point. The only choice to make is the choice to open our eyes to the fact that our choices in terms of *either this or that* are always unauthentic choices. One needs religion in order to be able to recognize that one is wrong at all times.

The second part of my thesis is the bridge between Kierkegaard and Heidegger using Nietzsche. Nietzsche, the final metaphysician, is important because of his extreme suspicion of reductionist and oppressive thinking within previous philosophies and religion. His suspicious philosophy enables us to understand the problem of technology better. It opens up Kierkegaard's either/or and adds something else to it: the Dionysian, the concept of an inherent chaos, madness and ecstasy, which does not fit within the logic of either/or. Considering the problem of technology, the Dionysian seems to be the anti-technology.

I then analyze Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche in the final part of my thesis. However highly Heidegger regards Nietzsche, he still concludes that Nietzsche does not really transcend the either/or question, a question which Heidegger sees as unoriginal because of its metaphysical tendencies. I continue by revealing Heidegger's own concept of technological enframing, which he discovers because of his research on *truth* (alètheia). Heidegger redefines truth as the aesthetic concept of *craftmanship*, which appears to be an alternative to technological enframing.

As a conclusion, I will summarize and combine Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's contributions to achieve a more complete understanding of the concept of enframing. I conclude with the statement that the much heralded scientific progress and development of our time is a tendency which can never truly be ground-breaking, revolutionary, or new, however much it claims to be just that. Rather, paradoxically, the ground-breaking effect can only be found in repenting for our content-based technological extremism by relating to the old, to the "prehistoric" darkness, of what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian. Naturally, this does not mean the destruction of *a* technological subculture. Yet, the Dionysian "prehistoric" darkness finally puts technology in its place: a place in the periphery of life.