



GIRLS JUST WANNA HAVE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Ethics of liberal education in a feminist and multicultural society
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Abstract

This thesis arose from the anti-liberal and anti-democratic aspects that can be a part of religious and cultural education which can limit the liberty in the life of the students during and after their education. It explores the moral obligation of a liberal democratic state to ensure that its citizens are capable of living in accordance with the two principles of liberal theory: freedom and equality. In the thesis, citizenship education and humanistic education is offered as an approach that ensures the possibility for students to develop themselves in a way that grants them freedom and equality in the personal, social and political order. It considers both the liberal multicultural, the liberal feminist and the liberal democratic view on this problem. It also considers the objections from religious groups. Still, the literary study concludes that liberal democracy has the moral obligation to ensure its minors' free and equal development.

Keywords: Liberal multiculturalism, liberal feminism, liberal democracy, citizenship education, humanistic education, religious education.

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Preface

I would like to thank Inge-Marlies, my family and my friends for their moral support while I wrote this thesis – my final product of the master of humanistic studies. I wish to give special thanks to Fernando, Laurens and Wike for their patience, thoughtfulness and input. Last but not least, a thank you to you, the reader; I hope you enjoy reading my exploration of such a sensitive subject.

*This is my way; where is yours?
For the way – that does not exist.*

- Friedrich Nietzsche

Introduction

Since the end of the 19th century, three waves of feminism have emerged in the Netherlands. The first fought for equal democratic political rights. The second fought for equal legal and social rights. The third and current wave is fighting against the remaining gender inequality in our society. Although the second wave of feminism challenged and dismantled the dominant cultural idea of gender roles – the man as the main earner and head of the household – the idea remains present in some Dutch segregated minority groups. These groups are often based on shared religious and cultural beliefs that have a very strict view of traditional gender roles. These roles are thought by the families within the minority group and by the social institutions and organisations that belong to the minority group.

The writer Franca Treur, raised in a Dutch Reformed Churches community, describes her own experience with the segregation of her group in an interview with *Lees Magazine* (n.d.): “*It was indeed a closed pillar,¹ with its own schools, textbooks and media. We had no television, read a reformed newspaper, and reformed family magazines. We only turned on the radio for the news and weather forecast. (...) Every day during my adolescence, I was picked up by a reformed school bus and taken to a reformed school 13 kilometres away. There was a fence around our schoolyard, and after school, I immediately had to get back on the school bus; I could never go anywhere in the city*”.² Treur’s description shows the isolation segregation can cause: all information she received about life as a minor was from the same religion/culture in both the private and public sphere. Although adults are part of a segregated group of their own will, the narrow information received from childhood and the group pressure people are exposed to in such segregated groups can have limiting effects on their life choices. A common example of individuals who are restricted by the rest of their group is women. These women are often taught to have a certain (submissive) place within the household, society and politics. Even throughout their mandatory formal education, they learn that they must dress, speak, and behave in a certain way. The author Lale Gül, who grew up in a Turkish-Dutch Muslim community, touches upon the subject in an interview with Nandram (2021), where she addresses her disappointment in progressive politics: “*Left thinks: ‘(...) let us counterbalance the harsh word of the right and praise the multicultural society.’ But believe me, you are not doing us any favours. Dare to say: ‘You do not see men and women as equal,*

¹ The word *pillarization* comes from the Dutch word ‘*verzuiling*’. It indicates the segregation of different religious (and cultural) groups in isolated pillars (*zuilen*) with each their own social institutions and organizations.

² My translation from Dutch.

Koran schools stand in the way of integration”². She believes that, instead of celebrating multiculturalism, we should be critical of conservative cultures that oppress LGBT+ members, apostates and women. Although Gül legally had the right to distance herself from the pillar she grew up in, doing so by writing a critical and mocking book about her upbringing has caused an enormous backlash. In the same interview, Gül describes the (death)threats she receives and the rejection from the community her family faces due to her debut novel. This shows the extent of group pressure to follow specific normative religious and cultural rules that are thought.

This brings us to the debate on how a liberal democratic society should relate to the diversity of religious and cultural norms within a society. One way of approaching the fact of diversity is through multiculturalism. According to Song (2020), multiculturalism is a descriptive term referring to diversity within a society and a normative ideal present in Western liberal democratic societies. The claims and goals connected to the ideal can differ, but overall, the concept is that *“multiculturalism endorse[s] an ideal in which members of minority groups can maintain their distinctive collective identities and practices”* (Song, 2020, introduction section). When we look at the examples of Treur and Gül, this would mean that the groups they grew up in should be allowed to live in accordance with their beliefs. This includes the practice of limiting the information and influences their children are exposed to. They do this with the interest of the minors in mind since they believe that it is best to raise children from a position of faith in all aspects of life, not a position of doubt (Felderhof, 2007a). Felderhof claims that a different, more secular upbringing can damage the minor’s religious development. According to Song (2020), multiculturalism has been justified on various grounds. A liberal justification of multiculturalism comes from Kymlicka (1989, 1995), who combines the values of equality and freedom with the (instrumental) value of cultural membership. He has defended multiculturalism based on a Rawlsian theory and a self-identity theory. The Rawlsian approach is based on the philosophical thoughts of John Rawls, mainly on his theory of justice (1971). The self-identity theory is based on the idea that our identity is always related to our cultural identity: cultures provide a ‘context of choice’ and influence a sense of respect. Similar to the justifications, the critique on multiculturalism also emerges from different theories (Song, 2020). One strong critique is consistent with the problem of gender roles. Okin (1991) explores oppressive group norms and calls attention to the tension between multiculturalism and feminism. For feminists, (gender) equality is an important, if not the most important, value. The meaning of equality can, in this case, differ from the

meaning of equality the segregated groups have. According to some religions, all humans are equal in the eyes of God, while they still can be appointed a different role in the community and family. Although there are different feminist schools of thought (Howard, 2018), feminists agree that men and women should have equal rights. Especially liberal feminists, such as Okin, *“focus on freedom and equality, liberal feminism’s primary concern is to protect and enhance women’s personal and political autonomy, the first being the freedom to live one’s life as one wants and the second being the freedom to help decide the direction of the political community”* (Howard, 2018, para. 2.1). In theory, this does not have to conflict with the ideals of multiculturalism, as long as women are part of a segregated group by their own free will and are able to choose for the life they want. Still, as was illustrated earlier in the introduction, this might not be as easy in practice, especially when someone grows up in a segregated group. Like Kymlicka, Okin (1989, 1979, 1999a, 199b) uses Rawlsian theory to defend feminism and criticize multiculturalism. Feminists and multiculturalists differ in their idea of freedom and equality. Multiculturalists will state that we need to protect the freedom and equality of a group to maintain their culture; feminists will state that we need to protect the freedom and equality of vulnerable members of such a group, including women.

In the context of a western liberal democratic society such as the Netherlands, the right approach to the different conceptualisations of freedom and equality is not straightforward. According to Biesta (2011b), a democratic society is based on the two central values mentioned previously: freedom and equality. Christiano (2006) describes the focus on freedom and equality as a non-instrumental justification of democracy; these concepts have an intrinsic value independent of the outcome. Some feminist thinkers criticise multiculturalism from this democratic base. Benhabib (2002) and Song (2005, 2007) argue to shift from a liberal to a deliberative democratic approach in addressing the subordination of women in minority cultures. Other democratic thinkers, such as Mouffe (2000; 2005), focus on agonistic plurality within a society to not silence the debate. Agonism, as opposed to antagonism, is an idea of conflictual consensus. Conflictual consensus allows for a respectful conversation where people can respect other people’s views while still standing for their own. This later form of democratic approach is more open to the ideal of multiculturalism since it acknowledges that people differ. Still, according to Mouffe, one has to recognise and follow the basic principles of democracy in order to participate; a democracy *“requires discriminating between demands which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be excluded. A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic*

institutions into question as legitimate adversaries” (Mouffe, 2005, p.120). Yet, when we look at the previous examples in the introduction, we can wonder if some aspects of the multicultural ideal put the basic democratic institution at issue. When people in segregated groups teach children that some have a subordinate role, this conflicts with the core values of equality and freedom. It raises the question of whether democracy should play a role in the life lessons taught to children so that they become responsible democratic citizens with respect for the core values.

Westheim and Kahne (2004) distinguish between different kinds of citizenship: personally responsible, participatory and justice-oriented. They explain the difference between the kinds of citizenship through an example of a food drive. The personally responsible citizen will donate food to the food drive; the participatory citizen will help organise the food drive; the justice-oriented citizen will look at the cause of the problem underlying the need for a food drive and addresses this cause. Biesta (2011a; 2011b) makes a similar distinction in raising a responsible democratic citizen through education: socialisation and subjectification. The first focuses on future citizenship, while the other focuses on current citizenship. An issue to consider is that citizenship education may not be enough to deal with the problems that arise from the different interpretations of freedom and equality. It is possible that minors need a broader education to become good democratic citizens and experience freedom and equality in their own lives. An alternative could therefore be humanistic education. Aloni (2007) distinguishes between the cultural-classical, the naturalistic-romantic, the existential and critical-radical approach and offers an integrative and normative model for education. If children from segregated groups were to receive a certain kind of democratic citizenship or humanistic education, they would be exposed to alternative norms that could enhance their freedom and equality. However, this would conflict with the religious and cultural beliefs of the minority group; they could see democratic education as a bad influence that could harm their children. Therefore, how democracy should approach this problem is not just a political question but also an ethical question.

Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how democracy can morally respond to the tension between the different interpretations of freedom and equality in education. Therefore, the following question will be examined: *What role can a democratic state play in children's education if we focus on the values of freedom and equality from liberal perspectives on multiculturalism, feminism and humanism?*

Therefore, to answer the main question, it is essential to look at different aspects of the question. Thus, the matter will be divided into the following sub-questions:

- 1) *In how far can liberal multiculturalism as represented by Kymlicka and liberal feminism as represented by Okin agree upon the state's role in promoting freedom and equality within the education of minors?*
- 2) *In how far can democratic citizenship education and humanistic education stimulate the liberal feminist, liberal multicultural, and liberal democratic ideals of freedom and equality in the development of minors living in a plural and democratic society?*

Research Method

This thesis will consist of thematic, philosophical research. In this research, the themes of liberal freedom and equality in a democracy and democratic and humanistic education will be addressed from a multicultural, feminist and democratic standpoint.

The first chapter will examine the tension in the concepts of freedom and equality when dealing with a minority culture. Song's article (2020) will give an overview of the contemporary debate between multiculturalists and feminists on the interpretation of the values of freedom and equality. Then a more detailed account will be given of Kymlicka's liberal theory of multiculturalism using his books (1989; 1995). Here the idea of group differential rights and the self-governance of minority groups will be addressed. The importance of segregation and raising minors from the basis of faith will be explored through various articles in the book edited by Felderhof, Thompson and Torevell (2007). After that, Okin's liberal feminist approach will be examined using her books on the subject (1979; 1989). The feminist focus on freedom and equality to enhance women's personal and political autonomy will be addressed here. Then we will move to the feminist critique on multiculturalism by using Okin's article (1998) and some papers from the book edited by Cohen, Howard and Nussbaum (1999), which focuses on the question: *Is multiculturalism bad for women?* This book also includes a response from Kymlicka to the feminist critique. Since Kymlicka's multicultural approach and Okin's feminist approach are based on Rawls, his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971) will be explored.

For the second chapter, the answer to the first sub-question will be used in addition to the literature on liberal democracy. This chapter will be devoted to the liberal democratic approach to the tension of freedom and equality since it is crucial to consider the context of the democratic society. The democratic approach will be used to respond to the multicultural

and feminist approaches to freedom and equality. The books and articles of Benhabib (2002) and Song (2005; 2000) will be used to analyse the feminist deliberative democratic responses to multiculturalism. The article and book by Mouffe (2000; 2005) will be used to understand the theory of agonistic pluralism within a democracy and consider a possible synthesis. The second part of this chapter will deal with the ethics behind democratic citizenship education and a possible response to multiculturalism and feminism. A detailed understanding of citizenship education will be explored through the work of Biesta (2011a; 2011b) and the article by Westheimer and Kahne (2004). Aloni's book (2007) will provide an analysis of humanistic education. It will revisit the book edited by Felderhof, Thompson and Torevell to understand the religious objections to liberal democratic education and humanistic education. Literature and findings from the previous chapter will be included in this chapter as well.

Chapter 1 | A liberal approach

When we look at the story of Lale Gül and Franca Treur, we notice a tension between the interpretations of freedom and equality within minority groups. On the one hand, minority groups want to have the same right as the majority to live their lives according to their beliefs. This includes the right to raise and educate their children in a way they see fit, even if this goes against the ideals of the majority group. The majority ideals on raising and educating children may even be viewed as harmful towards the (spiritual) development of the child (Felderhof, Thompson and Torevell, 2007). The right of minority groups to live according to their religious and cultural ideals is defended by the multicultural view on freedom and equality of Kymlicka (1989; 1995). On the other hand, individuals should be able to shape their own lives in a way they see fit. For children, this is not yet possible: they are dependent on their parents and their choices. When children are born into a pillar¹, they are shielded from the rest of society, which influences the information they receive. The information can influence the way they perceive the rights of themselves and others at the disadvantage of LGBT+ members, apostates and women. The inequality and lack of freedom that arises from group equality and freedom are addressed by feminist philosophers who defend individual freedom and equality (Okin, 1998). To understand the arguments from both sides, group rights and individual rights, we must first examine the philosophical grounds on which Kymlicka and Okin have based their arguments: Rawlsian theory. Thus, in this chapter, the liberal approach by Rawls is reviewed, after which we will look at the application of the theory by both sides. After that, the chapter will conclude by exploring the possibility of synthesis from a Rawlsian perspective. At the end of the chapter, the first sub-question of this thesis will be answered, namely the question: *In how far can liberal multiculturalism as represented by Kymlicka and liberal feminism as represented by Okin agree upon the state's role in promoting freedom and equality within the education of minors?*

The principles of justice

The different views on a just society and the possible conflict that arise within a plural and multicultural society are the problem Rawls (1971) wanted to solve. He wondered how one could design a just society when every person who thinks about a just society is influenced by their own beliefs, preferences, background, and so on. That is to say, a straight white right-winged Christian male born into riches may think very differently about a just society than a lesbian black left-winged atheist woman who has lived in poverty her whole life. Due to these influences, Rawls concluded that we had to leave behind all these aspects of ourselves that

make us who we are to design a just society. In a way, we had to imagine ourselves behind a *veil of ignorance* where we do not know who we are in the society we design: “*No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities*” (Rawls, 1971, p.11). This situation behind the *veil of ignorance* is what Rawls calls the *original position*. It is impossible to know who you are and which position you will have in society from the original position. Because people may end up as the worst in the society they design, they are more likely to create a society where the position of everyone is fair and just. Thus, Rawls's original position is viewed as a procedure that allows for fair decision making as it disables people to design the society to their own advantage at the expense of others. After all: one does not know if he will end up as the male or female described above. An example of Rawls is that of taxes for welfare: “*if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle*” (Rawls, 1971, p.7). Because the man cannot know which of these descriptions apply to him, he must be impartial in making the decision. Rawls states, therefore, that people behind the veil of ignorance would want a society that is just for everyone, not just profitable for some. Rawls argued that people in the original position would, thus, come to the following two principles:³

“First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p.266).

The first principle is part of the desired political institution where people have freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of political participation and so on. These liberties should be equal for all citizens since unequal rights do not benefit all. This first principle of basic liberties holds priority over the second principle and must always be met first. The second principle mainly applies to (legislation for) economic institutions, enabling

³ Rawls uses different formulations of the two principles, but uses the given formulation as the ‘final version’.

people with similar talents and motivation to have equal educational and economic opportunities. In the second principle, the first part (a) holds priority over the second part (b). The second principle seems less straightforward than the first principle: after all, how can social and economic inequalities benefit the least advantaged? Wenar (2021) tries to clarify Rawls position by using the following table (§4.3):

Economy	Least-advantaged group	Middle group	Most-advantaged group
A	10,000	10,000	10,000
B	12,000	30,000	80,000
C	30,000	90,000	150,000
D	20,000	100,000	500,000

In economy A, everything is equally divided between the different groups; still, the economy is overall to the least advantage of all citizens compared to the other economies. Economy B would therefore be an improvement, even though it is unequal because it improves the position of the least-advantaged group. Although even more unequal, economy C would also be an improvement since the least-advantaged group goes from 12,000 to 30,000. On the other hand, economy B would not be a just society compared to economy C. Although it improves the median, this would not be at the benefit of the least-advantaged group. In the case of D, the most-advantaged group would profit at the expense of the least-advantaged group. Thus, Rawls would argue that economy C would be justified since it is to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged group. Still, the calculations are more complex due to the *just savings principle*. The *just savings principle* considers the time in which people live and the earth they leave behind for future generations; this must be part of the calculations.⁴ The second principle considers the fact that many factors of our lives are out of our control, such as natural assets and the time in which we are born. It would be unjust if people who are unlucky in these aspects would be unable to be a full members of society. Still, it is profitable for society as a whole when people divide the work in accordance with their talents and skills. When someone has a skill in high demand, they are welcome to use that to their own advantage as long the least-advantaged (and others) in society profit from that skill.

⁴ Although this part of the principles is interesting, it is irrelevant for the subject of this thesis. Therefore, we will not discuss the *just savings principle* in detail.

Justice for minority groups

Now that we have discussed the basis of Rawls's theory of justice, we can look at how other philosophers applied the Rawlsian theory in their own work, starting with Kymlicka (1989). According to Kymlicka, many liberal philosophies, including Rawlsian theory, are primarily interested in the relationship between individuals and the state. This should, however, also contain "*a broader account of the relationship between the individual and society – and, in particular, of the individual's membership in a community and culture*" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.1). By focussing on the membership of a community and culture within liberal political theory, Kymlicka strives to go beyond the atomistic and individualistic premises for which liberal theories are often criticized by communitarians.

Kymlicka states that there are two ways in which one can have respect for a person: either as a member of a political community or as a member of a particular cultural group. Due to cultural pluralism, or multiculturalism, within countries, this gives rise to what kind of rights minority cultures should have within such a society based on the different types of respect. Kymlicka differentiates between two ways minorities can have a legal and political status that correspond with the two ways one can respect a person. In the first, minorities' rights are incorporated 'universally' into the state, giving them the same relationship with the state as all other citizens; in the second, minority rights are 'consociationally' so that their rights partly depend on their community. Although the latter may sound discriminatory, the idea is that a group would only receive different rights when this is in the group's best interest. That is to say, when the members of a group have beliefs of the good that are harmed by the 'universal' law of a state, that group should have different rights that are in accordance with their view on the good. This idea also corresponds with Rawls's second principle that there can be inequality when it is in the best interest of the least advantaged. In this case, the minority group can be viewed as the least advantaged because the majority ideals they disagree with would otherwise be forced upon them. Kymlicka states the following on incorporation of minority rights:

"Under consociational modes of incorporation, the nature of people's right, and the opportunities for exercising them, tend to vary with the particular cultural community in which they are incorporated. And the justification for these measures focus on their role in allowing minority cultures to develop their distinct cultural life, an ability insufficiently protected by 'universal' modes of incorporation" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.137).

According to Kymlicka, this corresponds with the core value of freedom in liberal theory. Freedom plays an essential role in liberal theories, such as the Rawlsian theory; every individual should have the autonomy to design and revise their idea of a good life. They need to be able to create a life plan and have the idea that this plan is worth carrying out (Rawls, 1971). Rawls states that the sense of a worthy life plan is the source of self-respect and the possibility to act in accordance with this idea of a good life is an important part of liberty. Kymlicka builds on this aspect of freedom and looks at the source of our vision of a good life. He believes the options we consider for a good life are based in our social context and, thus, also in our cultural membership: *“The individualism that underlies liberalism isn’t valued at the expense of our social nature or our shared community. It is an individualism that accords with, rather than opposes, the undeniable importance of our social world”* (Kymlicka, 1989, pp.2-3). The cultural world gives the context of our life choices: the cultural narratives form our ideas of a life worth living. The cultural membership, thus, provides us with norms and values to which we can measure what it means to lead a good life and choose our path accordingly. Although these norms are found within the cultural context, it is still possible for the context to develop: when the norms are no longer viewed as meaningful, they can evolve into new norms. Yet, according to Kymlicka, this change should come from within the cultural group and not be forced upon them. When the change is forced from outside the group, instead of developed within the group, this can cause a loss of the (minority) culture. In other words: it is the structure of cultural communities that matter, not the character of the cultural community. The meaning of cultural membership is so important that, according to Kymlicka, the people behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance should see cultural membership as a primary good. After all: no matter which cultural group one belongs to, a majority or minority, people would want to be able to choose a life path they find worth living, a path that gives them a sense of self-respect. But even when cultural membership is seen as a primary good, why then should some groups have different rights? According to Kymlicka, this is necessary due to the disadvantage minorities have when the interest of each citizen matters equally; when all interests matter equally, the decisions are made by the majority. Although, in theory, all people matter equally in Rawlsian liberal theory, in practice, this could mean that minorities would always be outvoted. An example given by Kymlicka concerns the aboriginals living in northern Canada:

“The effect of market and political decisions made by the majority may well be that aboriginal groups are outbid or outvoted on matters crucial to their survival as a

cultural community. They may be outbid for important resources (e.g. the land or means of production on which their community depends), or outvoted on crucial policy decisions (e.g. on what language will be used, or whether public works programmes will support of conflict with aboriginal patterns)” (Kymlick, 1989, p.183).

When minorities are universally incorporated into the state, this would be at their own disadvantage in cases like this; when we consider Rawls’s theory of justice, we must consider whether or not this disadvantage is caused by the people themselves or by the circumstances in which they find themselves. In the case of minority groups, this disadvantage is caused by the circumstances. To give them an equal chance to pursue a life that is meaningful to them, Kymlicka believes they should have the possibility to have special rights that can protect their cultural community and their context of choice. When we look at rights from Kymlicka’s point of view, we see that unequal rights give people equal freedom to pursue a life they consider meaningful.

When we translate Kymlicka’s ideas to education, we may assume that children should be able to grow up in their cultural context to which they derive ideas of a good life. There are two examples we can derive from Kymlicka’s book liberalism, community and culture when it comes to education. The first case is the segregation of black American citizens, which, according to Kymlicka, was viewed as ‘a badge of inferiority’; black children in segregated schools showed lower motivation. The second case is that of indigenous Canadians who view segregation as a defence of their cultural heritage and who view integration as ‘a badge of inferiority’. In this later case, the integration is the cause of lower motivation in school. To clarify his point, Kymlicka quotes the work of Michael Gross on the difference between segregation and integration of black and indigenous people:

“Where [black people] have been forcibly excluded (segregated) from white society by law, [indigenous people] – aboriginal peoples with their own cultures, languages, religions and territories – have been forcible included (integrated) into that society by law. That is what the [Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education] meant by coercive assimilation – the practice of compelling, through submersion, an ethnic, cultural and linguistic minority to shed its uniqueness and identity and mingle with the rest of society” (Gross, 1973, p.244; Kymlicka, 1989, p.145).

Of course, this makes the decisions on multicultural education rather complex. When we return to Kymlicka's point of view, we see a possible solution to the problem when he discusses the possibility of following education in a different language. This type of education does not need to be funded by the public, but it should not be stopped either. If minorities wish to decline the possibility of public education and instead choose to organize their own education, they are free to do so. This also corresponds with Rawls's theory of justice as well which states the following about declining goods:

“Of course, it may turn out, once the veil of ignorance is removed, that some of them for religious or other reasons may not, in fact, want more of these goods. But from the standpoint of the original position, it is rational for the parties to suppose that they do want a larger share, since in any case they are not compelled to accept more if they do not wish to” (Rawls, 1971, p.123).

Now, when we look at the current situation of the Netherlands, people are neither forcibly included nor forcibly excluded. There are many different education designs in the Netherlands based on different life views available for parents to choose from. When we look at the Rawlsian theory of Kymlicka, we can understand why it would be important that these options are available to the parents who are seeking an education for their children. Especially in the case of groups like the indigenous Canadian people who would view forcible inclusion in a negative light. When we stand behind the veil of ignorance, it would be a reasonable consideration to give parents the right to choose an education for their children that is, according to them, in the best interest of their child. Especially when we look at religious education, this can be a significant part of the children's upbringing: it is about the religious truth within a cultural group. When Torevell (2007) argues for religious education, he refers to the ideas and ideals from his Christian faith; he speaks about teaching students about *truth*. The problem with contemporary religious education, according to him, is that this *truth* is no longer perceived as truth due to secularisation. In his foreword, he asked multiple questions, including: *“If pupils are beginning to view religion as being marginal to their own hopes, aspirations, concerns and lives, what needs to be done? [...] Many external forces are unsympathetic to religious metanarratives”* (p.XVI). For him, this is a reason to desire a different education, one in which the *religious truth* can be just that: truth.

Justice for women

The multicultural interpretation of Rawlsian liberalism makes a strong point in letting go of the colonialist idea in which the Western culture is viewed as the 'right' culture. Instead, Kymlicka argues that in a genuinely liberal society, people should have the liberty to live in accordance with their view of a good life, which is in part derived from the cultural group in which they are born. Still, another interpretation of Rawlsian theory questions if all aspects of different cultures should be honoured in a liberal society. This interpretation comes from the feminist tradition, which focuses on equal opportunities for everyone. Okin (1989), who is well known for her Rawlsian adaption, takes Rawls's theory, like Kymlicka, further than the original theory: "*I turn to Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, to examine not only what it explicitly says and does not say, but also what it implies*" (p.89). She specifically looks at the implications Rawlsian theory has for gender, woman and the family. Okin must go beyond the original theory due to Rawls lack in addressing feminist issues even though his theory has great potential in challenging gender roles in society. It is this potential Okin uses to expand the theory of *justice as fairness* to a feminist position. She does this by first criticizing and addressing criticism, after which she extends the theory.

As a feminist reader of Rawls *Theory of Justice* Okin (1989) starts by asking the critical question: "*Does this theory apply to women?*" (p.91). She asked this question based on two observations. Firstly, when we look at Rawls description of the situation *behind the veil of ignorance* sex and gender are not mentioned as one of the assets we forget about ourselves.⁵ Nor are these aspects specifically mentioned throughout the work itself. Okin argues that this would not necessarily hint at the exclusion of women, were it not for the '*blindness of sexism*' that is present in the philosophical tradition in which Rawls participates. To illustrate her point she refers to Rawls references to Kant and Freud that fail to mention their sexist views on women who, according to them, would not share the moral capabilities of men. Okin states that Rawls ought to have elaborated his view on who should be included in these theories of morality so that the position of women in his own theory would be more clear. However, when it comes to his own theory Rawls does make clear in another article that sex is indeed part of the knowledge we forget about ourselves (Rawls, 1975). So, when we deliberate about a just society from the original position, we do not know if we will be male or female in the

⁵ "*No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities*" (Rawls, 1971, p.11).

society we create. Another point to note on this subject is Rawls wrote the following on inequality between men and women: *“Thus if, say, men are favored in the assignment of basic rights, this inequality is justified by the difference principle (in the general interpretation) only if it is to the advantage of women and acceptable from their standpoint”* (Rawls, 1971, p.16). This brings us to the second observation Okin makes about the people behind the veil. Rawls (1971) describes these people not as individuals but as ‘heads of families’. He does this to make sure that all behind the veil of ignorance care about the next generations, justifying the just savings principle. When Rawls explains his position on the just savings principle he does so referring to fathers and the claims their sons can make on them. Thus, the question arises of who these heads of families are. Although the head of a family can just as well be a woman, in the traditional sense it always referred to a man. In other times and still in some contemporary cultures, the head of the family can even be a minor son while the father is absent. Again the main criticism of Okin is that Rawls does not elaborate on his own position concerning the meaning of sex in his theory. Since the subject in this context is the future generation it could be possible that Rawls choose to use the male terms as neutral, as the sex of the people behind the veil would be irrelevant. Nevertheless, since Rawls does not specify his position on the matter Okin (1989) concludes that *“relations between the sexes are not properly regarded as part of the subject matter of a theory of social justice”* (p.92). Still, by assuming people behind the veil of ignorance are the head of the family instead of individuals Rawls creates a problem of inequality. Rawls justifies the inequality of the children from a paternalistic point of view, but says nothing about the adults who are not the head of family. When the people in the original position should all imagine themselves as head of the household, the other members of the family are not represented. When we look at the traditional idea of ‘the head’ this would most likely mean that wives are not represented in the debate on a just society. *“Thus the ‘heads of families’ assumption, far from being neutral or innocent, has the effect of banishing a large sphere of human life—and a particularly large sphere of most women’s lives—from the scope of the theory”* (Okin, 1989, p.95). Okin elaborates on this problem by looking at the distributive shares Rawls discusses in his work. The main point she makes here is that Rawls seem to assume that all adults participate in the paid labour market. She observes that Rawls seems to view the welfare of the household and the welfare of the individual as interchangeable. Yet, when we look at our past and contemporary society we see that paid labour and welfare are in many cases not equally divided within a household. Women often carry out more unpaid labour, or labour that is not even acknowledged as labour. Especially the household tasks and childcare are often

unevenly divided. Even when working the same job as a male for the same hours they often get paid less. This creates a greater economic dependence for women who are not viewed as the head of the household. Okin argues that Rawls not only ignores the basic gender structures in contemporary society by focussing on the heads of the household, he also seems to think “*in terms of traditional, gendered family structure and roles*” (Okin, 1989, p.96) as he speaks about gender roles within family. According to Okin (1989) “*it seems likely that Rawls means to imply that the goodness of daughters is distinct from the goodness of sons, and that of wives from that of husbands*” (p.96). This is extra problematic as both Rawls and Okin believe that early socialisation within the family is important for both the self-worth and moral development of the child. Okin notes that this socialisation determines in a way how a child will shape their life as an adult. The different socialization of boys and girls will therefore influence the roles they will have in society as men and women. Due to the influence family has on the development of the children Okin specifically focuses on the role family has in Rawls’s work. She notes that Rawls acknowledges the idea that a just society will only remain stable if the members continue to develop a sense of justice and the desire to act in accordance with the principles of justice. This sense and desire, according to both Rawls and Okin, is first nurtured when children grow up in family where they are loved and where the parents function as a role model. In a second stage it is the family where children first develop a sense of empathy due to the different roles and positions one can have within the family. In other words, they develop the capability to understand different points of view that may differ from our own. In this stage children learn to understand the feelings of others and can form “*ties of friendship and mutual trust*” (Rawls, 1971, p.416), which are important aspects of morality. Okin states here that these capacities are essential for thinking as if one was behind the veil of ignorance since you need to be able to understand different points of view to do so. According to Rawls, in the third and last stage, children develop an attachment to the principle of justice continuous ‘*with the love of mankind*’. When we look at Rawls idea of moral development, we see that he takes a radically different approach than the Kantian idea of rational morality. It is the influence of Kant in Rawls work that Okin criticizes earlier, due to the idea that women would not possess the same rational capabilities Kant considers necessary to live in accordance with morality. Yet, here Rawls acknowledges the importance of moral emotions or sentiments. She uses the following citation of Rawls on the three psychological stages of moral development:

“[They are] not merely principles of association or of reinforcement... [but] assert that the active sentiments of love and friendship, and even the sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in return” (Rawls, 1971, p.75; Okin, 1989, p.99).

Yet, while Rawls acknowledges the importance of the moral development of children within the family, he seems to assume that the *family institutions* are just without elaborating this idea. According to Okin, the absence of the justification that families are just brings Rawls theory on *shaky ground*, especially when one considers her critique on the gendered families that conflict with Rawls’ principles of justice. She argues that not only do gendered families create economic injustice, it also creates a bad example for the children during their moral development. This, in its turn, will harm their ability to engage *“in the kind of deliberation about justice that is exemplified in the original position”* (Okin, 1989, p.100).

Okin (1989) uses her main critique on Rawls to extend the theory of the original position by addressing the (in)justice of the gender system in both the family and society. Although much must be forgotten behind the veil of ignorance, people do know the general facts about human society. According to Okin, this must include the knowledge that women have been the less advantaged sex in multiple aspects throughout most human history. Instead of ignoring family and gender roles, those behind the veil of ignorance should pay extra attention to these aspects of society. Although gender expectation may survive the first principle of justice, it will not survive the second principle of justice since it would create unequal opportunities within the society and an extra disadvantage for the least advantaged.⁶ This is especially important because these aspects of society also shape the next generation and their moral capability. She believes the solution is for fathers and mothers to equally parent their children (even when separated) and have an equal opportunity for work outside the home. It would be up to society to create these opportunities by moving away from gender policies and laws, subsidized quality day care, rethinking the demands of work-life for both men and women, a gender-neutral basis of workplaces, flexible or reduced work hours, schools should minimize the promotion of gender, schools should teach children about the politics of gender, and so on. Although Okin primarily focuses on the family as the first school of morality, she also considers schools’ role, namely by promoting and teaching children about gender equality.

⁶ *“Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”* (Rawls, 1971, p.266).

Okin also acknowledges society's plurality, which may cause people to have more traditional views on the division of labour when the veil of ignorance is lifted. This is a more complicated aspect to deal with since adults can choose such an arrangement while children are born into one. For the adults, she proposes a law in which the household income is equally divided between both adults to reduce the economic disadvantage and dependence of the partner responsible for the labour at home. For the children, the school would become more critical in the education of equality. This aspect, however, is not elaborated on since Okin assumes the family to be the first school of morality (and gender equality) as well.

A discussion: ally or enemy

When we look at the arguments of both multiculturalism and feminism, we see that they make an equalitarian claim from very different perspectives. They use the Rawlsian theory to create a very different outcome from one another. On the one hand, the multiculturalist camp argues that children's education should be based on the parents' beliefs. On the other hand, the feminist camp argues that, although gender equality in families should be stimulated, it should at least be taught in school – even when it goes against the parents' beliefs. A discussion between the different camps was therefore bound to arise. Together with other authors, Kymlicka and Okin have explored the tension between feminism and multiculturalism in a bundled book (Cohen, Howard & Nussbaum, 1999). The lead article in the book is by Okin (1999a), who defends women's rights against the inequality that can arise from multiculturalism. In this article, Okin actively responds to the Rawlsian arguments by Kymlicka (1989), who she states is the foremost contemporary defender of group rights.

Okin (1999a) starts by addressing the problem that gave rise to this debate: “*what should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions clash with the norm of gender equality that is at least formally endorsed by liberal states (however much they continue to violate it in practices)?*” (p.9). In her article, she states that people have been too eager to see both feminism and multiculturalism as good things and assume that these different ideals of freedom and equality can be reconciled smoothly. Throughout the article, she gives multiple examples of occasions where women were disadvantaged by implementing the multicultural ideal in a liberal society. The examples come from different countries that dealt with problems that arose in connection to different minority cultures. One of her examples takes place in France during the time that the debate on young women wearing hijabs to school erupted. When this debate started in the late 1980s, she points out that another more serious clash between the majority and minority culture was mostly ignored: polygamic relations within

French Arab and African immigrant families. At this time, male immigrants were allowed to bring multiple wives into the country. At the same time, *“the women affected by polygamy regarded it as an inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African countries of origin, and unbearable imposition in the French context”* (Okin, 1999a, p.10). She explains that polygamy is in the best interest of the men and not in the women's interest. Okin cites an explanation of a male immigrant who states that he needs multiple wives to care for him if one of them falls ill. He also explains that it forces them to be polite in a family with multiple wives; otherwise, he can threaten them with taking another wife. The wives have no choice in the matter, and there is generally a lot of tension between the women who are part of a polygamic family against their wishes.⁷ This is only one of the examples where women are viewed and treated as subordinate due to a multicultural defence of group rights not available to others within a liberal society. Throughout the different examples, it is shown that a multicultural defence of minority rights can cause women of those minorities to have fewer rights and less protection from the law than women from the majority culture within the same country. This, of course, goes against the liberal and feminist beliefs Okin defended and where *“women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, [...] they should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and [...] they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men can”* (Okin, 1999a, p.10). Through her examples, Okin illustrates that many group rights based on cultural or religious ideals are anti-feminist as they limit the capacities of women and girls to live as fulfilling and freely as men and boys. Now, Okin (1999a) states that defenders of group rights have not addressed these problems due to two reasons: *“First, they tend to treat cultural groups as monoliths – to pay more attention to differences between and among groups than to differences within them [...] Second, [they] pay little or no attention to the private sphere”* (p.12). According to Okin, when we look at these two aspects, we can conclude two things about the connections between culture and gender. The first is the central focus of most cultures on *‘the sphere of personal, sexual, and reproductive life functions*. This focus often influences cultural practices and rules that greatly impact women's public and private lives. The second, even more an important aspect, is the principle present in many cultures that men have the right and responsibility to control women. Okin points out that in some cultures, it is even impossible for a woman to create a life for herself without involving a man (in the least because she has

⁷ Currently the law has been reversed and the French government only acknowledges one wife, viewing the other marriages as annulled. However, Okin (1999a) feels like the government is abdicating its responsibility to the women of the annulled marriages and their children.

no economic alternatives). In the many examples she gives, these limits to women's freedom are never in the 'to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged' to put it in Rawlsian terms. In some cases, such as the French polygamic example, it is to the greatest benefit of the man. In other cases, the restrictions on women freedom are in the best interest of the family and their honour. An example of the latter case that Okin indicates is women who are forced to marry their rapists to save their family honour. In some cultures, a woman is not only 'damaged goods' but also punishable by law for having sex outside of marriage. When looking at non-liberal cultures, Okin (1999a) goes as far as stating that "*sometimes [...] 'culture' or 'traditions' are so closely linked with the control of women that they are virtually equated* (p.16). In her many examples, Okin includes court cases in a liberal society of cultural defences based on the inferiority of women, which in some cases resulted in reduced charges or sentences. This shows that women (and sometimes children) of minority cultures do not receive the same rights and protection as other women due to the double standard applied in defence of their aggressors.

After pointing out the tension between multiculturalism and feminism, Okin (1999a) immerses herself in Kymlicka's defence of multiculturalism. She notes that Kymlicka states that groups can only claim special rights if they acknowledge and participate in liberal principles and, thus, without discriminating against subgroups within their cultural group. To her, this seems as though Kymlicka overestimates how many groups could gain special rights when liberal principles are the ground condition to do so. She states that:

"Discrimination against and control of the freedom of females are practiced, to a greater or lesser extent, by virtually all cultures, past and present, but especially by religious ones and those that look to the past—to ancient texts or revered traditions – for guidelines or rules about how to live in the contemporary world (Okin, 1999a, p.21).

When taking the liberal principles as ground condition, Okin believes that the denial of groups rights is far greater than Kymlicka's idea who she states only regards formal discrimination of women as a problem. Okin has hoped to show in her paper that sex discrimination and control of women is often enforced in the informal private sphere due to cultural roots. She believes that the group should not receive special rights that make it easier to constrain these women when this is the case. Okin points out that this already starts in children's development when they find their place within a culture; it instils and forces particular social roles that can determine the way they view themselves. Okin (1999a) argues that girls "*might be much*

better off if the culture into which they were born were either to become [integrated] or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women” (pp.22-23). Okin acknowledges that there are always other considerations that should be considered, such as a language that needs protection or if groups face racial discrimination. But these things should not constrain or undermine women's freedom within that group.

Kymlicka (1999) writes a rather short reply to Okin's (1999a) paper since he agrees with her general claim. He writes: “*Group rights are permissible if they help promote justice between ethnocultural groups, but are impermissible if they create or exacerbate gender inequalities within the group*” (p.31). He explains that he never intended women's freedom had to be protected merely in a ‘formal or legalistic way’. Indeed, Kymlicka agrees that the examples Okin gives throughout her paper should always be opposed to their shared liberal egalitarian approach. He explains that in his more recent work at that point (Kymlicka, 1995), he distinguishes between two kinds of group rights: *internal restrictions* and *external protections*. In the first case, people within the minority culture use their traditions to restrict the ability of individuals within their own group, particularly women. Okin examples are always about the group rights of *internal restrictions*. Okin (1999) and Kymlicka (1999) agree that these restrictions cannot be allowed since they violate the liberty and well-being of individuals within that group. *External protections*, however, are to protect other aspects of a minority culture from the majority culture so that they have the same opportunities to promote their interests – interest that are in accordance with liberal principles such as compensation for historical injustice, land claims, political representation, language rights and so on. This is where Kymlicka start to disagree with Okin. He states that, due to the danger of internal restrictions, she also argues to be sceptical about all group rights, including *external protections*. Kymlicka argues that feminists should not see multiculturalists as a threat but as allies in the combat for inclusive justice since they both try to extend the traditional liberal view of freedom and equality. He offers three aspects that show that feminists and multiculturalists are fighting a similar battle. Firstly, both fight against the ‘norm’ in the structure of societal institutions: feminists fight against the male norm, while multiculturalists fight against the cultural majority norms. Secondly, both criticised the traditional liberal theories since this often held prejudice against both women and minorities. Kymlicka (1999) points out that these theories often thought of citizens as men who shared the same language and culture. It did not consider the female point of view, nor the view of ethnocultural minorities. Thirdly, both sides look for similar solutions when it comes to the shortcomings of

traditional liberal theories, namely, the requirement of special rights to reach true equality. Now, two out of the three points need a closer look. The first point is interesting in the light of this thesis since he mentions schooling as one of the societal institutions that take the cultural majority as the norm. It is hard to determine how far schooling should be different for minority cultures: do we draw the line when the external protections of schooling cross over in internal restrictions? Examples from Kymlicka's work (1995) are the provision of language education, recognition of heritage in the school curriculum and the exemption from school dress codes so that women can wear religious clothing such as a chador. Especially in the last case, we can wonder if the external protections are getting too close to the internal restrictions. Pollitt (1999) looks at this aspect of the French dress code discussion precisely. She starts by illustrating the liberal idea that women should make their own choice in wearing (or not wearing) religious clothing to public institutions such as schools but quickly wonders if it is indeed the women who make that choice (even in a liberal society). She recalls a television debate "*in which a Muslim girl said she wanted the ban [on religious clothing in public] to stay because without it, her family would force her to wear a scarf*" (pp.29-30). On the other hand, Kymlicka (1995) is against the special right of minority groups to take their children out of school before the legal age in hopes that they will not leave their minority culture. This implies that children have the right to follow the kind of education that will enable them to choose how to shape their own lives. The third aspect is also interesting in the light of Okin's work. Although some feminists may argue that women deserve different rights than men, Okin is not one of those feminists. In her work (1989), she even argues against any special rights concerning men or women: she promotes gender-neutral laws. This goes as far as stating that women should not get leave based on their pregnancy but based on their experience of temporary disability. Although Kymlicka (1999) tries to use similar solutions to show the similarity between feminism and multiculturalism, this does not apply to Okin's liberal theory. Still, in her reply, Okin (1999b) states that she agrees with Kymlicka that there is an overlap between the challenges multiculturalism and feminism face, but that there also remain essential differences when one prioritise cultural group rights of women rights. However, the discussion seems to have led to a more nuanced alliance since Okin (1999b) ends her response with the following statement: "*What we need to strive toward is a form of multiculturalism that gives the issues of gender and other intragroup inequalities their due—that is to say, a multiculturalism that effectively treats all persons as each other's moral equals*" (p.131). Important in her reply is also the idea that we must extend her argument to

other oppressed groups, such as children, members of the LGBTQ+ community, minority races, people with a disability, dissenters, and so on.

Two of the responses (Sunstein, 1999; Nussbaum, 1999) on Okin's paper (1999a) lead her to address formal education (1999b). She notes, in agreement with Sunstein, that there is a different level of voluntariness between children raised and educated in religious and cultural groups and adults who know there are other ways of life but choose to live according to a religion or culture. Adults with a broad knowledge of different forms of life should be able to choose a life in which they allow for a certain nonautonomy (such as the exclusion of women from certain religious functions). Yet, as we have seen earlier, these adults often don't want their children to be exposed to alternative ways of life since it can influence their children's 'spiritual development' or even cause them to break with the religion and culture of their parents. Both Nussbaum (1999) and Okin (1999b) state that a liberal society should never allow for such a confined upbringing to take place since it blocks the liberty of the children to choose their own way of life. Okin (1999b) argues that religion or culture may "*not [be] thrust on a person by his or her parents or group, through indoctrination – including sexist socialization – and lack of exposure to alternatives*" (p.130). For Okin, this is an important reason to argue that all children should not only receive an education that shows human equality but also an education that gives children the opportunity to learn about multiple ways of life (religious and nonreligious). "*The liberalism I subscribe to requires that children's education not leave them with knowledge only of their parents' culture or religion, much less that it gives them the impression that that is the only 'right' way to live*" (Okin, 1999b, p.129). By educating children this way, they will be enabled to truly decide for themselves how they want to shape their lives and, in accordance, live a life they find worth living. This means that education can never only teach about just one philosophy of life – religious, secular or cultural. This seems to favour Kymlicka's (1989) examples against forcible inclusion and exclusion as well, since it allows all children to learn about different ways of life in a respectful manner, including their own. Still, according to Okin (1999b), in every form of education, children should learn about liberal human equality, since otherwise, as Sunstein (1999) points out, girls (and others) can develop an internalized subordination that will hinder them from creating a meaningful life they find worth living.

The non-ideal reality

Now that we have looked at the discussion between liberal multiculturalism presented by Kymlicka and liberal feminism presented by Okin let us return to our starting point: Rawls

(1971). In his work on justice, he presents what he calls the ideal and nonideal theories. The ideal theory assumes that everyone will accept the principles that are chosen behind the veil of ignorance and thus will not try to break these principles when they find them less attractive after the veil is lifted. The second assumption in the ideal theory is that everyone can fulfil their basic need so that their moral reason is not hindered. The ideal theory will help form non-ideal principles to create justice in an imperfect world.

For Okin, the ideal theory would assume that children already have moral role models in their parents regarding sex equality. Yet, we know that when the veil is lifted, there will be families with traditional gender roles that do not give children the example they need, according to Okin. So, in the nonideal theory, they would need to learn about sex equality through different means, such as their education. For Kymlicka, minority cultures would live life in accordance with liberal principles of (sex) equality and would be able to receive special rights for external protections. These external protections would also be granted for their children's education as long as no internal restrictions would arise due to these special rights. Yet, once the veil is lifted, we see that internal restrictions are likely to occur. Instead of allowing special education, it would be better to enable all children to follow an education that pays attention to all different ways of life, including their own culture. This way, sex equality can be stimulated while the cultures of the children are acknowledged and respected. By educating children this way, the future of a just society is fostered since children will learn to look at life from different perspectives: a skill necessary to think about morality.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, we asked the question: *In how far can liberal multiculturalism as represented by Kymlicka and liberal feminism as represented by Okin agree upon the state's role in promoting freedom and equality within the education of minors?* To answer this question, Rawls theory of justice was included since it forms the basis for both Kymlicka and Okin. The main problem these three philosophers try to deal with is the conflict that arises in a plural society where everyone's idea of justice is influenced by their own beliefs, preferences, background, etc. Rawls solution to find the principles of justice everyone can agree with, no matter their place in society, came from a thought experiment. In this thought experiment, people ought to imagine themselves behind a *veil of ignorance* where they would forget about all the aspects of their lives that influence how they think about justice. During their time behind the veil, they would not know where they would end up in society. So the people behind the veil would be forced to create a society acceptable for everyone, no matter

which plays one holds. This place, *the original position*, would thus enable people to think about justice from a neutral and fair position. Rawls concluded that those in the original position would agree upon two principles:

“First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p.266).

This thought experiment that both Kymlicka and Okin use to explore the meaning of freedom and equality in a just society. Kymlicka explores the idea that, in a society, certain religious and cultural groups can be ‘the least advantaged’ because they are a minority. Rules that suit the majority can harm the minority group and disable them from living a life that they find worth living. Kymlicka notes it is important to consider our shared community (majority and minority communities) because it is a source of our ideas of a good life, a life worth living. According to him, those behind the veil of ignorance would not create a society where the majority forces all their ideas of a good life upon the minority. Therefore, in correspondence with Rawls’ second principle, Kymlicka argues that minorities should receive special rights that protect their distinct cultural way of living and benefit that minority group. On the other hand, Okin points out the disadvantage of women in both Kymlicka’s and Rawls’ theory and explores the necessities to reach individual equal liberty within the society. She states that, since people in the original position are still aware of general facts about human society, they should also be aware that women have been the least advantaged in both past and contemporary societies. Thus, Okin argues that those behind the veil should pay extra attention to the gender structures within society and consider how a just society should approach these gender structures taking Rawls’ second principle into account. According to her, society should stimulate equal opportunities between the sexes by redesigning some aspects of society. This idea conflicts with traditional ideas on family and society and can in many ways clash with the group rights defended by the multicultural ideal. As we have seen, Okin and Kymlicka entered into a discussion on whether liberal feminism and liberal multiculturalism are allies or enemies. Okin illustrates different examples where gender equality clashes with claims of minority cultural or religious groups and concludes that many group rights based on cultural or religious ideals are anti-feminist as they limit the capacities

of women and girls to live as fulfilling and freely as men and boys. She argues that special rights should never be granted if they make it easier for women and girls to be constrained by groups. Therefore, she believes that Kymlicka overestimates how many groups could gain special rights if they acknowledge and participate in liberal principles. Kymlicka, who by then has developed his theory on groups rights further, agrees with Okin when it comes to the requirement of sex equality in granting group rights. In developing his theory, Kymlicka has distinguished two kinds of group rights: internal restrictions and external protections. With internal restriction, religious and cultural traditions are used to restrict individuals within the group. According to Kymlicka, groups should never be granted special rights when used as an internal restriction. External protections, however, are used to protect other aspects of the minority culture from the influence of the majority culture. These external protections do not need to be a threat to women's equality. Thus, Kymlicka argues that liberal multiculturalists and liberal feminists can be allies since they are fighting a similar battle. Although Okin still stands on her position that feminism and multiculturalism have different priorities, she does conclude that *“we need to strive toward is a form of multiculturalism that gives the issues of gender and other intragroup inequalities their due”* (Okin, 1999b, p.131). Okin points out that Rawls acknowledges that a just society will only remain just if its members continue to develop a sense of justice and act accordingly. Therefore, the stability of a just society depends on the way its children are raised. For Okin, this would mean, in the ideal theory, that children are raised in a family where the parents are role models in sex equality. Yet, she also acknowledges that this will not be the case once the veil has been lifted. This means that children need to learn about sex equality through different means, such as school. However, Kymlicka pointed out that both forced exclusion (segregation) and forced inclusion (integration) in general education could be harmful to students of minority cultures. Solutions Kymlicka offers are the possibility of the following education in different languages, the exemption on dress codes to wear religious clothing and giving minorities the opportunity to organize their own education in accordance with their beliefs. In the last case, education must be organized since Kymlicka is against taking minors out of school to stimulate their commitment to their group. Still, the last solutions of Kymlicka – the exemption on dress codes and the opportunity to organize separate education – can be viewed as internal restrictive. Especially since the children in the last case may lack the exposure to alternative ways of life which they need to make an autonomous decision on how to live their lives as adults. When this is the case, special rights should not be granted, according to Okin and Kymlicka. Instead, all children should receive a liberal education in which they are exposed to

and learn about different religions, cultures and ways of life so that they will be enabled as adults to shape their lives in a way they believe is worth living. This will increase the ability of children to understand morality in such a way as is necessary for the original position since they learn to understand the world from different perspectives. This also leaves room for minority cultures to feel acknowledged through their education since their religion or culture will be part of the curriculum. A non-negotiable aspect of this education must, however, be human equality. So, we can conclude this chapter with the following statement: From both a liberal multiculturalist and a liberal feminist perspective, we can argue for an education in which children learn about different ways of life in the hope they become autonomous adults capable of shaping a life they find worth living.

Chapter 2 | A liberal education

The original position is only a starting point for Rawls (1971) to come to the two principles a social contract ought to have. The political system Rawls has assumed to stand after the veil of ignorance is lifted a constitutional democracy in which people need to continue shaping a just society. In the preface of the revised edition (1971), Rawls shares that the idea of democratic equality inspired him in the design of his principles of justice. It is appropriate then that the basis of Rawls theory – equality and freedom – is also the basis of the democracy he refers to. Still, a just democracy can only remain just and stable if it continues to develop a sense of justice and a desire to act in accordance with justice. As we have seen in the first chapter, this starts with the moral development of children since they will be the ones shaping not only their own life but also the future society. So, in this chapter, we will look at the moral nourishment children need to receive to preserve a stable and just democratic society throughout different generations. However, as Song (2007) points out: “*‘Justice as fairness’ is not a theory of democracy and says little about democratic politics, it is a contribution to democratic theory in that it argues that a democratic political regime is required by justice*” (p.44). So, before we can understand how children can develop into free and equal democratic citizens, it is essential to understand how a liberal democracy should be shaped in an ideal and a non-ideal world. To better understand the shape of liberal democracy, we will look at different democratic theories that will form the basis for our understanding of democratic citizenship. After creating a clear view on liberal democracy and democratic citizenship, we will explore two options of education that may contribute to the moral and liberal development of children into free and equal citizens: citizenship education and humanistic education. At the end of the chapter, the second sub-question of this thesis will be answered, namely the question: *In how far can democratic citizenship education and humanistic education stimulate the liberal feminist, liberal multicultural, and liberal democratic ideals of freedom and equality in the development of minors living in a plural society?*

The ideal and non-ideal promise of free and equal citizens

Let us start by examining the kind of liberal society we need to strive for in accordance with Rawls principles of justice while keeping the feminist and multiculturalist ideas of liberty and equality in mind. One of the people who has already looked into the meaning of democracy while considering the discussion between liberal feminism and liberal multiculturalism is Song (2007). In her book, she tries to understand Rawls idea of a just democratic society. Based on the theory of justice, she states that this democracy must be a society of equals. To

understand what this equality entails, she highlights Rawls conceptions of equality, which shows that, according to Rawls, all people have inherent value and ought to be treated with human respect irrespective of their place in society. So, Song (2007) states that “*when [Rawls] says that his theory of justice is intended ‘for a democratic society,’ he means a society whose members are understood in the political culture as entitled to equal respect*” (pp.44-45). According to Song, equal respect in democratic terms would mean that everyone should have an equal right to participate in collective decision-making. She argues that this can best take place through deliberation. During this deliberation, people participate in a dialogue where they accept that there will be reasonable disagreements on various subjects. To discover the best course of action, they must look beyond ‘their own particular interest, commitments, and identities’ when arguing for an outcome of the dialogue – just like people behind Rawls veil must look at different perspectives. In a deliberative democracy, every citizen gets the chance to be heard, not just people who are part of the majority. Yet, she does acknowledge that liberal deliberative democracy needs to uphold the fundamental rights of freedom and equality:

“On the model of deliberation I’m defending here, for deliberative outcomes to be legitimate, individuals must regard one another as free and equal: free in that they recognize that no particular comprehensive moral or religious view serves as the defining condition of participation or authorization of the exercise of political power, and equal in that they regard one another not just as formally equal in that each is recognized as having equal standing in the political process but also as substantively equal in that their chances to contribute to and influence deliberation are insulated from the existing distribution of power and resources” (pp.69-70).

Here we see the influence of the debate between liberal feminism and liberal multiculturalism: both women and minorities have been disadvantaged when it comes to the ability to exercise political power. In her book, this is visible as she strives for a just society for both cultural minorities and women. According to Song’s model, their ideas and consideration should be considered equally during a dialogue. Yet, she also shows that the problem of inequality in political deliberation needs to be addressed. To truly create a liberal deliberative democracy, it is the state's responsibility to provide the conditions necessary for deliberation. One of these conditions is the people's capacity for deliberation, which can be nourished through education. Song notices that education has another important goal for liberal rights: it makes it more likely that members of any group are part of this group by their own free will. Song (2007)

states: *“Education must play a key role. Children should be taught about their basic constitutional and civic rights so they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime”* (p.162). How education may help with these capacities is not elaborated by Song but is mentioned by another supporter of the deliberative democracy: Benhabib (2002). Benhabib deliberative democratic theory, like Song’s theory, also focuses on the debate between multiculturalists and feminists. In her theory, she argues that pluralist traditions can be compatible with a deliberative democracy model when they accommodate three conditions. The first condition is *egalitarian reciprocity*, in which members of different groups, minorities and the majority, are entitled to the same rights. The second is *voluntary self-ascription* in which adults have to be asked if they *‘accept their continuing membership in their communities of origin’* (p.19) so that membership is not merely based on their origin of birth. The last is *freedom of exit and association* in which people are free to leave their community *and* free to stay a member even when they choose for intergroup relations. In the latter case, the children who come out of these relations should have the right to remain members of their parents' community, if they wish to do so as adults. When it comes to education, Benhabib (2002) states the following:

“I would suggest that [...] any educational system that denies the exposure of children to the most advanced form of knowledge and inquiry available to humankind is unjustifiable. The alternative moral teachings, life-forms, and religious traditions of their own communities can be made available to these children alongside other forms of knowledge. The obligation of the liberal-democratic state is to protect not only ‘the social mobility’ of its young [...], but their equal right to develop their moral and intellectual faculties as full human beings and future citizens as well” (p.123).

She shows that such a broad education as a child is not only necessary to guarantee that they will be able to live as free and equal citizens, but also to secure their understanding of the freedom and equality of other human beings. According to Benhabib, persevering a cultural way of life cannot be morally accomplished by *‘limiting children’s social mobility’* due to a narrow education in which they are not exposed to plurality and human equality. She states: *“Obscurantism is not compatible with moral and political autonomy”* (Benhabib, 2002, p.125). This does not mean that parents lose the right to teach their children about their way of life or that schools belonging to a specific community cannot teach children about their culture and religion. On the contrary, Benhabib argues that they should have the right to teach children about what they believe makes a life worth living, but that they must do so while

giving a broader education that prepares children for society and nourishes their capabilities to live a life as a free and equal citizen of the democracy. Of course, this may lead to contradictions in schools' teachings, but she states that *“it is the mark of human intelligence to learn to deal with such contradictions and tensions”* (Benhabib, 2002, p.125).

We have seen that in a liberal and just democracy, children need to follow a broad education so that they can not only design a life they find worth living but also participate as citizens in the democratic state. However, both Rawls's thought experiment and Song's and Behabib's theory on deliberation seem to be grounded in the idea that people will reach some form of consensus by looking at or from different perspectives – suited to the ideal theory in Rawlsian terms. Yet, we know that this is not the case when it comes to all aspects of society, for example, the subject in this thesis: how children ought to be educated. We will therefore explore a theory suited to our non-ideal world. Due to the plurality within society, Mouffe (2000, 2005) argues for a different view on democracy, stating that a deliberate democracy does not correctly deal with the tension that can arise in a liberal democracy. She is somewhat sceptical about the possibility to reach a consensus, especially when deliberate Democrats hope to reach a consensus on aspects such as morality that transcend procedural agreements. Mouffe states that to reach consensus through deliberation, people should not merely be free and equal, but they need to be reasonable and rational as well. She illustrates this idea by citing Rawls on the subject of legitimacy:

“Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” (Rawls, 1993, p.217; Mouffe, 2000, pp.6-7).

Through deliberation, people ought to consider others as free and equal and should consider reasonable pluralism during their search for consensus. Still, Mouffe argues that a comprehensive consensus without exclusion could never be established in a plural society. So, although Mouffe agrees with the need for a new understanding of democracy, she does not believe that deliberative democracy fulfils this need. Mouffe (2000) states that we should *“realize that taking pluralism seriously requires that we give up the dream of a rational consensus”* (p.12). She believes we must accept that we do not live in an ideal world with an ideal discourse without succumbing to antagonism. When people act from the antagonism, they see people with an opposing view as the enemy that, in some cases, should not even have the right to have these opposing views. Pluralism, according to Mouffe, always holds a

dimension of antagonism since it is ‘inherent in human relations’. Therefore, this aspect must be addressed when looking at a just democracy. Yet, *“the novelty of [pluralist] democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different way in which it is established”* (Mouffe, 2000, p.15). Thus, she proposes another form of democracy and democratic citizenship that can lead to a just society while addressing antagonism: the *agonistic* model of democracy. Agnostic pluralism is what she describes as conflictual consensus, which can be viewed as a symbolic place where people can respect the beliefs of others without letting go of their own beliefs. The people who are viewed as ‘them’ are no longer perceived as enemies, but as ‘adversaries’; *“somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question”* (Mouffe, 2000, p.15). The other, therefore, is an opponent with whom we share common ground: freedom and equality in a liberal democracy. As long as we have this common ground, albeit the different interpretations of the core values of liberal democracy, we can work towards an agnostic model of democracy. The different views on democracy are given in a plural society: *“The democratic character of a society can only be based on the fact that no limited social actor can attribute to herself the representation of the totality and claim to have the ‘mastery’ of the foundation”* (Mouffe, 2000, p.14). Thus, according to Mouffe, there is no one ‘right’ interpretation of liberal democracy and its core values. Still, there are limits of pluralism that can be accepted within a liberal society. Mouffe (2005) writes that democracy *“requires discriminating between demands which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be excluded. A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries”* (p.120).

Before we move to the next part of this chapter, I would like to clarify Mouffe’s theory shortly from two other perspectives: Biesta’s (2011a; 2011b) and Huizinga’s (1998). The idea that liberal democracy is not set in one true description is something philosopher Biesta (2011) agrees with. There is, according to him, not one right interpretation of the form of democracy: the social and political order are always changing and developing. Like Mouffe, Biesta accounts for the changing social and political order through the human quality of plurality. Yet, unlike seeing this quality merely as a difficulty, he states that it is desirable. He says that those who think differently *“reminder [us] that there is always the possibility of a ‘different’ democracy, that is, of a different configuration of the democratic ‘order’”* (Biesta, 2011a, p.3). In a way, we can see the social and political order as an ongoing experiment in which the experiment of democracy can be understood as an ongoing transformation where

private troubles become public issues. Because there are many different forms in which a (liberal) democracy can manifest itself, it is essential to stay open to varying interpretations of democracy. Biesta even views it as a critical aspect of democracy to remain open to different forms of democracy: *“to simply assume that the ‘order’ of democracy can be fully defined and determined may actually go against the idea of democracy itself”* (Biesta, 2011a, p.2). In the ongoing experiment of democracy, people are transformed into democratic subjects that value the two fundamental values of democracy. To him, these values are the same as we discussed before: freedom and quality. The reason for democracy to be fluid and sensitive to change is due to the idea that it is a human invention. This idea is shared by Huizinga (1998); he states that our cultural and political society is a game that humans design. It arises out of our ability and desire to play but is a game that is played in all seriousness. The people who play the game can be allies of opponents, and the goal is to win – individually or as a team of allies. The opponents are viewed as fellow players who recognize and accept the game's rules as true. This is an essential aspect of the game: although humans design it, the players play it in all seriousness. This means that all players, even opponents, have an important place and role within the game. Therefore, the opponents are viewed as fellow players and not as enemies to be destroyed. It is possible for people to either manipulate the game through cheating or to only observe the game as an onlooker without participating. Yet, although these people do not hold productive places within the game, they still acknowledge the reality of the game. Only when a person tries to break the reality of the game he is a real threat to those who play and may be treated so. When we translate Biesta’s and Huizinga’s theories to the theory of Mouffe, we can imagine liberal democracy as an ever-developing game. In this game, all players who acknowledge the rules support the ideal of a liberal democracy regardless of their own interpretation of liberal democracy. The opponents may have a different interpretation but are fellow players in the same game and recognize the same rules. The different people or teams will still want to win the game without destroying their fellow players. This attitude within the game can be viewed as the symbolic place of the agonistic democratic model. Only when people question the liberal democratic values – the game-breakers – are viewed as an actual threat to society.

The nourishment of liberal democratic citizens

Now, when we look at these different stands on democracy, we can wonder what that means for children's education within a liberal society. So far, we have seen that both liberal feminism and liberal multiculturalism accept and encourage the democratic development of

children independent of their parentage. On the one hand, this enables them to choose a life as adults they themselves find meaningful; on the other hand, it enables them to participate in the political dimension of society. The most obvious choice then is to teach children about the core values of liberal democracy – freedom and equality – for themselves and others is through liberal democratic citizenship education. Yet, when there is no one right way of framing liberal democracy and its core values, it is not straightforward how we need to design citizenship education. That is why, when we consider different kinds of citizenship education, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) state the following:

“Indeed, thoughtful analysis requires that those who design curriculum [of citizenship education] and those who study its impact be cognizant of and responsive to these important distinctions [of citizenship] and their political implications. The choices we make have consequences for the kind of society we ultimately help to create” (p.22).

They emphasize that the choices we make in educating our children will influence the future of our society. Thus they ask themselves what kind of citizens we need in our democratic society. They describe three types of ‘good’ democratic citizens that can be nourished through education: personally responsible, participatory, and justice-oriented.⁸ In nourishing the personally responsible citizen, the focus lies on character and compassion — this kind of citizen act responsible by obeying the law, donating, volunteering, and so on. The focus in educating the participatory citizen lies in the relationships and contribution to the community. This kind of citizen understands how government and organizations work and knows how to plan and participate in efforts to help the less fortunate. The development of the justice-oriented citizen focuses on the ability of *“informed analysis and discussion regarding social, political, and economic structures”* (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004, p.5). This citizen will try to understand and analyze different aspects of society and look for structural political problems; they will implement social change and social justice. An example they give to illustrate the different kinds of citizenship is a fundraiser to collect items for the less fortunate. The personally responsible citizen will contribute to the fundraiser by donating these items. The participatory citizen will organize the fundraiser. The justice-oriented citizen will try to address the root cause of the problems that make the fundraiser necessary. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) note that the first form of citizenship is not necessarily exclusive to democracy and can even hinder democracy: *“Indeed, government leaders in a totalitarian regime would*

⁸ Westheimer and Kahne do not intend their list of citizenship types to be exhaustive. They acknowledge that there are multiple political dimensions and theories on democracy that will influence the way in which we view ‘good’ citizenship.

be as delighted as leaders in a democracy if their young citizens learned the lessons put forward by many of the proponents of personally responsible citizenship” (pp.5-6). Thus, they argue that when it comes to educating children as good democratic citizens, we must turn to a combination of participatory and justice-oriented citizenship education: *“Developing commitments for civic participation and social justice as well as fostering the capacities to fulfil these commitments will support the development of a more democratic society”* (p.6). These two forms of citizenship – participatory and justice-oriented – are consistent with the theories of liberal democracy we have discussed earlier in the paper. The participatory citizen will understand the rules of the cultural and political game – they will have the proper understanding of how society and politics are organized and how they can efficiently participate. The justice-oriented citizen will be able to look at society and politics from different points of view and will be able to hold a dialogue on important subjects – an essential aspect from Rawls perspective. Through this, they will be able to find structural problems and strive to solve the cause of the problem, not only the symptoms.

Biesta (2011a; 2011b) also argues that there are different kinds of citizenship and distinguish between citizenship as a social identity and citizenship as a political identity. The first case of citizenship is about the place, and role people hold in life and society. The second case of citizenship is *“having to do with the relationships amongst individuals and individuals and the state, with their rights and duties, and with their participation in collective deliberation and decision making”* (Biesta, 2011b, p.1). When teaching about this later form of citizenship, Biesta makes another division: socialization and subjectification. Through socialization, students learn about the contemporary social and political order. This kind of citizenship education focuses on the reproduction and adaption of this contemporary order. It is about acquiring knowledge, skills, competencies and dispositions to understand and participate in society. In this case, *“education thus becomes a process of socialization through which ‘newcomers’ become part and are inserted into the existing social and political order”* (Biesta, 2011a, p.94). Thus students are being prepared for participating in the contemporary liberal democracy. Through subjectification, the students learn through participation in what Biesta calls ‘the experiment of democracy’. Where socialization is about becoming a citizen in the future, subjectification is about being a citizen while learning about democracy. It is about the experience of being a citizen – not a linear process of becoming a citizen. Students experience what it is to be a citizen, both negative and positive, which can strengthen and weaken the desire for liberal democracy. *“Subjectification is therefore a supplement to the*

existing order because it adds something to this order” (Biesta, 2011, p.95). In the latter form, we see the natural way the social and political order ought to change; thus, this active form of learning about citizenship is more desirable according to Biesta’s theory. When we look at the theories of Westheimer and Kahne, and Biesta, we see similarities between the different kinds of citizenship and the education of citizenship. The personally responsible citizen may be taught about citizenship through socialization: the student learns what a responsible citizen should do, such as obeying the law. The participatory citizen and the justice-oriented citizen are more likely to be thought through subjectification: here, the student learns to take an active part in the social and political domain and the justification used within these domains. When we look at the work of Veuglers, Derriks and Kat (2006), we see that education can be viewed as a place where children are already part of the political and social through their education. Thus, education is a form of subjectification in itself. They state that: *“Education does not merely prepare students for society. Rather, society is already present in the form of the academic content, the students and the teachers”* (p.235). The school itself can be viewed as its own society within the larger national society. This smaller society, or rather people within the school – the students and the teachers – reflect the national society. In contemporary Dutch society, this would mean that it already reflects the liberal democracy and the pluralism present in our society. By learning about plurality through both the curriculum and their surroundings, students learn to deal with and appreciate pluralism within their society (Veuglers, Derriks and Kat, 2006). Of course, the more plurality a school allows within the school; the better children will be able to handle differences.

Humanistic education

We have seen that citizenship education should be focused on *subjectification* to form citizens that participate in and reflect on society. *Still*, we can wonder if this is sufficient in developing children’s liberties once they grow into adults. The goal of citizenship education is to help students find their way within and shape the liberal democracy, but when we look at the liberal theory, we realise that true freedom and equality precedes the social and political order. The children need to be able to develop in a way that allows them to create a life that is worth living for them. This has more facets than merely understanding and involving the liberal democracy. Therefore, I will propose in the last part of this chapter that children not only need liberal democratic citizenship education but also an education in which they can develop and explore themselves. I will argue that humanist education can offer such self-development opportunities to children.

When we want to understand the different traditions of humanistic education, we must turn to the work of Aloni (2007), who has researched the different humanistic traditions. He makes a division between four approaches of humanistic education: the cultural-classical; the naturalistic-romantic; the existential; and the critical radical approach. The cultural-classical approach of humanistic education is based on philosophers from the Greek and Roman classical culture, the renaissance and the enlightenment. These four stages of the development of humanistic education come together in Aloni's understanding of the cultural-classical approach. He summarises the cultural-classical approach as follows:

“In contemporary terminology, the role of education is to expand, deepen, refine and improve our human ways of experience through familiarization with the virtues and achievements of the human spirit as these are manifested in the best masterpieces, writings and deeds of human culture” (Aloni, 2007, p.37).

This kind of education focuses on human excellence and morality: humanity and freedom are the core aspirations in the development of humans. Children must be educated in a way in which they can develop their mind, body and soul. Their relationship with fellow humans and their social responsibility as citizens play an important role in their moral development: they must design a life committed to virtues and values. Here we find the influence of Aristotle's ideal of *eudemonia*: a state of happiness that arises by living a virtuous life, a life in which we can fulfil our fullest potential. As described by Aloni (2007), the cultural-classical approach requires students to take action by striving for a meaningful and moral life in which they can develop ‘their gifts’. When we compare the cultural-classical approach to education with the democratic citizenship education approaches of Westheimer and Kahne (2004) and Biesta (2011), we can find a certain commonality: the stimulation of students to take an active part in the democratic society and to inspire students to evolve the social and political order. In the cultural-classical approach, this, however, seems much more grounded in the moral and personal development of the students. In a way, the cultural-classical approach offers students a moral foundation from which they can understand their social responsibilities as citizens. Yet, it is important to note that the self-development in the cultural-classical approach is aimed at citizenship; fulfilling ones fullest potential is a part of a personas place in society So, although the cultural-classical approach offers a moral foundation for democratic citizenship education, it still neglects to stimulate freedom and equality in a way that precedes the social and political order. This brings us to the second humanistic approach described by Aloni (2007): the naturalistic-romantic approach. The naturalistic-romantic approach started with

the influence of Rousseau's approach toward the education of children in the 18th century and is continued by philosophers throughout the following centuries who his work has influenced. Rousseau believed every human has a unique inner self that naturally wants to move towards moral goodness and personal development. However, this natural tendency can be misguided by the human desire for social success, which causes a self-centred and docile attitude. For this reason, children should be educated away from the influence of society; they should grow up in a natural environment in which they have the room to evolve their natural abilities and authentic self. Although the goal of the naturalistic-romantic approach is similar to that of the cultural-classical approach, it is not the same. The cultural-classical approach looks for universal moral development connected with the world; the naturalistic-romantic approach is more individual. How the goal is reached differs as well. Still, according to Aloni, Rousseau did not aim to destroy the foundation of humanistic education, but *"he aimed to guide education towards a healthier path where man's primal nature is not perceived as an obstacle to human perfection but as the only basis upon which one can rely"* (Aloni, 2007, p.38). According to Rousseau, children's education should be based on intrinsic motivation: the child should be able to explore the world in a way that is fit for a child. Because the education is based on the child's interest, it will be a meaningful experience to learn. By relying on this inner nature, children would be able to reach their full potential. Again we can compare the democratic citizenship educational approaches of Westheimer and Kahne (2004), and Biesta (2011) with the humanistic approach on education Aloni (2007) describes – the naturalistic-romantic approach. This time around, the humanistic educational approach focuses on the students' self-development separate from the social and political order. Human freedom and equality are thus represented in a different way; here, the authenticity of children plays a key role. The inner nature of all children is equally viewed as good – it is not something that has to be shaped through their education. The aspect of freedom in this approach has to do with the individual freedom of the students to develop in accordance with this inner nature, not in relation to their citizenship. So, whereas the cultural-classical approach can be viewed as a foundation and application of citizenship education, the naturalistic-romantic approach of humanistic education should be viewed as a different form of stimulating freedom and equality in the development of students – namely, the freedom and equality that goes beyond the social and political domain. This brings us to the third approach of humanistic education: the existential approach. The existential approach, as described by Aloni (2007), rejects both the core assumptions of humans as rational beings (cultural-classical approach), the assumption that humans have a certain good inner nature (natural-romantic approach) or the

idea that humans are guided by a transcendent power (religious aspects of educational approaches). Instead, it looks at human beings as unburdened from universally or individually fixed paths; they are ultimately free. With this freedom comes the responsibility for humans to create their own identity and life. The meaning of life is not set; it must be made by people themselves. This educational approach is based on existentialist philosophers such as Sartre and Nietzsche. They argue in their work that there is no one right way to live as there is no absolute truth, but that there can be different interpretations of a life worth living. To illustrate, Aloni cites Nietzsche: *“This is my way; where is yours? For the way – that does not exist”* (Aloni, 2007, p.44; Nietzsche, 1974, p.43). It is up to people themselves to define who they are and create a life worth living – they must shape themselves and their environment. This also means that it is not up to the educator to decide what is right or wrong for the student; they must merely empower them *“to become aware of the social forces acting to shape and determine their characters; to extend their personal freedom so that they will be able to see what is possible side by side with what exists”* (Aloni, 2007, p.46). Thus, this approach subscribes even more freedom to humans – and therefore the students – than the previous two approaches of humanistic education. Like the natural-romantic approach, this is mostly aimed at personal freedom, but it differs in the way in which the students can develop themselves. In the natural-romantic approach, children develop themselves naturally based on their inner self; in the existential approach, children must choose how they want to develop themselves – they become the creators of who they are. Yet, like the natural-romantic approach of humanistic education, this approach can be viewed as an addition to citizenship education that proceeds the social and political order. This leaves us at the last of the four approaches: the critical radical approach of humanistic education. According to Aloni (2007), the critical radical approach is aimed at the understanding of and resilience towards phenomena of human exploitation. In this type of humanistic education, children learn to understand, identify, combat and even prevent different ‘social and political trends of oppression’. The critical radical educators

“claim is that we should first and foremost nurture and empower our students with critical awareness, moral sensitivity and political activism. This, they believe, will protect them from the trends of oppression, dispossession and cultural deprivation as well as make them alert and skilled in timely identification of the threatening writing on the wall before they become a reality and tattoo the image of mankind.” (Aloni, 2007, p.51).

This approach has two goals: emancipation and empowerment. This kind of humanistic education comes closest to democratic citizenship education since it is based on an egalitarian and enlightened democracy. The children should learn through this kind of education to participate in the creation of a meaningful, moral and knowledgeable society. It must *“provide young people with a genuine experiencing of freedom, equality, independence, and strength for the sake of influencing and improving their own lives and that of the community”* (Aloni, 2007, p.51). When we look at the critical radical approach of humanistic education next to the democratic citizen approaches by Westheimer and Kahne (2004) and Biesta (2011), we see a similitude in their view on the education of students. In the education of students, they must be offered the opportunity to develop themselves in a way where they can understand society from a critical perspective: they must be enabled to detect, analyse and resolve the core of problems that arise in society. In addition, the critical radical approach, like Biesta’s approach, aims at teaching students through their experience with democracy, or as Biesta would state, by viewing them as current citizens. This approach is also interesting in the light of the discussion of the first chapter: as it focuses on *‘grave problems’* such as discrimination against women and minorities.

Aloni (2007) does not only describe the traditional four humanistic approaches of education, but he also offers an *‘integrative and normative model for humanistic education’*. He describes this approach as complementary to the other approaches, not as disqualifying the previous approaches. Instead, he brings together the different philosophies searching for a humanistic educational approach suited to the 21st century. He shows that, although the approaches differ from each other, they do have two common goals. The first goal is the humanization of humankind, and the second is the humanization of society. In the first goal, educators strive to offer an education in which the students can develop themselves and which enables them to create a full and dignified human life. In the second goal, the focus lies on creating a just society in which the students must take an active part. This educational approach is based on Aloni’s (2007) humanist worldview: *“a worldview and an ethical code that places human wellbeing, freedom, development and dignity as the ultimate human end, beyond all political, religious, ideological and economic ideals and interests”* (p.62). This worldview is essential in the light of the discussion between liberal feminism and liberal multiculturalism. On the one hand, Aloni shows appreciation for human plurality and multiculturalism; on the other hand, he states that not all views should be treated as equally just. According to Aloni, positions that renounce equality, dignity and freedom – the basic

human values – should not be validated. Aloni (2007) states: *“The message is loud and clear: pluralism and multi-culturalism - yes; but not moral relativism according to which ‘anything goes,’ and everything is equally just”* (p.71). This is consistent with the liberal and democratic theories discussed throughout this thesis. We have also seen that democratic citizenship education is a part of different approaches of education, but that humanistic education goes further: it also offers a moral foundation for citizenship; goes beyond the social and political when it comes to personal development; and offers students to create a life which is meaningful to them. Humanistic education, therefore, is in line with the ideals of freedom and equality within a liberal democratic society. Something we can also find in Aloni’s (2007) description of humanistic education:

“Humanistic education is characterized by general and multi-faceted cultivation of the personality of those being educated, in a climate of intellectual freedom and respect for human dignity, towards the best and highest life of which they are capable in three fundamental domains of life: as individuals who harmoniously and authentically realize their potential, as involved and responsible citizens in a democracy, and as human beings who enrich and perfect themselves through active engagement with the collective achievements of human culture” (Aloni, 2007, p.77).

Education and philosophies of life

In his explanation of humanism, Aloni (2007) writes the following: *“humanism posits Man [...] at center stage of existence and considers the enhancement of human development, freedom, well-being and dignity as the ultimate goal, above and beyond all others - be they religious, national, ideological or economic”* (p.63). Thus, Aloni states that humanistic, and to extend humanistic education, goals go *beyond religious goals*. He points out that, in some cases, humanistic (education) goals can be opposed to religious (education) goals. We can also see this in Felderhof, Thompson and Torevell (2007), a collection of essays that argue (Christian) truth should be thought as the Truth and not as one of many philosophies life valid. According to Felderhof (2007b), the problem is that teaching multiple views of life as possible truth causes religion to become merely a potential hypothesis. He states that educating multiple perspectives of truth deceives students into an a-religious understanding of religion. This deception can take place both while a teacher is either aware or unaware: *“Of course, the self-consciously agnostic and atheist could offer the moral excuse for this deception, namely, that they were deceiving their pupils into what they believe to be the agnostic or atheistic ‘truth’”* (Felderhof, 2007b, p.97). So, instead of educating students about

religion by teaching them about multiple philosophies of life, they should be thought about life from a religious point of view. Similar arguments are made by Thiessen (2007), Fleming (2007), Wright (2007), Thompson (2007) and Lloyd (2007). They state that religious education should inspire students to live according to religious beliefs. Fleming (2007) describes the goals of religious education as the following: *“to explore and encounter God, to experience the sacred, to search for faith, to call people to live spiritually”* (p.112). This should be done by nourishing students with a religious tradition that is thought to them as Truth as it cannot be done from a liberal perspective. The authors named above argue that a liberal education of religion hinders the spiritual development of the students. Like Felderhof, they argue that liberal education causes ‘agnosticism and theological relativism’ and creates the danger of students not believing in anything at all. Lloyd (2007) goes as far as stating that *“it is deeply confused and irresponsible to pass on the task of deciding whether a religion has any truth to a child”* (p.33). The authors seem to agree that religious education should make a religious claim of the students and guide them to an understanding of that religious truth. The authors do not specify what the religious truth is – of course; this depends on the religion students are educated in. However, throughout this thesis, we have seen that non-liberal religious education can be harmful towards people's personal, social, and political freedom and equality. This danger is also recognized by Aloni (2007):

“The basic assumption of orthodox religious perceptions, not to mention fundamentalist ones, is that divine truth which originates in revelations and the holy writ is absolute and eternal and obliges human beings to live according to it, whether it is compatible with their worldview or not. Should they not obey, God and his authorized earthly representatives will settle accounts with them” (p.64).

In the introduction, we could read about a contemporary example of this danger: the story of Lale Gül. This kind of escalation is something humanistic and liberal education strive to prevent. Yet, humanistic education is not anti-religious since it presumes all humans belong to a ‘family of man’ and looks for a basis of humanity based on the principles of equality and dignity for all – religious and non-religious. Aloni states that at least some forms of religions can dwell in harmony with a humanistic worldview, although the essence of the worldviews differs. Therefore, this thesis is not arguing against religious education necessarily, but for a broader education that enables students to freely and equally create a life that is meaningful to them – religious or not. Like Benhabib (2002) argued, this can coexist with religious education even when the two contradict each other. Through education, students, therefore,

learn to shape their own path. Or, as beautifully formulated by Nietzsche: “*Now I bid you to loose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you... with a different love shall I then love you*” (Aloni, 2007, p.45; Nietzsche, 1968, p.190).

Conclusion

At the begging of this chapter, we asked the question: *In how far can democratic citizenship education and humanistic education stimulate the liberal feminist, liberal multicultural, and liberal democratic ideals of freedom and equality in the development of minors living in a plural and democratic society?* To answer this question, we started exploring the kind of just democracy Rawls could have referred to. Since Rawls uses a form of deliberative democracy in his thought experiment of the original position, we first looked at the idea of deliberative democracy as explained by Song and Benhabib. Song argues that in good dialogue, the participants look at different perspectives through which they reach a decision. The process of decision making through deliberation can, according to Song, only work if freedom and equality are upheld. It is especially important that those who have been disadvantaged are heard during the deliberation – such as both women and minority groups. Benhabib argues that pluralist traditions are only compatible with deliberative democracy when they meet three conditions: the traditions must be egalitarian reciprocity; the adult members must voluntary be part of the group, and there must be freedom of exit and association. Both Song and Benhabib argue that to match these conditions, education must play a key role in the upbringing of children: they must be able to develop their abilities to take part in society and design their life in a way they find meaningful. In this aspect, they agree with Okin and Kymlicka, who both argue for freedom and equality as core aspects in children's education. To Benhabib, this means that children’s education cannot be limited for the sake of preserving a cultural way of life. However, the cultural way of life can be taught alongside education that enables children to become free and equal citizens. Song and Benhabib, based on Rawls, assume that people will reach some form of consensus through deliberation. Knowing this is not always the case in practice, we turned to Mouffe’s idea of agnostic democracy as a way of approaching plurality within our society. In the agnostic democracy, people can approach people with different beliefs as adversaries: although they can disagree with people's ideas, they do not question the right to defend those beliefs. This way, people do not see ‘the other’ as an enemy that must be destroyed. Together with Biesta’s and Huizinga’s theory, we see that democracy can be viewed as a fluent order – even the interpretation of the core principles of the liberal democracy (freedom and equality) can differ. Thus, the liberal democracy can change and

develop over time: in a sense, the plurality can therefore be an asset to democracy, since *“to simply assume that the ‘order’ of democracy can be fully defined and determined may actually go against the idea of democracy itself”* (Biesta, 2011a, p.2). Yet, there are limits to what democracy can accept: those who break the reality of democracy by rejecting its core values altogether can be seen and treated as a danger for the democracy itself. Looking at these different views on democracy raised the question of how the personal and political freedom and equality of children can be protected through education. We started with considering democratic citizenship education to give children the opportunity to develop capabilities to ensure their freedom and equality in society. Here the three kinds of citizenship by Westheimer and Kahne – the personally responsible citizen, the participatory citizen and the justice-oriented citizen – and the two kinds of citizenship by Biesta – citizenship as social identity and political identity – were discussed. Westheimer and Kahne stated that citizenship education should strive for a combination of the participatory and justice-oriented citizen: a citizen actively involved in democracy and that looks at the root of the problems that arise in society. Biesta favoured an education in which citizenship is viewed as political identity and thought through subjectification: the students need to find their way in the democracy by already being viewed and treated as a citizen. Although these forms of democratic citizenship education nourish students' capability to participate in a liberal democracy – independent of the interpretation of its core values – we were left to wonder if freedom and equality would precede the social and political order. To help children develop the capacities to create a meaningful life, we looked at the possibilities humanistic education could offer. Here we focused on the theoretical understanding of humanistic education by Aloni. Based on Aloni's work, we looked at four different humanistic approaches – the cultural-classical; the naturalistic-romantic; the existential; and the critical radical approach – which came together in his integrative and normative model for humanistic education. In relation to merely giving democratic citizenship education, this approach could offer a moral basis for citizenship and room for personal development in both the social and political order and beyond. Even though this form of education can contradict religious education, they can coexist. The liberal humanistic education offers the freedom, equality and dignity to create a life the students find worth living – religious or non-religious. So, we can conclude this chapter with the following statement: Humanistic education can integrate democratic citizenship education and offer students a foundation of moral understanding and stimulate the liberal ideals of freedom and equality present in liberal feminism, liberal multiculturalism and liberal democracy.

Conclusion | Education for free and equal citizens

The cause of this thesis was the stories of Lale Gül and Franca Treur, who described the limited, liberal democratic influence they received as minors growing up in a religious and cultural minority. This limitation was caused by the lifestyle of their families, which were based on one religion and culture and rejected all other influences. Such limitations minors experience while growing up can cause them to experience less freedom and equality than the majority within society. This raised the aim of this thesis: to understand how a liberal democracy can morally respond to such limitations, especially within the education of minors. Therefore, the following central question was proposed in the introduction: *What role can a democratic state play in children's education if we focus on the values of freedom and equality from liberal perspectives on multiculturalism, feminism and humanism?*

The search for an answer started with exploring the liberal ideas of Rawls. Like we did in this thesis, he wondered how to define a just society when we all have different views on justice. It was exactly this subjectivity Rawls tried to eliminate through his theory of justice. To do this, people had to imagine themselves behind a *veil of ignorance* where they forgot the aspects of themselves that could influence their vision of justice. Rawls believed that people in this *original position* would come to two principles through objective deliberation to create a society that is just for everyone. The first principle grants everyone equal liberty; the second argues that inequality may only exist when they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged *and* if all citizens have an equal opportunity to reach positions in society. This second principle plays an important role in the discussion between liberal multiculturalists and liberal feminists. Kymlicka, who argues from a liberal multicultural position, argues that it is minority groups who have been the least advantaged in society; inequality in society should therefore be to the greatest benefit of minority groups. He shows that inequality can be used to preserve the different aspects of a minority culture that would otherwise be lost. The loss of a minority culture, according to Kymlicka, would influence not only equal liberty but also the ability of members to create a meaningful life. That is to say that the context of our life matters in the way humans create meaning in their life, thus cultural membership matters. When it comes to the education of minors, it is therefore important to think about the consequences of both forcible inclusion and exclusion. In some cases, it may be in the student's best interest if the education is based on their religion and culture. Okin, who argues from a liberal feminist position, argues in connection to Rawls's second principle that women have been the least advantaged in society. She believes that those behind the *veil of ignorance*

cannot ignore that women have experienced inequality and less freedom than men in both our past and present. Therefore, when designing a just society, extra attention should be paid to the place of women in society. One of the consequences would be promoting and teaching gender equality in the education of minors. After all, Rawls states that a just society can only continue to exist if humanity maintains to develop a sense of justice. Okin, therefore, states that a liberal society should never allow a confined upbringing that blocks the students' freedom and equality in later life. Now, Kymlicka and Okin are familiar with each other's work and have participated in a debate on the liberal society. The debate started when Okin argued that all cultures, but especially the minority cultures within Western societies, carried many aspects that are bad for women in that they limited the capacities of women and girls to have a fulfilling and free life. She gave multiple examples of special rights to preserve the minority culture that was never in the best interest of women – the least advantaged group in both minority and majority cultures. She argues that, when giving special rights to minorities, one must always consider the possible inequality it causes or sustains in the minority group. These claims were no cause for a heated debate: Kymlicka agreed with Okin in general. He stated that we need to distinguish between two kinds of special rights within a liberal approach: the rights that cause internal restrictions and the rights that pursue external protections. Internal restrictions of members within the minority culture should never be allowed, but external protections (such as language preservation) can still be desirable in the light of a liberal society. This answers part of the main question, namely that liberal democracy should indeed be involved in children's education. The search for an answer to the main question continued by considering how the liberal democratic ideals – equality and freedom – ought to be included in education. This started with exploring how a liberal democratic society ought to be shaped. Although Rawls's theory was inspired by liberal democracy, he did not elaborate how this society looked like. We, therefore, turned to the liberal theory of Song and Benhabib, who argue for a deliberative society. After all, Rawls thought experiment was based on deliberation based on different perspectives. Song argued that in a liberal society, all people are entitled to equal respect through equal participation in collective decision-making. She argued that this decision-making ought to occur through deliberation where everyone has an equal right to be heard: members of the majority and minority, men and women. To arrive in a society where everyone has the opportunity to be heard, some key conditions need to be met. One key condition is education: Students must understand their constitutional and civic rights and must be able to develop the capacities to participate in a deliberation. Benhabib agrees on education's key role in a liberal deliberative

democracy. She argues that students have the right to learn about different philosophies of life, which goes further than offering the opportunity to participate in the social and political domain of life; she also understands this form of education as an opportunity to develop in the personal domain, for the students to develop ‘as full human beings. Therefore, special educational rights should never be used to limit the mobility of the students in life. This is very much in line with the synthesis we drew from the discussion between Okin and Kymlicka: special rights in education can never be a form of internal restriction. However, the theories of Song and Benhabib are grounded on the idea that people will be able to come to a consensus through deliberation. In our non-ideal world, this is not always the case – think of the authors that contributed to the bundled book by Felderhof, Thompson and Torevell, who argued that a brought liberal education would harm the spiritual development of the students. To understand the liberal democracy from the point of view of a non-ideal world, we turned to the work of Mouffe. Mouffe argues that the deliberative form of democracy does not recognize the tension that can arise within a liberal democracy; due to the plurality within our society, it is impossible to reach a rational consensus on all aspects of society. In a way, democracy will always have an antagonistic character. Yet, when we want to have a just and functional democracy, we ought to strive for an agnostic form of democracy. Through an agnostic approach, we see those opposed to our ideas not as enemies that need to be destroyed but as adversaries with whom we may not agree but who are entitled to defend their ideas. Mouffe, together with Biesta, acknowledges that the interpretation of the liberal principles – freedom and equality – may even differ from the different members of the liberal society. Still, there are limits to this approach: when the other renounces the liberal democracy, they may be excluded from the democratic debate. These theories logically lead to the idea of democratic education as a mechanism to stimulate liberal democratic principles in the way students are educated. Here we explored the ideas of Westheimer and Kahne, and Biesta. Westheimer and Kahne distinguished three kinds of citizens: the personally responsible citizen, the participatory citizen and the justice-oriented citizen. The first kind of citizen was not exclusive to the liberal democracy since they moral aspects such as obedience and helpfulness. Thus, Westheimer and Kahne turned to the other two forms of citizenship: the participatory citizen who understands how society and politics work and could respond to problems within society; and the justice-oriented citizen who can detect, understand and deal with the core of problems within society. Biesta distinguished between citizenship as a social identity and a political identity. According to Biesta, citizenship ought to focus on citizenship as a political identity, which can happen through socialization of subjectification.

Socialization focuses on future citizenship and integrating into the liberal democracy. Subjectification focuses on current citizenship and allows for the evolution of democracy. The latter is preferred to the former since democracy should, according to Biesta, be viewed as an ongoing experience where there is no one right form. Since citizenship education mainly occupies itself with the social and political domain, we continued to explore the possibilities of education to stimulate students in their personal liberty through humanistic education. We turned to the analysis of Aloni, who divided humanist education into four movements: the cultural-classical; the naturalistic-romantic; the existential; and the critical radical approach. The cultural-classical approach focuses on developing the virtues and achievements of their students so that they may fulfil their greatest potential in human society. The naturalistic-romantic approach focuses on a meaningful and full development of the students' authentic and good inner self away from societal pressure. The existential approach focuses on the freedom and empowerment of students to design a life that is meaningful to them. The critical approach enables students to understand phenomena of human exploitation and equality and build resilience towards such phenomena. These different approaches came together in Aloni's 'integrative and normative model for humanistic education'. The citizenship educational approaches by Westheimer and Kahne, and Biesta could be integrated into this model of humanistic education. The humanistic approach offered a moral foundation for citizenship and stimulated students' personal, social and political development through which they can direct their own lives in a meaningful way. Now, I have argued that this form of education does not replace religious or cultural education but can coexist even when it creates contradictions in the education of minors. The coexistence of such education can still be viewed as an unacceptable limitation by some minority groups. Still, it cannot be morally denied in a liberal democracy in which people have the right to design a life they find worth living. Thus, when we return to the main question, I would like to conclude that liberal democracy has a moral obligation to offer education to all minors through which they can develop the personal, social, and political aspects of their life from the basis of freedom and equality that will enable them as adults to live a life they find worth living – an education that offers this opportunity is humanistic education which can be used as an addition to other forms of education.

Discussion | Moral objectivity or moral subjectivity

This paper offered arguments for the liberal education of minors so they could develop equally and freely through humanistic education. It is important to note that these arguments were made from a liberal democratic perspective – one of many different visions of a just society. This perspective has been criticized – both from within and without – and cannot universally claim moral truth. Of course, the foundation of this paper – Rawlsian theory – tries to make such a universal claim. Yet, Rawls has been accused of claiming Western ideals as universal – not considering that his own Western background influences his execution of the thought experiment in his own work. This thesis did not examine this critique nor defend against it. It aimed at exploring the justice of education of minorities within the contemporary liberal democracy – the arguments in this paper were based on these ideals. Of course, my own background was visible throughout the paper as well since I have little concern for ‘the immortal soul’ – and let us be honest, if all religions are correct, we are all doomed anyway since one often has to believe in the only right religion to end up in paradise, but that is a discussion of another time. Of course, as mentioned before, this thesis does not argue against religious and cultural education. Still, it does argue that it should not limit the influence to which minors are exposed. One final point I would like to highlight as a limitation of this thesis is the possible critique the feminist Okin could have had on Aloni. Like Rawls, he draws much inspiration from philosophers whose theories could be qualified as sexist, such as Rousseau, who had a different perspective on girls' education (opposed to boys' education). However, like Rawls theory, we may translate the theories used by Aloni in a way that respects and even promotes gender equality. Overall, the argumentation within this thesis could be further explored and defended – although one might need multiple books to make it ‘foolproof’. To put it in Nietzsche’s words: *“This is my way; where is yours? For the way – that does not exist”* (1974, p.43). Either way: I hope you enjoyed reading the thesis and can take something away from it.

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